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The Fleet Battle Experiments (FBE) are CNO-initiated series of operational experiments for the purpose 
of examining emerging systems, technologies and concepts. The Maritime Battle Center (MBC) of the 
new Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) is the CNO's agent for planning and implementing 
these experiments in conjunction with the numbered Fleets. FBE-E is the fifth in the series and is under 
the operational sponsorship of Commander Third Fleet (COMTHIRDFLT) in San Diego. The Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) performed assessment for FBE-E during March and April 1999. 
CONCEPTS AND EXPERIMENT APPROACH 
NPS has performed assessments for several Joint Warrior lnteroperability Demonstrations (JWIDs) and 
routinely for the ONR Adaptable Architecture for Command and Control (A2C2) laboratory experiments. 
NPS personnel were also involved in the All-Service Combat Identification Evaluation Team field tests in 
1995 & 1996. The Modular C2 Evaluation Structure (MCES) is a tool developed at NPS in conjunction 
with the Military Operations Research Society (MORS) for stepping through quantitative assessments 
that has applicability for FBE-E. NPS has conceptually applied the MCES in helping to define measures 
to gauge the success of each of the major areas ofFBE-E. 
Although the FBEs are labeled Experiments, they are not laboratory experiments but are operational 
experiments or better yet, explorations of new concepts, technologies and processes. In FBEs to date 
there have seldom been opportunities for experimental replication (several runs under controlled 
conditions) or control groups that constitute the standard case or experimental designs that systematically 
vary the very large number of factors in the operations. Usually the base case or standard is simply the 
"usual process and results". Perhaps more important than whether the specific experimental processes 
worked in this FBE, are the insights into how they can be made better for the next FBE. 
MAJOR RESULTS 
• Embarkation of the MIUW Van extended organic and inorganic sensor range and allowed it to be 
used in the Littoral Zone of Interest without having to establish a secure rear area for MIUWU protection. 
• Utilization of the UAV for detection, identification, and tracking had remarkable value. High 
quality imagery of mobile targets was almost continuously available to the Harbor Defense Commander, 
Full Dimension Protection Cell and others. A combat swimmer was detected by the UAV while at 
altitude. 
• Changes in tactics that compensates for arc and range of fire and improved identification methods 
are needed to prevent fratricide ofHV A defenders and take into account possible collateral damage both 
over water and ashore. 
• NCASW increased force situational awareness through distributed advance search plans. 
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• Reliable networked communications are essential for Distributed Collaborative planning (DCP) 
inNCASW. 
• Common tactical decision aids and common understanding of the DCP process 
are enhance the update of situational awareness required for NCASW. 
• Laws demonstrated flexibility and ease of use. While the system was by no means fully exploited, 
it performed well for the functions utilized during this experiment. 
• Deconfliction requires further investigation. DAMS was not successfully electronically interfaced 
to LAWS. Full implementation of algorithmic procedural deconfliction in LAWS may yield improvement 
over current methods and be more efficient than DAMS. Any deconfliction system requires an adequate 
visualization tool to be useful. No methods currently address latency issues. 
• Naval Surface Precision Fires weapons currently in use or programmed are not useful in the 
Urban Canyons. 
• NCASW increased force situational awareness through distributed advance search plans. 
• Reliable networked communications are essential for Distributed Collaborative planning (DCP) 
inNCASW. 
• Common tactical decision aids and common understanding of the DCP process are enhance the 
update of situational awareness required for NCASW. 
• DARPA One Way Multi-Lingual Interview System shows promising utility. 
• The Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE) using 
proprietary software SoftRisk enabled interface with CMOC's similar information system based on Lotus 
Notes with the emergency response network. 
• WMD identification, real time METOC data, and real time feed ofWMD indications/ 
warnings/analysis are required for command management ofWMD. 
EXPERIMENTATION ISSUES 
The process of naval concept development is supported by experimentation, partially in the FBEs, but 
also in games and LOEs. In order to perform even operational experiments, an analytical framework, 
which identifies the issues to be addressed and the possible indications of the results, is required. 
Therefore FBE's have identified hypotheses and measures of effectiveness. Although to a large extent 
these have not been testable, it is largely because the treatments (new systems to be introduced) and the 
conditions (the scenario and fleet actions) have not been able to be accomplished in the actual FBE. 
Experimentation requires an experimental test bed. In FBE-Echo circumstances did not allow dedicated 
experimentation along the lines planned. Moreover many of the planned new systems were either not 
available or not serviceable in the environment. Future FBEs must be protected from these factors if the 
results are to be complete and credible. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
Further testing of :MIUW Units on mobile platforms is indicated. Improved communications and sensor 
architectures and network connectivity require further study. 
Methods and or tactics for protection of HV A that minimize collateral damage and guard against 
fratricide need to be developed and evaluated. 
Fully integrate UA V control into the command network to enhance dynamic and broad use of a valuable 
tactical sensor. 
Further experimentation on network centric antisubmarine warfare to include integration into the full 
dimension protection concept and also to include tracking of white shipping. 
Deconfliction methods integrated into the weapons network that are visual and simply displayed should 
be developed and evaluated in future experiments. 
Command and Control policy and architectures for sensors and sensor coverage need to be developed and 
evaluated. Develop and use an automated method of cueing of changes in command and control posture 
and sensor allocation. This could facilitate timely and dynamic reallocation of sensors in the grid to 
adequately response to changing threat levels in the battlespace. 





FBE Echo was defined by high-level goals from which lower level or more detailed operational 
concepts called themes were developed. Using these themes, hypotheses and measures were 
enumerated. This conceptual framework contributed to the construction of a data-capture plan 
and follow-on evaluation. 
In general, when dealing with complex systems, system complexity increases as the focus moves 
from the abstract concepts to the system components. One impact of this complexity continuum 
is a necessity for the data gathering and analysis processes to become similarly complex. FBE 
Echo provided an opportunity to determine the scope of data gathering and evaluation 
requirements and to study how they might be refined for implementation in future experiments. 
The Naval Postgraduate School effort for data collection in FBE Echo was an experiment within 
an experiment. The effort was geared to integrate the development of the assessment plan and the 
development of the data capture plan with the development of the experiment plan. 
The complexity of the experiment planning process however as well as the dynamics of the 
changes to execution plans resulted in mismatch between scheduled events and the data collection 
plan. In some cases assets were required for experimental uses that incapacitated scheduled data 
capture without the knowledge of the assessment team until well after the fact. 
These experiences highlight the need for using an autonomous data capture scheme coupled with 
a data archival system and knowledge management methodologies to maximize support for 
updating analysis of initiatives. A single experiment does not produce the quantity of data for a 
full analysis of any one initiative. There is much useful data both qualitative and quantitative that 
can be gleaned from an experiment. NPS is in the process of developing the data archive 
capability to capitalize on the incremental addition of data and knowledge management 
\methodologies for subsequent initiative analysis update. 
DATA CAPTURE TECHNOLOGY AND METHODS 
An outcome of Fleet Battle Experiments is that the design of data capture methods and 
technologies are improved as the experiments are executed. What will accomplish the data 
capture task in any given experiment is the result of something learned in a previous experiment, 
or part of a well-established methodology taken from the domains of military exercise data 
collection. However, complex experiments, such as FBE Echo require multiple data capture 
methods. 
Quantitative (electronic) and qualitative data were gathered in the course ofFBE Echo. 
Quantitative data was recorded to establish "ground truth" in asymmetric interactions, which 
could then be used for modeling analysis and as part of further development of simulations. Two 
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principal means employed to gather this data were GPS (Global Positioning System) and ADS!. 
(Air Defense System Integrator). 
Portable (hand-held) GPS units were procured (approximately 20) for use by asymmetric forces, 
JTF PSU (Port Security Unit) boats and by two rental trucks posing as mobile SCUD-type missile 
launch platforms. The GPS units were equipped with a detachable memory on which GPS 
positions were recorded for a prescribed time step. A difficulty with this technology was that as 
the time-step was shortened, available memory for the platform's track was used more quickly, 
resulting in shorter times between change-out of memory. Detachable memory was downloaded 
from each GPS unit onto a laptop, for use in reconstructing a particular unit's track. 
ADSI is a LINK integrator device, which fuses together inputs from LINK-11 and LINK-16 and 
presents a common operational (LINK) picture to the JTF Commander. USS CORONOADO 
was equipped with ADSI in FBE Echo, and the system output was an input to the COP (Common 
Operational Picture) in the Full Dimension Protection cell. ADSI has a data-recording feature 
that records LINK reports and stores them for later retrieval and data reduction. This database 
was retrieved post-exercise for analysis and reconstruction. 
Qualitative data was gathered through multiple means and instruments. Each experiment pillar 
was defined around a set of concepts stated as hypotheses. Many of these hypotheses required 
observational data, questionnaires or debriefings. In addition, collaborative logs were collected 
where used. For example, COMPASS was used as a distributed collaborative planning tool 
between the Full Dimension Protection (FDP) cell on CORONADO and other units in the 
experiment. The log of these communications was collected at the end of the experiment. 
Similarly, an electronic log was maintained in the FDP cell and provided an excellent source of 
information for post-experiment analysis. 
Questionnaires were developed relevant to specific participants in specific types of events, and 
filled out at the end of each event. These were used extensively in asymmetric events as a means 
to debrief OPFOR participants. Questionnaires were also constructed for various watch-stander 
roles throughout the experiment, but were less effective at gathering information. 
Debriefings of participants in asymmetric attack, WMD targeting events, UAV support and other 
cells were particularly valuable in establishing the context of the experiment and contributed a 
great deal to the insights gained in the experiment. 
DATA ARCHIVING, MODELING AND KNOWLEDGE 
MANAGEMENT 
There is a tendency to treat major experiments as independent events, which produce final results 
for a specific set of questions. But, FBE concepts are broad and require a succession of 
experiments before obtaining fmal answers. We expect experimentation to lead to modification 
of many aspects of the operations concepts being tested over time. Concepts, procedures, 
systems, etc., will all be in evolution. This makes it important to have an analysis system, which 





• Embarkation of the MIUW Van extended organic and inorganic sensor range and allowed 
it to be used in the Littoral Zone of Interest without having to establish a secure rear area for 
MIUWU protection. 
• Utilization of the UAV for detection, identification, and tracking had remarkable value. 
High quality imagery of mobile targets was almost continuously available to the Harbor Defense 
Commander , Full Dimension Protection Cell and others. A combat swimmer was detected by the 
UAV while at altitude. 
• Changes in tactics that compensates for arc and range of fire and improved identification 
methods are needed to prevent fratricide of HV A defenders and take into account possible 
collateral damage both over water and ashore. 
CONCEPT 
Mission Concept: Harbor Defense, Maritime Pre-positioned Force Protection (protection of 
High Value Assets (HV A) at sea or at offshore anchorage or in port) against asymmetric threats 
from combat swimmer attacks is a requirement in the asymmetric environment. 
Operations Methods: Employ a boat with specialized sensors and flexible command and 
control capability to protect against asymmetric threats in port, at offshore anchorage, or in other 
littoral areas. 
Use response forces in a layered defense to include armed patrol boats and Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal units under the command of the specialized boat to increase speed of response and 
defensive posture. 
Use real time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data to achieve greater battlespace 
situational awareness to improve speed of command. 
System Solutions: Slice boat, MIUWU (Maritime Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit) Van, 
Swimmer detection system, and Hand held sonar. 
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SUMMARY 
MIUWU maneuverability was enhanced by being placed aboard an afloat unit (termed the SLICE 
boat). By being embarked the MIUWU was less vulnerable as a moving target and was able to 
relocate as needed, extending organic and inorganic sensor range. Embarkation also allowed the 
use of MIUWU in the Littoral Zone of Interest without having to establish a secure rear area for 
MIUWU protection. 
However, it was also determined that some equipment did not function well on this mobile 
platform. A result from this experiment is that MIUWU equipment should be evaluated for use 
while embarked on a mobile platform. The evaluation should consider all expected mechanical 
issues, electronic functions and environmental effects. For example, contact with the MIUWU 
was lost when the SLICE boat accelerated. There were inherent satellite targeting problems 
associated with a moving platform, as well as stabilization issues with other equipment. Solutions 
to these problems would provide the JTF with an enhanced MIUWU capability, to be tested in a 
future FBE. 
Defenders aboard an anchored high-value asset were confused about which boats to shoot when 
high-speed boats attacked the high-value asset and defending PSU boats engaged the attackers. 
Inshore Boat Unit (ffiU) and Port Security Unit (PSU) assets need some form of IFF or tactic to 
separate themselves from the threat vessels. 
Fratricide is a risk when the fields of fire for the ffiU's and PSU's overlap during maneuvering to 
intercept incoming attackers. Fire directed from the high value unit against attackers may also be 
dangerous to a defending mu or PSU not easily identified or too close to an attacking boat. This 
risk is multiplied in poor visibility due to weather or at night. The PSU's attempted to use the 
tactic of staying close to the HVU and using overlapping fire on attackers. Another tactic, 
"peeling off" away from attacking craft to allow the HV A to bring its defensive fire to bear was 
also attempted by the PSU's. Both tactics were demonstrated to be problematic in practice, 
leading to a post experiment definition of need for some form of electronic identification to be 
instantly recognized by both the HV A and defending units. A time-sensitive targeting concern is 
that there is a very limited time in which defending crews can respond to attacking fire. 
Indications and warnings provided by a system, which also provides identification information, 
might decrease the overall response time by reducing the identification time. 
An overriding hypothesis for FBE Echo was that network-centric concepts could be used to 
advantage in the asymmetric environment. Indeed, from the MIUWU perspective this unit was 
able to use multiple sensors to detect, track and identify a jet-ski attack on a HV A at anchor in the 
littorals. However, from the PSU perspective there were problems related to the receipt and 
effectiveness of commands between the MIUWU and controlled units. Examination of message 
traffic loading during this portion of the experiment revealed very high message rates. However, 
PSUs noted in post-experiment questionnaires that very little of these communications were 
useful in their conduct of HV A defense and that there were limited pre-attack warnings. Poor 
communications between the MIUWU and PSU' s contributed to the C2 difficulty and was 
evidenced by several of the boat drivers' inquiry as to whether jamming had been conducted by 
the OPFOR. Specifics related to this problem need to be defined. However, a more readily 
identifiable contributor to C2 problems the lack of headsets for PSU's to maintain two-way 
communication between themselves or MIUWU. Holding a handset while executing high-speed 
maneuvers is problematic at best. In post-experiment interviews PSU crews reported they reacted 
to self-identified in-theater threats, followed by execution of pre-planned tactics. The extent to 
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which MIUWU provided situational awareness to defending units seems to have been limited due 
to a combination of difficulties. A limited objective experiment may help identify specifics of C2 
system problems and provide insight to deconfliction tactics and technology. 
As part of the WMD scenario, EOD-HQ tested CD-ROM analysis software and communications 
paths to provide this information to the field. Included in this communications system were 
TECDIV at Indian Head (?), the WMD cell aboard Coronado, EOD-HQ itself and the Response 
Team. The system was to provide historical images ofWMD systems and a record of 
communications related to the present situation. The capability of this system could not be fully 
tested or demonstrated due to the lack of a satellite channel and poor RF conditions. Further 
complicating the WMD problem, Response Teams did not have chemical sniffers or other 
technical means to assess the threat on sight. Identification of these additional technical means 
and further tests are indicated, along with improvement in the C2 architecture to support 
connectivity between the multiple sources which are necessary to assess and neutralize the threat. 
Swimmers attack against the HV A is another possible threat in the asymmetric environment, and 
defense against this threat was tested in FBE Echo. As part of a swimmer defense, a hand-held 
sonar has been developed but was unavailable for this experiment. Without the added 
technology, PSU's adopted a tactic of dropping overlapping grenade concussion patterns, but 
these actions did not result from swimmer detection, indications by any sensor or direction by the 
HV A or MIUWU. This part of the experiment highlighted the need for further testing of new 
equipment and tactics to counter this type of threat. 
During early formulation of concepts of operations in response to asymmetric threats for the San 
Francisco Bay phase of the experiment, use of defensive helicopters in a ready five state would 
provide a major defensive capability. An initial definition of the concept was modeled using the 
General Campaign Analysis Model (GCAM). Model analysis demonstrated that if the helicopter 
was not airborne at the time of threat designation the helicopter would not be positioned to effect 
intercept. The impact of this early analysis was that helicopters were then not tested in the 
defensive tactic weapons for these scenarios. 
MEASURES AND OBSERVATIONS 
Hypothesis 1: Combat swimmers can be detected by the Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare 
Unit (MIUWU) and other swimmer detection systems and countered by coordinated operations of 
the Port Security Unit (PSU). 
NOTE: Swimmer Detection System that was to be tested during these events was not available. 
Therefore, this hypothesis was not satisfactorily addressed. 
Measure 1: "The percentage of trials in which swimmers are detected before reaching unit and 
estimated range at which detected. Modes of detection and confirmation and time to sort and 
declare threat should be recorded. Swimmer mode (surface, open circuit and closed circuit) and 
visibility conditions should be noted." 
Measure 1 Observations: Combat swimmer attack detection was conducted dusk to nightfall. 
No visible sign of attackers were detected. Two separate PSU simulated dropping concussion 
grenades at 40-yard intervals to have overlapping effect but these were not instigated by any 
sighting or cueing from higher authority. 
10 
Measure 2: Time between detection and prosecution by response force, including 
communication latency between the HVU and the PSU and time between alert and activate 
effective responses (weapon to bear on visually identified target at effective range). 
Measure 2 Observations: No detection of any combat swimmers occurred during this 
scenario, primarily due to unavailability of the Swimmer Detection System. However, some 
understanding was gained for future examination of the physical domain in which data gathering 
and measurement of swimmer detection, defense and response will take place. 
Hypothesis 2: Attached mines can be located more quickly using hand-held sonar. 
Measure 1: Ratio of time to locate mines attached to ship with and without the sonar. 
Measure 2: Utility of hand-held sonar. 
Measure 1 and 2 Observations: Sonar devices were anticipated but unavailable for the 
experiment. A hull-search diving experiment with EOD was substituted. Conditions for the 
experiment were poor, in part due to communications difficulties (possibly due to EOD being 
located behind a building surrounded by a two story metal fence under the Oakland Bay Bridge). 
EOD responded promptly to notification of possible limpet mines deposited on the hull of the 
HV A, however a 2 Yz - 3 knot current and severely limited water visibility made retrieval of the 
limpets extremely difficult (mines were put in place during slack tide). Only one mine may have 
been detected and none were removed from the hull. Conditions on the following day were 
improved, but it still required several hours to remove the limpets. The experiment demonstrated 
the impact of environmental conditions on the ability of a trained and equipped EOD unit to 
counter the threat. 
Commentary from EOD personnel and observers indicate that mission planning in this 
environment was challenged. The lack of reliable communications delayed critical information. 
When the environmental conditions are difficult and missions are executed individuals rather than 
groups, communications must be reliable and easy for any mission to be executed successfully. 
This experiment as well as others in the littoral points out the need for information flow by means 
of devices that are not affected by water, loud background noise, and the user actively engaged in 
performing the mission. 
In summary, although the original hypotheses could not be tested due to lack of anticipated hand-
held sonar equipment, insights were gained with regard to EOD requirements for countering 
asymmetric threat in difficult environmental conditions. These lessons learned point to the need 
for the development of next generation individual digital secure and non-secure communications 
devices. 
Hypothesis 3: Networked multi-sensor surveillance and response forces in layered defense can 
counter asymmetric small-boat attacks. 
Measure 1: Ranges at which attacks are detected and at which they are declared threats. 
Measure 1 Observations: PSU tactic employed in the experiment against asymmetric small 
boat attack against the HV A was to first Intercept, Interrogate and Report (I2R) boats within a 
range of 1000-1500 yards to the HV A. Boats continuing the approach to within 500-1000 yards 
were to be intercepted and steered/escorted out of the area. Within 500 yards targets were to be 
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designated hostile and engaged with weapons. PSU' s were oriented toward inbound threats to 
create overlapping fields of fire. Nominally, four defending PSU's were stationed at each quarter 
of the ship at a range of approximately 100 yards. If only two PSU' s were available each would 
patrol a figure 8 pattern fore and aft of the ship. 
Although incoming traffic was spotted and prosecuted according to the prescribed tactic, there 
was no white traffic in the harbor because of the issuance of a Notice to Mariners (NOT AM) for 
all shipping to remain clear of the experiment area. Initially, Coast Guard auxiliary boats were to 
be present in the engagement area to provide clutter and enhance the discrimination problem 
expected in an asymmetric scenario, but that did not happen. In addition, OPFOR used their 
easily recognizable SBUll PBL's, reducing the identification and engagement problem within 
the experiment. 
OPFOR success (attacking boats within range and in orientation to attack and damage the HV A) 
was determined subjectively. A more quantitative assessment of attack (or defense) success 
requires measurement of time-stamped OPFOR and defender tracks to yield the dynamics of 
interaction and elements of the engagements (i.e., how close opposing forces approached the 
HV A/defenders and their orientation during attack, interception or being fired upon). One 
purpose of the experiment was to gather data useful to reconstruction in a simulation model. 
Portable GPS units with time-stamped position recording capability were used for this purpose, 
and may be combined with additional data capture means, such as that from UAVs. NSWC 
Crane is currently developing a computer model using the GPS data that will be promulgated as a 
follow on addendum to this report. At a lower level, technology that allows determination of 
attack success (laser-designated hit detectors) would enhance unit-level play and provide 
additional data useful for experiment reconstruction in a simulation environment. 
Observers in PSU's commented that C2 required by the MIUWU TAO embarked on the SLICE 
boat was problematic in maintaining coordination of defensive units in the course of the small 
boat attack. Lacking this coordination, PSU' s reported that they responded to threats as they 
were perceived by the PSU's, not as directed by the TAO. Although the MIUWU TAO was 
observed making numerous communications during fast boat attack events, these 
communications were not consistent with boat crew designation of hostile targets or their 
prosecution of the threat. This implies a limited COP at the "MIUWU, resulting in reduced 
situational awareness. In a threat environment where defming the threat and tracking multiple 
targets against a data noisy environment is most challenging, it is probable that current MIUWU 
C2 and maintenance ofMIUWU COP would need to be enhanced. Additional testing will be 
necessary to determine the extent of capabilities and limitations associated with the concept of an 
embarked MIUWU and the C2 associated with the asymmetric domain. 
Measure 2: Time to initiate response to potential (sometimes WMD) threat after threat is 
detected, engaged or device is planted. 
Measure 2 Observations: Two WMD events occurred during the experiment. EOD tactic for 
countering a WMD involved vectoring a detachment to the threat site establishing an initial 
assessment of type of threat encountered and coordinating with EOD-HQ for follow on guidance. 
EOD-HQ computes a plot of possible lethality radius, down-wind threats, etc. and informs those 
affected. A notional detachment is equipped with HF and UHF equipment and a VDC-400 PC 
containing CD-ROM threat software for threat analysis. These capabilities are mirrored at EOD-
HQ, with PSC-5 satellite communication equipment used for long range data communications. In 
the experiment the EOD command structure included a WMD cell on the CORONADO to act as 
liaison with EOD-HQ through the MIUWU van. EOD-HQ C2 was to employ satellite 
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communications with experts at TECHDIV, Indian Head as well as with the CORONADO WMD 
cell. This connectivity was central to planning the defeat of the WMD threat on-line, using on-site 
communications and digital imaging. 
In the first WMD experiment, EOD-HQ was notified of a possible WMD and deployed one 
detachment to the threat site. As previously mentioned, communications with EOD-HQ were 
characterized as intermittent by observers and participants. The WMD cell on CORONADO was 
not equipped to receive EOD transmissions, and as a result of unavailability of a satellite channel, 
reachback to TECHDIV, Indian Head was not possible. Despite C2 setbacks, the threat was 
assessed, lethality areas established, appropriate players notified and the threat neutralized per 
planned tactics. Performance measures ofEOD response to WMD were not measured, however 
qualitative assessment ofthe COP and situational awareness shows validity of network centric 
principles applied to this threat. This was demonstrated in the second WMD experiment in which 
EOD personnel embarked on CORONADO set up to receive and transfer digital images and 
typed data as the engagement proceeded. Improved communications during this phase of the 
experiment enabled relay of real-time typed communications and digital imagery between the 
responding detachment at the WMD site, EOD-HQ and the CORONADO. 
Measure 3: Perception of false alarms, fratricide and collateral damage risks. 
Measure 3 Observations: One false alarm occurred when communications for another event 
were interpreted as a possible WMD threat. EOD responded but on reaching the site the mistake 
was apparent and none of the personnel at the HVU were aware of a WMD threat in the area. 
Fratricide between PSU' s was observed to be limited using tactics which spaced them at the fore 
and aft quarters of the HVU. This spacing prevents friendly vessels from coming within lines of 
fire unless a defender continued to fire after an incoming attacker was at a distance equal to, or 
inside the defender's patrol distance from the HVU. Fire from the HVU however, was determined 
to be a threat to defending PSU's. The prevention of collateral damage with the PSU .50 caliber 
machine guns, to neutral boats or other entities ashore or in and around the small harbor area, 
would have required further coordination between civilian and military planners. 
Hypothesis 4: Networked multi-sensor surveillance and response forces in layered defense can 
counter attacks from personal watercraft Get-skis). 
Measure 1: Ranges at which asymmetric jet ski threats are detected and declared threats. 
Attacks occurred during daylight hours with good visibility. Sensor technology to detect threats 
was not used by PSU personnel or MIUWU, although overhead video was provided by the 
unmanned air vehicle (UAV) and video equipped P-3 to provide input to the Full Dimension 
Protection (FOP) cell as part of the JTF COP. C2 of asymmetric surface engagements from the 
FOP cell was not possible through the C2 architecture linking FOP, MIUWU and PSU's. 
Instead, jet-ski threats were identified visually by HVU, MIUWU and PSU's at approximately 
one mile from the HVU. Since no neutral screening was used to create a classification problem, 
it was easy to declare and track the jet-ski attackers during six attack runs. 
Measure 2: Time to initiate coordinated response to threat (including possible WMD) after 
detection, engagement or discovery of a planted device. 
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Under the conditions of this experiment, time to initiate coordinated responses to potential threats 
after threat detection was instantaneous. As already noted, lack of interspersed non-threats 
provided a situation in which identification by PSU's was not a variable. The PSUs took 
appropriate action to positioning themselves in response to the threat, without MIUWU 
coordination or vectors. It is assumed here that classification using other sensors (e.g., UA V ) 
would have presented a different experimental condition and a separate C2 problem. 
Measure 3: Perception of false alarms, fratricide and collateral damage risks. 
As noted with the small boat attacks, lack of neutral traffic prevented assessment of false 
classification. It is assumed that fratricide and collateral damage would have occurred, resulting 
from small arms fire from the HVU and defending PSUs. Collateral damage to neutral units 
would likely have occurred as PSUs fired upon the extremely maneuverable and fast jet skis 
moving through neutral water traffic and between the PSU' s. 
OPFORjet skiers claimed to have reached the HVU on all attack runs. OPFOR commentary 
noted PSU difficulty in maintaining a tight defensive zone around the HVU. However, PSU 
crews believed none of the OPFOR attackers were successful on any attack run. Under ideal 
weather and daytime conditions, PSU crews observed that jet-skis were easily neutralized by PSU 
and HVU gunners before attackers could get close enough to the HVU to be effective. 
In other debriefed observations, MIUWU radar equipment was not effective in vectoring PSUs to 
threats. PSU coxswains commented that MIUWU did not coordinate their responses. All 
OPFOR attackers were tracked by Blue Force lookouts. Lack of coordination may have been the 
result of some PSU communication problems. Some observers noted instances in which PSUs 
could not talk between each other or with the MIUWU. However, these radio problems did not 
likely inhibit the ability ofPSU's to respond to OPFOR threats. PSUs with communications to 
the MIUWU relayed information with hand held radios to PSUs lacking communications. In lieu 
ofthis level ofC2, PSU's responded without further coordination or guidance. Boat coxswains 
did note that radios equipped with headsets would have greatly improved their ability to copy C2 
nets, especially during high-speed maneuvering. 
An additional JTF asset, USGC LONG ISLAND, could easily identify and track jet-skis. 
However, the cutter was assigned a sector close to the HVU, and could not engage the threats. 
Reconstruction of the situation will likely show that this vessel needed to be in a picket positioned 
at least one nautical mile from the HVU in order to react. From this position the picket vessel 
would need to close with the HVU and shoulder/walk out the OPFOR units, peeling of from the 
threat as necessary to allow PSU's to engage the threat and limit fratricide. 
Hypothesis 5: Networked multi-sensor surveillance and response forces in layered defense can 
counter attacks from rubber rafts attack at night. 
Measure 1: Ranges at which attacks are detected and at which they are declared threats. 
Two PSUs were assigned to guard an anchored HVU, and two PSUs were assigned to defend the 
berthed HVU. OPFOR attacks were carried out only against the anchored HVU. PSU s executed 
figure eight patrol patterns for and aft of HVU and personnel used night vision sensors to detect 
and declare OPFOR threat 200-250 yard from the HVU. OPFOR units used shoreline cover for 
attack runs, advancing together and sliding off when spotted by PSU's. Some attackers were 
successful in reaching the HVU. The PSU's used spotlights to simulate their weapons on target, 
probably destroying one craft and damaging another. OPFOR commented afterwards that they 
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gained the HVU as PSU's were focused on the center of the bay, and that the HVU did not appear 
to have adequate lookouts. 
Measure 2: Time to initiate coordinated response to threat (including possible WMD) after 
detection, engagement or discovery of a planted device. 
PSUs appeared to react late to approaching OPFOR units, which successfully advanced to the 
HVU. PSU's intercepted OPFOR as they fled the HVU, the result of an LPOIC's decision (no 
direction was given by higher authority). 
Measure 3: Perception of false alarms, fratricide and collateral damage risks. 
Because the threat was not noted until engaged at the HVU, no false alarms were made. Because 
the PSUs and OPFOR were operating without lights, it was difficult to distinguish friend from 
foe. A high fratricide rate may be expected in this environment. 
Under the cover of darkness, it was easy for OPFOR to make it to the HVU. More than two 
PSUs were needed to guard the HVU at night. More lookouts equipped with night vision gear on 
the HVU, and PSU crews similarly equipped would have improved the probability of threat 
detection. Although radio communications were improved for this event, as mentioned earlier, 
headsets would further improve the Coxswain's ability to talk on the radios, particularly during 
high-speed maneuvers. Debriefing of PSU crews indicates that the MIUWU was not effective in 
vectoring the PSU's in this environment. 
Hypothesis 6: Networked multi-sensor surveillance and advanced detection and management 
systems can mitigate effects of asymmetric WMD attack from low slow-flying aircraft. 
Measure 1: Ranges at which attack is detected and at which it is declared a threat. 
Measure 2: Time to issue WMD warning. 
Measure 3: Time to initiate coordinated response to threat (including possible WMD) after 
detection, engagement or discovery of a planted device. 
Measure 1-3 Obsenration: Due to the proximity of a congested public wharf area near the 
HVU, no small arm weapons were allowed topside per the promulgated Force Protection Plan. 
Ship's force could make visual threat designations of the LSF, and along with the small arms 
complement aboard the HVU presumably make a defense (capability of the ship to respond could 
not be observed however). Close In Weapons System (CIWS) trained in bearing and commanded 
to fire for effect is another possibility. Closest point of approach to the anchored HVU was 
approximately 500 yards, well within range of the ship's port and starboard 25mm Chain Guns 
(although not permanently mounted, would likely be available in this environment). For future 
modeling and simulation purposes, the hypothesis has yet to be adequately tested. In addition, 
this experiment included the Full Dimension Protection cell and WMD plume prediction models 
for assessment and coordination with civil-military planners in the event of chemical or biological 
release over the HVU in the vicinity of the harbor, or over areas included in the Defended Asset 
List (DAL). 
Hypothesis 7: Networked multi-sensor surveillance and response forces in layered defense can 
counter night attacks against an HVU by anti-ship missiles launched from a truck ashore (when 
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the threat is known to exist and within a specific area, proceeding to a possible launch area in the 
hills above harbor. 
Measure 1: Percentage of times exit into or out ofthe area is detected. 
Measure 2: Percentage of time truck is detected in logical launch position or condition before 
simulated launch. 
This event combined concepts of Asymmetric Dominance and Full Dimension Protection. The 
addition of the Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) was particularly noteworthy in this experiment. 
Results are described further in the next section ofTheater Air and Missile Defense (TAMD) in 
the asymmetric environment. 
Hypothesis 8: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB), advanced sensors and 
networked control of the PSU by the MIUWU will allow more effective positioning and 
employment of the PSU against the variety of asymmetric threats. 
Measure 1: Ratio of time to reset protective grid using MIUWU control to reset time without 
MIUWU control. 
Measure 2: Ratio of detection by IPB to that without IPB. 
Measure 1 and 2 Observations: In general, MWWU reported good capability to detect all 
attacking and friendly units. MWWU exercised control of engagements through C2 architecture 
in which communications were made from the TAO to direct PSU movements. As previously 
noted, there is disagreement between PSU's perspective and the TAO with regard to the receipt 
and effectiveness of the TAO direction. The MIUWU observer noted continuous message traffic 
from the TAO during these attacks. However, PSU's reported virtually no "helpful" 
communications from the MIUWU during attacks, and limited pre-attack warnings. 
Communications difficulties were addressed earlier. In spite ofC2 concerns and disagreements 
with regard to effectiveness, the hypothesis was tested and it is clear that IPB does enhance 
effective employment of layered defense assets. As will be discussed later, tracking the 
truck/missile would have been very difficult without IPB. 
SUBMITTED REPORTS 
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division Report 
Introduction 
Population models estimate that 70% of the world's population will live in cities by the year 2025 
and that 70% of these cities will be located on the world's littoral. Operations in these areas will 
be characterized by the application of Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS). Utilizing 
the sea as maneuver space, naval expeditionary forces must be prepared to execute a variety of 
operations without dependence on facilities ashore. 
To support the Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) concept, the Navy must have the 
ability to bring Marines into an urban littoral environment and remain on station to provide sea 
based C2, logistics and force protection. If the Navy intends to support the OMFTS concept, then 
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techniques, tactics and technologies must be employed or developed to allow the Navy to operate 
for extended periods in the littoral regions and neutralize the various threats involved. This 
includes the neutralization of asymmetrical threats in the littoral. 
The Asymmetric Threat portion of the Fleet Battle Experiment Echo was designed to test the 
hypothesis that " A maneuverable naval force protection capability - with access to theater and 
national sensors and control of response forces -can counter asymmetric threats to High Value 
Assets (HV As) maneuvering in the littoral." Six experiments were designed to explore this 
hypothesis. Included in the 6 experiments were eight independent hypotheses, used to evaluate 
the respective experiments. Each of these hypotheses and the results are discussed herein. 
Combat Swimmers 
The first experiment involved three different combat swimmer approach techniques: surface, 
open circuit SCUBA, and closed circuit SCUBA. Two hypotheses were used to evaluate this 
experiment. The first hypothesis for this experiment was . . . " Combat swimmers can be detected 
by the Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit (MIUW) and countered by coordinated operations 
of Port Security Units (PSUs) ". The defense against the combat swimmers was to consist of the 
MIUW unit embarked aboard the SLICE boat, PSUs under operational control of the MIUW and 
the watchstanders aboard the HVU. Measures of effectiveness for this event were the number of 
detections and the response times. This hypothesis was not fully tested. The AN/WQX-2 
swimmer detection sonar device, which was to be towed by the SLICE boat, was not available, 
therefore no swimmer teams were detected by the MIUW. HVU participation was not noted by 
the swimmers, other than some additional lookouts at the pier area. Although no detections were 
made, the MIUW unit scripted some detections and vectored PSUs to various areas to simulate 
concussion grenade attacks. There was no determination made as to the timeliness or accuracy of 
these simulated attacks. This event was executed on three different nights during the experiment 
and the combat swimmers were able to penetrate the defenses and plant mines all three times. 
The HV A was a much easier target at the pier than at anchorage. 
The second hypothesis for this event was " Attached mines can be located more quickly using 
hand held sonar units". Measures of effectiveness were the time to locate mines with and without 
the sonar device and the usability of the device. This hypothesis was also not fully tested. The 
hand held devices were not available for the experiment. The mine removal without the devices 
was interrupted due to safety concerns. The currents were stronger than anticipated during the 
scheduled removal time and visibility limited to about 4 inches. The mine removal was attempted 
again the next morning but again was hampered by strong currents and poor visibility. 
This type of threat ranges from a very low tech, inexpensive, low level of training approach to a 
very high tech, trained professional combat swimmer. These types of evaluations should be used 
in conjunction with modeling and simulation. Many of the defensive measures that would be 
used to interdict combat swimmers are designed to slow them down, tire them out, and cause 
them to use up their oxygen supply. Most are too hazardous to use during this type of experiment 
and should therefore be modeled. Interception of the actual swimmers by small boats at night 
creates a potentially unsafe situation. However, before this event could be modeled, the 
capabilities of the swimmer detection sonar would need to be well understood. This would be 
accomplished by experimentation such as was planned for this event. 
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High Speed Boat Attacks 
The hypothesis for high-speed boat attacks is ''Networked multi-sensor surveillance and response 
forces in layered defense can counter small boat attacks". This event was simulated twice, once 
with the HV A at the pier and once with the HV A at anchorage with several runs made during 
each event. Due to the way the experiment was executed, a true test of this hypothesis was not 
possible. 
One measure of effectiveness for this event was the ranges at which surveillance assets were able 
to detect and track the OPFOR boats. In the design of this experiment, the intent was the 
inclusion of neutral shipping to provide cover for the non-distinct OPFOR boats. The rules of 
engagement were such that the PSUs were to enforce a 1500-yard no transit parameter around the 
HV A and prosecute any unit entering a 500-yard engagement zone around the HV A. 
Surveillance assets were to be employed to detect and track the OPFOR boats as they left their 
staging areas and provide intel to the MIUW unit so that a prepared, organized defense could be 
established by pre-positioning the PSUs. This event was executed without benefit of the neutral 
shipping or the non-distinct OPFOR boats. The Coast Guard kept the test area clear of neutral 
shipping for safety reasons and the Special Boat Unit (SBU) was required to use easily 
identifiable, military boats. In addition, many of the surveillance assets assigned to spot and track 
the OPFOR were not available. Therefore the OPFOR was easily spotted visually and identified 
as hostile from a mile or more. This measure of effectiveness is therefore not valid in the context 
of this experiment. 
There was some disagreement on the command and control effects of the MIUW unit for the blue 
forces. Observers on the SLICE boat, and on some of the PSUs, reported that the defense was 
coordinated from the MIUW unit, while some of the PSUs reported that they were not provided 
with any guidance. This situation was attributed to comms problems observed with the MIUW 
unit at several times during the experiments. One aspect that should be addressed is the 
communications gear aboard the PSUs. The units require the coxswain to key a hand mike to 
communicate. A headset maybe more appropriate as the coxswain requires both hands to 
maneuver the craft against high speed targets. One observer should also be provided with a head 
set so that he can hear what actually is communicated to the other assets. There was also 
disagreement on the success of the PSUs to protect the HV A. The PSU crews felt they were very 
effective, as did the OPFOR crews. Observers had trouble evaluating the outcomes for two 
reasons. First the PSUs and OPFOR boats were very similar if not identical and as the eight 
identical small craft maneuvered at high speed, it became easy to confuse the two. Also, OPFOR 
boats that may have been disabled due to effective PSU fire, kept boring into the target thereby 
hampering efforts of the PSUs to engage additional targets. Computer analysis will be performed 
to better assess casualties. The blue forces felt that the Coast Guard cutter was a very effective 
deterrent to the attackers while the OPFOR expressed an opposite opinion. The observers felt 
that the PSU tactics appeared to be fairly effective for the conditions evaluated. 
A second measure of effectiveness for this hypothesis was "the time to initiate response to 
potential WMD threats". In the experiment scenario, one of the OPFOR boats is disabled and 
discovered to have a potential WMD aboard. EOD headquarters was notified and sent a response 
team to investigate. Reachback to a WMD cell aboard Coronado and national assets were 
evaluated. EOD responded correctly and professionally but untimely due to various 
communications problems. EOD headquarters was placed behind a building with a two story 
metal fence under the Bay Bridge, which contributed to the difficulties. In summary, EOD 
planned and executed their tasking as well as possible under the circumstances. Poor 
18 
communications with the WMD cell aboard the Coronado and satellite unavailability combined to 
hamper a planned tactical response system that potentially is an excellent real-time tactical tool. 
The last measure of effectiveness was the " Perception of false alarms, fratricide or collateral 
damage risks". False alarms were not evaluated due to the nature of the way the experiment was 
executed. The potential of fratricide and/or collateral damage at a pier side area or anchorage in a 
crowded harbor would be a definite possibility. This will be modeled for further evaluation. 
Jet Ski Attacks 
This experiment was very similar to the high speed boat attacks. The hypothesis evaluated was 
that " networked, multi-sensor surveillance and response forces in layered defense can counter jet 
skis". Many of the same issues that hampered the evaluation of the small boat attack were 
present here. The PSUs were judged to be reasonably effective against jet skis identified at long 
range, in an uncluttered environment. Multi-sensor surveillance was not observed. One 
observation of note was that the Coast Guard zodiac craft appeared to be a better match in speed 
and maneuverability to the jet skis than did the PSU boats. 
Combat Rubber Raiding Craft 
Hypothesis five was "Layered defense can counter night attacks by covert rubber raft". There 
were two measures of effectiveness that were used to determine if networked multi-sensor 
surveillance and response forces in layered defense can counter attacks from rubber rafts at night. 
The first measure of effectiveness was the range at which attacks are detected and declared 
threats. There were two PSUs assigned to guard the HV A at anchorage, and two assigned to 
guard to HV A at the pier. The PSUs executed figure eight patrol patterns for and aft of the HV A. 
Night vision glasses were used to detect and declare OPFOR threats that were 200 - 250 yards 
from the HV A. OPFOR units approached the HV A together along the shoreline for their attack 
and split off only when they were spotted by a PSU. The rafts appeared to have successfully 
made it to the HV A, although one PSU used their spotlight to simulate a weapon and would have 
most likely destroyed one raft and hit the other. OPFOR felt that they were successful for two 
reasons; the blue forces were focusing their attention to the middle of the bay, and the HV A 
lacked lookouts that could have spotted them. The HV A at anchorage was the only one that was 
attacked during this exercise. OPFOR did not attack the HV A at the pier. 
The second measure of effectiveness for this exercise was perception of false alarms, fratricide, 
and collateral damage risks. There were no false alarms made however, fratricide was probable 
by the PSUs during interception of the OPFOR units near the HV A. The reason for this was that 
both the PSUs and OPFOR units were running without lights, and it was easy to misidentify 
friend from foe. There was no collateral damage because of the location of the interception but 
running lights or additional night vision glasses would have helped identify targets. 
The hypothesis tested false during this exercise. Unless detected, the rubber combat rafts can 
penetrate the PSU defensive barrier. More consideration should be given to detection. 
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Low Slow Flyer 
Hypothesis six was ''Networked multi-sensor surveillance and advanced detection and 
management systems can mitigate effects of asymmetric WMD attack from low slow-flying 
aircraft". This hypothesis was to be tested based on three measures of effectiveness; the ranges at 
which attack is detected and declared a threat, time to issue WMD warning, and time to initiate 
coordinated response to potential WMD. These measures could not be adequately tested because 
of two conditions during this exercise. 
The multi-sensor surveillance and advanced detection and management systems were attempting 
to recognize the normal air traffic pattern in the bay area, and detect the asymmetric WMD attack 
based on an abnormal path from a low slow flying aircraft. During this portion of the experiment 
there was some confusion due to a local commercial seaplane that was docked on the pier near 
the HV A. The commercial plane made random trips in and out of the bay area during the 
experiment, which made it difficult to detect the Low Slow Flying aircraft that was attacking. 
In addition to the confusion due to the random local air traffic, there were no small arm weapons 
allowed topside while in the San Francisco Bay area, therefore the ship's force could only point at 
the Low Slow Flyer (LSF) to simulate the detection and the ships defense posture. Even if the 
Low Slow Flying threat could have been identified, it would have been difficult to determine 
whether or not it was engaged in sufficient time to protect the HV A. 
Because of these two conditions, the data collectors who were aboard the PSU, SLICE boat, 
Coast Guard Cutter, and US Navy ships concurred that the measures of effectiveness were not 
fully tested due to the inability to detect the experimental, low slow flyer. This being the case it 
can be argued that this hypothesis was found to be false. 
Truck Mounted Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Threat 
Hypothesis seven was "recon/surveillance can help track truck threats". During the testing of this 
hypothesis a truck carrying a cruise missile was detected and tracked by an unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV). This event was repeated twice in the asymmetric threat portion of the 
experiment. The UAV was cued to the time and location that the suspect trucks would be leaving 
a staging area. The UAV was to perform surveillance on the trucks and provide a video feed to 
the MIUW unit. This hypothesis was found to be true. One item of note was that there was a 
black "x" on top of the trucks for identification. Future experiments may try vehicles of a more 
covert nature. Some evasive maneuvering by the trucks may also be appropriate although the 
drivers commented that they never had any indication that the UA V was following them. 
Intelligence Preparation of the Battles pace 
There were two measures of effectiveness that were used to test this hypothesis. The first 
measure was the ratio of time to reset the protective grid using MIUW control as opposed to time 
reset without MIUW control. In general, the MIUW reported timely detection of all attacking 
and friendly units. However, from the PSU perspective the receipt and effectiveness of the 
commands that were issued from the MIUW unit TAO were not helpful. The PSUs reported that 
the communications during attacks were very poor and there were limited pre-attack warnings. 
Communications between the PSU' s and the MIUW unit TAO were a major problem during the 
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experiment even to the point where the drivers made inquiries as to whether there was jamming 
taking place by OPFOR. Providing the PSU coxswains with headsets for two-way 
communication during high-speed maneuvers would improve communications. In many cases, 
communications were impractical because the coxswain and crew were unable to operate the 
hand-held units during high-speed maneuvers. 
The second measure of effectiveness was the ratio of detections with IPB to that without IPB. 
PSU drivers reported that they were reacting to threats as they identified them and then executed 
their pre-planned tactics. From the perspective of the data collectors and PSU crews, the attacks 
were detected and engaged much more efficiently by each individual unit This was due to being 
able to identify the OPFOR as hostile at long ranges due to their distinctive craft. 
Although there were problems with communications and discrepancies in reports, this hypothesis 
was tested. It is clear the IPB does allow for more effective employment of layered defense 
assets. It was not clear that the hypothesis was tested in the intended manner. Several air 
surveillance assets that were included in the planning sessions were not available during the 
events. Also, surveillance was much easier due to the lack of other traffic in the harbor. 
NETCENTRIC ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE (NCASW) 
MAJOR POINTS 
• NCASW increased force situational awareness through distributed advance search plans 
• Reliable networked communications are essential for Distributed Collaborative planning 
(DCP) in NCASW 
• Common tactical decision aids and common understanding of the DCP process are 
enhance the update of situational awareness required for NCASW 
CONCEPT 
Mission Concept: Maritime dominance relies on the traditional air, surface and subsurface 
superiority in the battlespace. 
Operations Methods: The employment of Network Centric ASW (NCASW) will improve the 
commanders ability to assess balance mission objectives with the risk imposed by adversary 
submarines. 
System Solutions: Distributed Collaborative area search planning JEZ/JAZ 
Technical Solutions: WeCAN, IMAT, SPPEDS 
SUMMARY 
The objective of network centric undersea warfare is to create a fully integrated undersea warfare 
capability contributing to full dimensional protection for forces in and beyond the Joint Area of 
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Operations (JOA). In FBE-Echo network-centric anti-submarine warfare the goal was to use 
distributed collaborative planning (DCP) for multi-sensor search and prosecution. An ASW cell 
with improved connectivity, standardized models and databases was stood-up for training and 
contingency operation planning in FBE-E and conducted both planning and execution during the 
associated Limited Objective Experiment (LOE). This was the first FBE in which undersea 
warfare played a major role. 
Concepts being tested in the undersea warfare cell involved the availability of enhanced C4I 
systems to provide high data rate connectivity, fusion of a detailed underwater picture with 
surface and air pictures, use of search planning and assessment tools, battle management tools, 
and remote sensor management tools. Sensor systems providing passive acoustic, mono-static 
active acoustic, multi-static active acoustic, non-acoustic detection plus environmental 
characterization were required to complete the undersea picture. Finally, weapon systems for 
shallow water ASW, for loitering and in support of distributed sensors, mine neutralization, and 
non-lethal options are necessary in this asymmetric environment. 
For FBE-E not all of these capabilities were present, but were simulated by the ASW anchor desk 
as necessary to conduct the experiment. The anchor desk was designed around enhanced 
connectivity to ships, submarines, aircraft, national assets, environmental information resources, 
sensor platforms and other command centers. Search plans from the anchor desk were distributed 
to affected units updated with local environmental information, assessment of compatibility with 
other assigned warfare duties and assessment of risk to that unit 
The ASW portion ofthe Anchor Desk was tasked to: Develop and evaluate search plan options 
to support the overarching campaign missions. Develop, maintain and distribute adversary 
submarine threat data and cueing information derived from all surveillance systems. Fuse, 
maintain and distribute coherent tactical and operational pictures of the undersea battlespace. 
Evaluate the effectiveness of completed search operations leading to an assessment of the current 
asymmetric submarine threat to the overarching campaign missions. Consolidate and analyze in-
situ environmental data collected by dispersed sensor platforms. Cache and distribute 
oceanographic and meteorological data, imagery, etc., to provide "one stop shopping" reach-back 
service to assigned/supported ASW forces. Manage the collaborative search planning process and 
the employment of remote sensor systems. Conduct "what if' analysis of ASW search and force 
employment plans to evaluate alternative courses of action. 
MEASURES AND OBSERVATIONS 
Hypotheses: 
During Phase I ofFBE-Echo, the ASW Anchor Desk focused specifically on the search planning 
process. The first two hypotheses address the planning development cycle and measures that 
might be used to assess this process. The last four hypotheses were concerned with a Limited 
Objective Experiment (LOE), which took place in Phase II of FBE-Echo. The LOE was intended 
to experiment with new technologies including the Advanced Deployable System (ADS) and the 
Acoustic Communications System (ACOMMS), and assess effectiveness of the collaboratively 
developed search plan. 
Hypothesis 1: A collaboratively developed and maintained area ASW search plan improves the 
integrated search effectiveness over an area of interest for a given set of sensors. 
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Hypothesis 2: The use of identical, high fidelity models and associated databases by all 
participants in ASW operations improves understanding of both the coordinated multi-sensor 
search plan and individual sensor performance. Additionally, the use of a common model allows 
"drill-down" into the factors affecting performance. 
Hypothesis 3: Time integration of the tactical undersea picture provides additional significant 
information for all ASW echelons compared to the current real-time tactical picture alone. 
Hypothesis 4: The undersea tactical picture provides sufficiently timely positional and 
operational information concerning blue force submarines to safely enable dynamic weapons 
exclusion zones around blue force submarines. 
Hypothesis 5: An ASW Joint Engagement Zone (JEZ) will allow more successful prosecution 
of an adversary submarine than the current exclusive waterspace management policy protecting 
blue force submarines. (Note: The JEZ assumes a common tactical picture containing timely 
track information for blue force submarines and reliable, real-time communications between blue 
force submarines and the rest of the ASW forces.) 
Development of a search plan was the only deliverable for the ASW Cell during Phase I of the 
experiment and therefore only a qualitative assessment of the search plan process could be made. 
Effectiveness of the search planning process to construct a viable search plan as a measure of 
system performance could not be determined until the following phase of the experiment and 
execution of the LOE. To facilitate this qualitative assessment, logs were kept by several 
members of the cell, including the IJW A (NPS student) observer, a Maritime Battle Center 
observer, and 3rd Fleet staff. Additionally, questionnaires were distributed to each member of the 
cell to collect qualitative input. 
Preliminary results indicate that the first two hypotheses were substantiated in Echo and that the 
LOE provided additional substantiation to these hypotheses. Major points are discussed below. 
ASW DCP: Distributed Collaborative Planning (DCP) methods were demonstrated to be 
essential overcoming the inherent complexity of area ASW. Common understanding of the 
planning process, assumptions, databases and limitations are critical to a cohesively developed 
search plan. Collaborative aspects of Phase I were done at a single location, with verification of 
distributed results tested in the LOE 
TDAs: Real-time, adaptive planning becomes a tactical tool when performed to assess many 
"what if' iterations inside the tactical time constant. Each node in the network must employ 
common TDAs and effective methods to transfer information. The PC-based Interactive Multi-
Sensor Trainer (IMA T) was demonstrated to be a key tool in building common databases. More 
TDAs need to incorporate range-dependent models as opposed to the range-independent models 
originally chosen because of lack of computer power at sea. 
Information Compression/Processing: The volume of information necessary to support 
ASW search planning may be passed through low bandwidth by distilling all of the model input 
data to a small "kernel" that is shared among the participants. The processing power of the 
common TDA is then used to reproduce the full depth ofthe model results at each node. The use 
of processing power and identical tools at both ends of a communication line enables 
"information compression" vice simple data compression. This concept performed to the extent 
required to support Phase I, and was tested further in the LOE (analysis of these results are not 
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yet available. From Phase I it is evident that the Web Centric ASW Network (WeCAN) 
SIPRNET -based web page provided a good, albeit high-bandwidth means to share information. 
ASW Training: Force-wide ASW training supported a general understanding of relevant ASW 
factors and the information provided by the ASW IDA. Beyond this cursory assessment, it 
would be premature to make an assumption as to the viability of collaborative search planning in 
the ASW community. Comments received with regard to development of search plans were quite 
positive. The responses reflected a great deal of enthusiasm for the technology and an adaptive 




• Laws demonstrated flexibility and ease of use. While the system was by no means fully 
exploited, it performed well for the functions utilized during this experiment. 
• Deconfliction requires further investigation. DAMS was not successfully electronically 
interfaced to LAWS. Full implementation of algorithmic procedural deconfliction in LAWS may 
yield improvement over current methods and be more efficient than DAMS. Any deconfliction 
system requires an adequate visualization tool to be useful. No methods currently address latency 
issues. 
• Naval Surface Precision Fires weapons currently in use or programmed are not useful in 
the Urban Canyons. 
• NCASW increased force situational awareness through distributed advance search plans 
• Reliable networked communications are essential for Distributed Collaborative planning 
(DCP) in NCASW 
• Common tactical decision aids and common understanding of the DCP process are 
enhance the update of situational awareness required for NCASW 
CONCEPT 
Mission Concept: Operate in the littoral, provide Naval Fire Support to place munitions on 
designated targets in a time constrained environment. 
Operations Method: Employ sensor to shooter continuum versus fixed and mobile targets. Utilize 
Integration of imagery and targeting tools in support of reactive and deliberate targeting. Integrate 
the use of four dimensional near real time deconfliction in the execution of precision engagement. 
Conduct targeting and missile shots in a GPS jamming environment. 
System Solutions: LAWS, DAMS, EFT, CCT, JST ARS, and ADSI 
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Technical Solutions: ISAR P-3 and Tactical UA V 
SUMMARY 
This pillar continues experimentation for the "Ring of Fire" which has been a strong portion of all 
of the FBEs to date and also of the related "Vicious Blaze" and "Silent Fury" efforts which 
address more deliberate targeting processes. Its objective is to utilize Naval Fires of all types to 
allow the operation of Naval forces in an urban environment where there is no organized 
conventional threat but a significant unconventional threat including terrorists and infiltration 
units including weapons of mass destruction. 
The overall goals are to explore three aspects ofNaval Fires (NF): 
Targeting NF in an urban environment including integration of multiple imagery 
sources and targeting tools including the isolation of USMC areas of operations from 
enemy reinforcement. 
Sensor to shooter capability against both fixed and mobile targets particularly use ofUAVs in 
permissive and non-permissive environments. 
Responsive deconfliction ofNaval and other fires. 
The desired effect of these capabilities was to suppress enemy activity levels to those that can be 
dealt with by the relevant in-country forces and to allow maneuver with minimal losses by 
friendly forces at sea, in landing or ashore. Secondarily, adaptability of personnel to the 
functionalities of the various systems and the potential automation of the processes is of interest. 
To accomplish these objectives, a network of ISR sensors and of command & control and weapon 
fire control systems was built using actual and simulated systems. The Land Attack Warfare 
System (LAWS) was the cornerstone of the network and was located in command centers on the 
Coronado and on the shooter ships as well. Major information flows were the UAV pictures, 
other imagery, the Common Operating Picture (COP) and target data packages from the various 
mission-planning systems. 
1. National Assets, TACAIR and UA V Sensors for Fires in Support of Forces Ashore in Urban 
Environment 
Based on actual and simulated cueing from HUMINT I national assets and Naval air platforms, 
plus the live UAV (the Pelican pseudo-Predator) tracking and spotting missions were performed. 
When appropriate, UAVs were tasked to locate, identify and track targets. Passing of specific 
threat information from the UAV control and fusion elements to the ashore units and shooters 
was evaluated. Integration ofUAVs into overall surveillance planning was examined. 
Initial Hypothesis: Navy UAVs in conjunction with other assets can provide effective warning 
and supporting fires for urban operations against the following threats: 
Enemy actions beaches, streets I buildings - Monterey & SF 
Enemy vehicular movements (Monterey to San Francisco) 
Enemy infiltration in urban neighborhoods 
Enemy WMD in industrial area 
Night urban targeting 
Vehicular target of interest 
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Interdiction of USMC operating areas 
Fixed targets of WMD interest (Monterey and SF) 
Actual range targets fi TLAM & SLAM 
Targets related to WMD vignette 
Each of these activities generated real or simulated fire mission requests. Air and NSFS systems 
were tasked to support the missions. A deliberate (6 fi48 hour) targeting exercise (Vicious Blaze) 
examined all-source imagery fusion, manipulation and dissemination for production of electronic 
target folders afloat. Silent Fury processes were planned on reactive targeting via TACRECCE 
for response under two hours. 
Measures for this initial hypothesis are given below: 
Measure 1: Responsiveness of targeting to mission requests: time to detect target and pass to 
shooters. 
Measure 2: Ability to derive accurate target coordinates for point precision database within 
engagement time windows. 
Measure 3: Ability to build electronic target folders for major targets of interest including 
WMD-associated targets within time windows of opportunity. 
Implementation: For Measure 1: Flew simulated A/C and national sensors to cue UA V 
operators to locate, identify and track hostile targets. Used simulation to maintain ground truth 
and support surveillance planning. Compared simulated results to real views for detectability. 
Consolidated and recorded timelines with LAWS for analysis. Maintained electronic logs of 
major results of flights and simulations. Provided a questionnaire to gain insights into difficulties 
of control ofUAV operations and passing of information to affected units. For Measures 2&3 
observers recorded processes used to obtain and manipulate information into target folders for 
evaluation by the shooters. Usability of the systems was assessed by a five-point subjective 
scoring of the features. 
As anticipated, the range of target conditions above strained the capabilities to quickly respond 
with effective strikes. 
The Precision Engagement portion of the exercise consisted of experimenting in how the Navy 
will support ground operations ashore with Naval Fires. This included new technology and new 
tactics, techniques and procedures. The three cells primarily involved with this evaluation were 
the Joint Strike Center (JSC), the USMC Enhanced Combat Operations Center (ECOC) and the 
Joint Fires Cell (JFC). The Joint Strike Center was primarily concerned with deliberate targeting 
at the strategic and operational levels. They used various sensing assets to collect imagery on 
potential targets for strike planning and the building of Electronic Target Folders (ETFs). The 
Enhanced Combat Operations Center was primarily concerned with reactive targeting to support 
ground forces ashore at the tactical level. Sensing assets were also used at this level to refme the 
target location, status and type. These two cells fed fire mission requests to the Joint Fires Cell 
via the Land Attack Weapons System (LAWS). This system allowed the JSC and ECOC to 
rapidly and efficiently pass fire mission request via a Local Area Network with a high degree of 
accuracy. This information was evaluated in the JFC to ensure it met Commander's Guidance 
and then a shooter was assigned to fire the mission. The mission information was transmitted via 
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EHF satellite to a LAWS workstation on the shooter. LAWS was able to keep track of all 
pertinent data on the target, the units ashore and the fire support ships available so the decision-
maker's situational awareness remained very high. 
This hypothesis was partially maintained. The Predator sensor package in the manned Pelican 
vehicle proved invaluable in the urban environment. IR imagery did very little for the LAWS 
director. In comparison, JSTARS provided operationally substantial information in the urban 
environment but high traffic density made it difficult to distinguish contacts of interest. Sensor 
control is enhanced by bringing it close to the tactical center of gravity but integration across 
platforms is still difficult when choices between situational awareness and target prosecution 
must be made. Naval surface precision fires were rarely used as the weapon of choice in a city. A 
different weapons mix must found. 
Sometimes FYI free text messages were interpreted as possible calls for fire. This can be worked 
out by establishing the fire support language to be used. The LAWS director did not fire the 
missions but had to waste time asking for clarification. 
There was confusion over how many people and who had authorization to actually approve a fire 
mission. Everyone agreed this was because of the lack of understanding of what C2 
relationships were and how information was supposed to flow. 
There has never been a fire support overlay developed for any of the missions. This document 
should lay down basic fire support coordination measures. 
In summary, while LAWS itself is a capable system, there exists a huge gap in what it can do and 
how we can exploit it with current tactics, techniques and procedures. Everything from TIPs to 
shipboard organization to comm links to mindsets needs to be changed to accommodate such a 
highly automated system. However if these can be changed very accurate, reliable, lethal fires 
could be delivered to battlefield while optimizing airspace via deconfliction. 
Deconfliction 
The use of long-range Naval weapons in these circumstances is currently constrained by the 
inability to efficiently deconflict the flight paths and trajectories and weapon effects of aircraft, 
UAVs and weapons. A more dynamic approach to deconflict could allow more efficient use of 
forces and more rapid striking of targets while avoiding fratricide. The deconfliction approaches 
can vary from decentralizes dynamic "get out of the way" to very centralized "permission 
granting systems. FBE-Echo will look at 4D (latitude, longitude, altitude and time) with a bubble 
of airspace around each object to minimize the amount of airspace closed to other weapons 
systems. 
The Precision Engagement portion ofthe experiment also looked at how the myriad of missiles, 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), aircraft and shells can be orchestrated to minimize the risk of 
fratricide while optimizing the use of heavily used airspace. The Dynamic Allocation 
Management System (DAMS) was linked to LAWS to provide rapid airspace deconfliction for 
incoming shells and missiles and aircraft transiting the area of operations. 
Hypothesis: Dynamic deconfliction techniques can provide control in limited but diverse 
operations. 
27 
Measure 1: Targets served per period. 
Measure 2: Time fisensitive targets served while in engagement window. 
Measure 3: Time for dynamic deconfliction vice permission with normal TTP. 
Measure 4:% ofbattlespace available for dynamic assignment of fires. 
Implementation: The Dynamic Airspace Management Systems (DAMS) was used to predict 
trajectories and summarize status for time periods. DAMS was to be the major data source as 
well as the source for target requests and missions planned in LAWS. 
The experiment was essentially a 'no-test" regarding this hypothesis. 
There was some basic deconfliction between missions the JFC was firing and the P-3 and UA V 
were sensing. However, this was just because we could read their position data off the imagery. 
If it had been an actual military airspace it would have been significantly more cluttered. DAMS 
integration did not happen. 
An automated deconfliction tool with visual display would provide the quick verification that 
appears to be desired. 
Dynamic deconfliction is a long-term solution with significant potential but is a long way from 
implementation. 
MEASURES AND OBSERVATIONS 
Hypothesis: Current weapons system targeting processes are disjointed and do not exploit 
available technologies. Precision engagement is a resource-demanding endeavor that sacrifices 
execution speed for accuracy. FBE-E will experiment with new technology and supporting 
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) with the intent of improving integration among weapon 
systems and between operations and intelligence efforts. Such activity will result in improved 
speed and accuracy of the targeting, planning, and execution processes, and reduce requirements 
for restrikes. Airspace deconfliction resulting from flight path conflicts, weapon trajectories, 
weapons effects, friendly aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight are also problems 
that constrain the use of long-range weapons. Improved technology and new ttp explored in 




FULL DIMENSION PROTECTION (FDP): JOINT THEATRE AIR 
AND MISSILE DEFENSE (JTAMD) 
Major Points 
• Full Dimension Protection, as a concept operationalized through an FDP cell coordinated 
with a Harbor Defense Coordinator aboard an afloat MIUWU, and supported with a range of 
technologies, tactics and C2, successfully provided enhanced force protection in an 
asymmetric littoral environment against a range of threats. 
• LINEBACKER concept proved its capability to provide JT AMD in concert with AADC role. 
Multiple constructed targets were successfully engaged, coordinated with the FDP cell and in 
an environment in which consequence management took on considerably greater importance 
due to presence ofWMD. Excessive switching in and out of LINEBACKER/Tactical mode 
did present some hardware problems however, an area of further investigation. 
• Synergy was demonstrated between technologies available to the FDP Watch Captain, and 
essentially proved the value of a network-centric environment in maintaining and using a 
Common Operational Picture (COP). Specifically, combining near real time information of 
JST ARS, ADSI, UA V real time video feed, and targeting tools in LAWS created a responsive 
system in the FDP cell of immense variety. This variety was critical to the JTF capability to 
mount effective coordinated response, in a "Ring of Fire." 
• Distributed Collaborative Planning (DCP) enhanced situational awareness between FDP cell 
on USS CORONADO, USS PORT ROYAL (AADC and LINEBACKER) and provided a 
reach-back capability to SMDBL and MOSC (Naval Postgraduate School also maintained a 
parallel COMPASS session during the experiment) that was essential in operational planning. 
COMPASS, as the DCP provider in the experiment was used daily as a means of 
coordinating planning. More importantly however, it was used effectively to establish a 
Defended Asset List (DAL) between the JTF provider of forces, and civil-military authorities. 
Construction of the DAL and the ability to engage in reevaluation in a dynamic environment 
was critical to defining force placements and real-time planning. Additional defmition of 
DCP tools and protocols for their use and bandwidth to support them are areas requiring 
further consideration for additional experimentation. 
• Joint coordination with AVENGER units added SHORAD to force protection. Combining 
within the network-centric environment in the JTF needs further development, in particular 
when combined with IT AMD and LINEBACKER. Coordination was developed through the 
course of the experiment, rather than prior understanding of interfaces and responsibilities. 
• UAV added a superb capability to the FDP cell. Video feed directly to the watch team could 
be cognitively combined with additional information, e.g., ADSI fused LINK COP, surface 
picture from the HDC to the FDP and other technical sources to provide exceptional SA. 
This was proved to be particularly effective in FDP mission to find the WMD carrying vans, 
then respond to a range of potential developments. The UAV video feed included GPS data 
and cross-hair ranges that enabled the FDP cell to provide targeting information to JTF assets. 
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In the final event, the FDP Watch Captain was able to engage the WMD vans using naval 
. gunfire, based on UAV provided information. UAV operations need further refinement 
however, in the areas of C2 and command relationships. The platform was a demonstrated 
success, however the command relationships and C2 to support its use in a naval or joint 
operation and in a network-centric environment have not been developed. Tasking of the 
platform was often difficult and was a system with multiple internal conflicts. 
• Low Slow Flyer (LSF) threat requires additional study. By chance, the HVU was pier-side 
next to a seaplane excursion operation. Multiple take-offs and landings by this aircraft made 
discriminating and reporting an actual LSF threat very difficult. The experiment was to 
include feed from the Western Area Defense Sector (WADS) radar, which was to be 
observed over a period of days to establish patterning behaviors for civilian aircraft. This 
feed was not available until the last day of the experiment however, and it is not clear that 
such patterning would have provided significant discrimination for evaluation. Another tactic 
was enacted by the FDP cell in lieu of WAS feed; CAST was used to determine most likely 
sites for LSF operation. JTF assets were then used to gather specific intelligence with regard 
to operations in these areas, which did in fact yield the OPFOR threat aircraft. Additional 
research needs to be conducted with regard to LSF threat and engagement, especially with 
regard to potential WMD capabilities. 
• Use of the Joint Interface Control Officer (llCO) concept greatly enhanced the usefulness and 
reliability ofthe TADIL COP. The multi-link van (MLV) employed LINK tools that 
facilitated interface and maintained LINK operations. This operation, together with the Air 
Defense System Integrator (ADSI) maintained on USS CORONADO provided a combined 
LINK-11 and LINK-16 COP. As mentioned above, this COP was combined by the FDPCC 
within the network-centric set oftools provided in the FDP cell to create a range of actions as 
the dynamics of the tactical situation changed. nco employment needs further development 
to include within the organic capabilities of the JTF. 
• Use of visualization tools, such as STALKER enabled the FDP watch to make nearly 
immediate assessments of cruise missile launch and impact points. Coordination of actions 
between JT AMD, WMD analysis of engagement (consequence management of potential 
plume dispersions) and CIVMIL authorities provided a powerful system for near real-time 
COA determination. Further work needs to be considered however, for best means to provide 
coupling between these processes and technologies with WMD data; plume analysis from 
HPAC as part of the COA analysis vice post impact/engagement consequence management. 
• Coordination with Precision Engagement, Land Attack Warfare System (LAWS) emerged as 
the experiment progressed. A LAWS terminal was included as part of the FDP suite, and a 
member of the FDP watch organization worked with the Precision Engagement cell to 
produce a working FDP-LA WS-PE fires team which demonstrated its effectiveness at 
sensing, identifying, targeting and pairing in numerous events. This process greatly 
decreased the potential TCT timeline of some events. 
• Command relationships between FDP, the JTFC and joint operations need to be further 
defined. In this experiment there was considerable ambiguity in the precise distinction of the 
command relationships implied by FDP centralized capabilities and roles. Two examples for 
further definition are the development ofFDP as the JTF moves from blue-water (CWC 
tactical environment) to littorals (FDP tactical environment). Consequences for battle-group 
organization and joint forces C2 are highly interrelated in this concept. 
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CONCEPT 
Mission Concept: If an expeditionary force is operating ashore, then the commander 
responsible for the defense of those forces should establish a Full Dimension Protection (FDP) 
cell to provide a single point for force defense. 
Operations Methods: An FDP cell was formed under the CJTF and provided with 
technologies, procedures and personnel onboard USS CORONADO. A Joint Interface Control 
Officer (nCO) was assigned, with the objective to construct a defensive grid from TADIL data 
that would be observable at all levels between defense coordinators and expeditionary 
commanders. A C2 architecture was constructed that was to provide an analog of a network-
centric environment in which all-source sensors and intelligence would be made accessible by 
CJTF and operational commanders to enable them to make tactical decisions in a time critical 
environment. An architecture was proposed in which civilian and military sensors would share 
data to construct a defensive grid, and was to include airport and harbor radar as part of the fused 
grid. A civil-military defense network was established to provide timely warning of asymmetric 
Ballistic Missile and air breathing threats capable of delivering a WMD. 
Alongside the construction and implementation of various architectures, tactics, techniques and 
procedures (TIP's) were to be developed as an inductive process within the experiment. These 
included: the assessment of means to pattern civilian traffic patterns (space, air, land and sea) for 
discrimination of asymmetric threat against activity norms; use of LINEBACKER tactic to couple 
FDP to tracking of space and potential ballistic missile threats; TIP's for self-defense of high 
value assets (HV A) in confined battle-space; development of LINEBACKER TIP for defense of 
the CJTF DAL while simultaneously providing self-defense in an asymmetric environment; 
explore use of Naval control of Shipping (NCS) and MIUWU coordinated with civilian harbor 
defense authorities to deconflict surface engagements with asymmetric threats amongst civilian 
traffic. 
System Solutions: Technologies (STALKER, EDGE, COMPASS, JSTARS, MSCT, LAWS, 
HP AC, ADSI, UA V), organizational (FDP cell, MIUWU-NCS, nco, SHORAD-A VENGER, 
Precision Engagement, CIVMIL, WMD), C2 (COMPASS, satellite, HF, UHF, VHF, land line, 
cellular comms, UNCLAS and classified web, GCCS/JMCIS), data (ADSI, nco-T ADIL ), 
TIP/tactical (LINEBACKER, traffic patterning, NCS, UA V control). 
SUMMARY 
JT AMD has been an important concept in FBEs to date. In FBE-Echo JT AMD was expanded 
conceptually to include defense against asymmetric Low Slow Flying (LSF) aircraft, theatre 
ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. The addition of AEGIS SPY -1 in a "Linebacker" mode 
combined with new sensors and technologies was to be tested in this experiment. A specific 
objective of the experiment was to explore the ability of the Expeditionary Force to make use of 
in-place civilian sensors to help establish a defensive grid. These sensors included airport and 
harbor radar and the supporting civilian communications system. UAVs, national assets and 
appropriate military systems such as the Air Force's JSTARS and Army AVENGER air defense 
units were also used in the network centric sensor and defensive grid. Fusion and control 
occurred aboard the CORONADO and the SLICE-boat embarked MIUWU as the asymmetric 
threat response cell. A Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) was also simulated as part of a C2 
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experiment include new technologies and develop tactics, techniques and procedures (TIPs) for 
their use. 
In addition to maintaining an air picture with diverse sensor sources inputting data to an active 
defense, JT AMD included planning of attack operations and simulated operations and 
coordination with launch platforms, C2 nodes, missile stocks and infrastructure. Special 
software to support planning was installed on CORONADO and integrated fire missions passed 
to the Land Attack Warfare System (LAWS), to control weapon-target matching and mission 
cueing. 
Hypotheses related to JT AMD in general were concerned with use of sensors to construct a 
sensor grid that would be sensitive to a high variety of asymmetric, air breathing and missile 
threats. At the same time, FDP was meant to integrate new technologies and consequent high 
data rates to create an effective defense and provide a C2 structure for other warfighting areas. 
As a result, JTAMD as part ofFDP crossed most other warfighting areas important to the JTF. 
Hypothesis 1: Addition of information from indigenous military/civilian systems (e.g., airport 
radar) can significantly improve the fused picture of air and surface showing conventional and 
asymmetric threats. Initial measures considered for this hypothesis: 
Measure 1: Range at which a low, slow-flying threat can be detected and tracked. 
Measure 2: Range at which asymmetric surface threats can be detected. 
Measure 3: Warning time of a missile launch or range at which asymmetric cruise missile can 
be detected and engaged. 
Measure 4: Fraction of population in affected area warned of asymmetric threat or WMD 
release. 
To a large extent this area concerns adding civilian air track information and sophisticated 
processing to the force protection picture being generated in the Asymmetric Dominance areas 
described earlier. Measures (1) and (2) occurred again against the same threats and are treated in 
more detail there. Measure (3) assumes a cruise missile threat similar to that described below as 
well but extends into the track and engage portions of the event. A modeled event derived from 
this portion of the experiment is being prepared from electronically recorded data aboard the 
T AMD ship, detailed in collaborative logs maintained in the FDP cell and fused data at the Air 
Defense System Integrator (ADSI). An engine for this model is being constructed around Naval 
Simulation System (NSS). 
Measure 4 involved the participation of a civil-military cell aboard CORONADO with the FDP 
cell. Although the hypothesis could be tested with respect to passing warnings to civilian 
authorities, the process of bringing together sensors fused at the FDP cell and models to provide 
data on launch points, distribution of WMD products and impact points required a system 
assessment. A collaborative event log and recordings of individual events was maintained for 
this purpose. To a large extent the success of this area should be assessed at two levels. The first 
is the ability to provide connectivity to the potential sources of information in an interoperable 
manner (national and JTF sensors). At the next level is the added value of this information to that 
provided by organic assets. Because ofthe qualitative nature of value added, a questionnaire was 
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administered by NPS students (brought aboard to capture data) to gather significant observations 
by participants after significant events. 
The Air Defense System Integrator (ADSI) fused together all the tracks from the Link 11 and 
Link 16 tactical data links. This database was preserved for later analysis of specific events. For 
example, simulated missile tracks were injected from SPA WAR in San Diego, which were 
included in link data reported to the FDP cell via ADSI. These tracks became the basis ofTAMD 
intercept problems, which included plume analysis and impact point analysis for delivery to the 
civil-military cell for further action. Further analysis of these track data is ongoing, using data 
reduction of the very dense Link reporting systems and positional data fed to NSS. 
The hypothesis was partially confirmed in that the LINEBAKER multiple-AEGIS ship 
configuration allowed remote tracking, reporting and simulated engagement of simulated 
air/missile threats to the city. Combined with the fused link data, modeling technologies and C2 
aboard the flagship, the JT AMD system improved situational awareness of such threats and 
allowed warning to be provided to civil defense authorities within one minute. 
Army A VENGERair defense units were likewise able to provide direct support to ground 
elements while maintaining Link 16 connectivity, ensuring the same COP with Aegis units so that 
the JTAMD umbrella was stretched over the littoral. Additionally, participants noted that 
JSTARS data provided valuable tracking data on boats and vehicles in the city. 
A Joint Interface Control Officer (flCO) function was established to maintain continuity of the 
joint data link picture to the COP. Some difficulties were recognized, as connectivity was 
tenuous and further investigation of sensor management/ integration is indicated. Because much 
of the link was maintained as a serial feed (phone line vice electromagnetic data feed), span of 
control was stretched without regard for realistic C3 difficulties so that FDP was not tested with 
regard to C3 capabilities. 
Activities within the FDP cell focused on the actions of an FDP Cell Commander (FDPCC). 
Once MSEL events began, the FDPCC directed watch-standers to accomplish tasks necessary to 
complete the event. Two watch-standers, a Surface Defense Coordinator (SDC) and an Air 
Defense Coordinator (ADC) monitored the Surface and Air voice nets and controlled surface and 
air threat coordination while the FDPCC monitored the Command net and controlled JTF assets 
using technologies within the FDP cell. Other positions in the cell included contractors to operate 
and manage various contributing technologies: EDGE, ADSI, LAWS, STALKER and 
COMPASS. 
The experiment demonstrated the fusion potential for the many sensors dedicated to FDP. 
Working relationships between technologies and their value added within the FDP cell was not 
well formulated prior to events. However, what was demonstrated was that centralization of 
many sensors, predictive and targeting tools placed in an operations room enhanced situational 
awareness of decision-makers and provided a common operational picture. Future experiments of 
this concept should be designed around more specifically focused hypotheses (or narrower 
concepts). TIPs constructed to improve independent system performance as part of the FDP 
decision making structure might also prove useful in determining useful and valid measures of 
effectiveness and performance. 
As an example, an important FDP capability involved "patterning" civilian air traffic over a 
period of days to create a picture from which to later subtract anomalous behavior of what might 
be an asymmetric threat (low slow flyer). When Western Air Defense System (WADS) data was 
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fused with the JTF Link (military air picture), there was a significant problem with clutter. 
Without clear TIPs to determine how this information could be processed and used to enhance 
the COP to provide value-added data, it was difficult for the watch team to use the information 
presented. In addition, measures of effectiveness were limited at this level to determining 
whether the data system supported construction of the picture, but not the effectiveness of system 
components. By conducting this first experiment however, it will be possible to construct 
measures of effectiveness and performance, and focus concepts to be tested in experimental 
design. 
At the point in analysis of FDP and T AMD in FBE-Echo the data supports system level 
assessment. Reconstruction of individual events using modeling and simulation tools will reveal 
much about system interactions and provide additional insights. This event level analysis is being 
pursued at present. 
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND RELATED COMMENTARY 
(Extracts from logs and observations; local time stamp) 
03140541: Status report. UAV flight 12 March, 1530-17000. GBS problems precluded real-
time receipt of video, but passage via VHS will allow later exploitation. JST ARS training in FDP 
cell continues. Integration of graphics feed (MTI and SAR) will not be possible on SIPRNET as 
the ground station's format is proprietary and not connected to SIPRNET backbone. Electronic 
Target Folder (EFT) 1 is posted on SIPRNET at C3F homepage. TASID is up and ready to pull 
UA V streaming video from PELICAN when GBS link is up. IPL status also prevents pull of 
national imagery, so training continues with file imagery. 
C41 issues noted at the beginning of the experiment provides a snapshot of efforts (these were 
noted on 14 March). Internal red phones not operational (FDP cell), with contractors onboard to 
troubleshoot. GBS is partly installed and continues to be worked on. IPL is down but trouble-
shooting is in progress. JSIPS-N has good comm path established but circuit connection is not 
stable to the EPS. lESS segment of JSIPS is down, trouble-shooting in progress. MDS 4.X is up 
but still not receiving threat data from GCCS-M. CCI lite is up but Net Meeting connection is 
intermittent due to CA III blind spot. JTW is up except Target Package Generator (TPG) 
program, with the contractor attempting a software fix. T ASID nearly fully functional. GISRS 
common operational framework (COF) software is not running due to a bad power supply, ETR 
unknown. 
03141000: Country Orange executed three test launches of SCUD missiles from the Hawthor:ne 
area at IOOOU, 1005U and 1015U. Missiles were launched on an Easterly heading and landed in 
the Tonopah test range. Indications of launch received by USS PORT ROYAL through SIRED. 
Launch message from USSPACECOM were received on GALE but were not received either 
through ADSI via Link 16 or JMCIS in the FDP cell. Coordination with CMOC and Medical 
cell confirmed SAT communications from FDP cell through CMOC to Governor's Office of 
Emergency Services via both voice and data. 
Orange direction of fire was non-threatening, however if scuds are launched toward city all units 
in ATF are at risk. All units must be up FDP Command net (designated TA202Rl). Specifically, 
CORONADO, BON HOMME RICHARD, PORT ROYAL and JOHN PAUL JONES have the 
capability to receive external data or track missiles. As ships enter harbor they become more 
vulnerable to asymmetric threat, I& W will be passed over FDP Command net. All units review 
FDP Plan (C3F DTG 131523ZMAR99). 
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During DCP session, AEGIS LINEBACKER radiation parameters determined from RP&C were 
discussed. PORT ROYAL was requested to send CAPS image including DAL and SM-2 
BLKIV A coverage during the next DCP (COMPASS) session. Exchanged information with 
WMD cell to include translating their plume models for truck agent dispersal to moving air burst 
model to support civil-military warning over voice and data circuits. 
nco is coordinating LINK 16 connectivity for BON HOMME RICHARD, JOHN PAUL JONES 
and U.S. Army Avenger SHORAD unit. 
03141532: LINK testing yields interesting results. JOHN PAUL JONES (JPJ) launched 
simulated ballistic missiles using the AEGIS dynamic test target program. These targets were 
broadcast over LINK-11. CORNOADO (CO), BON HOMME RICHARD (BHR), JPJ and 
PORT ROYAL (PRY) and the multi-LINK van were all up on LINK-11, however, the only 
platforms that can interpret the expanded M-7 message format are the two Aegis ships, JPJ and 
PRY (both are AEGIS 5.0). If CO had been upgraded to also receive and interpret the M-7 
message format in LINK-II, this would have provided the FDP cell with the capability to have 
two means by which to receive space tracks, LINK-11 and LINK-16. 
A significant lesson learned with regard to LAWS; It was discovered in the course of preparing 
ADSI for use on CO that LAN tracks can be presented on LAWS, which is installed in the FDP 
cell. This means that in the situation in which the FDP cell does not have voice communications, 
or in a time-sensitive targeting situation, a fire mission can be initiated by the FDP cell on a J-3.0 
message by simply right-clicking on the mouse and scheduling the target. 
SHORAD participation in the LINK is solid. Avenger unit is copying LINK-16 and therefore 
involved in the distributed defensive grid. 
03141552: LAWS installation in the FDP cell is complete. FDP cell watch expects to be able to 
observe launch point information displayed on LAWS (passed from detection platform through 
LAWS). LAWS operator in the FDP cell will be able to conduct defense to offense target 
designation by scheduling all launch points received via J3.0 message as immediate targets for 
the Precision Engagement cell. 
Comment: Significant fmding for further time-sensitive targeting experiments. 
03150831: Distributed Collaborative Planning (DCP) session with PRY. Defended Asset List 
has been expanded to include San Francisco Harbor, San Francisco Airport, the downtown 
district, Oakland, Sacramento and Marin County. The expectation, as an outcome of the DCP 
session, is that PRY must now plan defense with Avenger SHORAD and SMDBL, then request 
additional defense assets as required from the CJTF. Additional information is required regarding 
Avenger capabilities, and requested from SMDBL as part of the DCP session. 
JICO is presently working an issue that concerns bringing JSTARS into the LINK. Also of 
concern is that the SLICE boat on which the MIUWU is riding, has no LINK capability. 
Comment: Without LINK capability the MIUWU relied on voice communications between the 
naval control of shipping (NCS) officer in the FDP cell to direct MIUWU towards potential threat 
areas or in response to sensor indications of jet-ski, small boat or swimmer attack. MIUWU 
would then direct JTF assets in response. This situation added an increased C2 load onto the FDP 
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cell, which had the impact of adding to the perception that C2 was not adequate to the 
conceptualized FDP role. 
03151039: Orange launched two test missiles to intimidate Green. Three space systems detected 
the launches and reported them over STRED. Individual tracks were received for launch vehicles 
and impact points. The information was passed by the FDP Watch Commander to all units on the 
FDP Command net, and to the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) for consequence 
management. 
Impact prediction from SP ACECOM produced an ellipse that showed probability of either a 
water or land impact, including populated areas just to the north of San Francisco. Based on this 
information the FDP cell initiated a weapons tight order, in spite of possible shore-impact. 
Comment: FDP cell did not have track information from AEGIS platforms, nor was the launch 
event correlated through JMCIS (cause undetermined) which would have provided the additional 
resolution needed to make a more determined choice between destroying incoming missiles, or 
allowing them to land in the water. 
As a second comment, tracks received from SPACECOM and injected to the COP through ADSI 
should be rebroadcast so that non-TRE or TRAP units can follow space-related predictions. JPJ 
did not receive these inputs, for example. 
Third, in relation to this event, LAWS was not included in the launch-to-impact COP. In the 
course of the experiment it became obvious that the correlation of these events with LAWS 
capability could be immensely important to immediate CJTF response against launchers. This 
once again points to a relationship between FDP, LAWS, time-critical targeting and Precision 
Engagement that needs to be further explored. As a specific issue, tracks need to be displayed on 
LAWS from ADSI, however, track numbers on ADSI do not correlate to LAWS track numbers. 
This ambiguity makes the targeting problem very complex, requires manual correlation and 
increases time latency in time-critical targeting. 
03151055: FDP DCP session. CMOC/city officials are offered Army Avenger unit to provide 
additional protection to downtown district of San Francisco. It is noted that Avenger is only 
capable of countering air-breathing threats (i.e., not against theater ballistic missiles). 
Comment: FDP cell proposed a TTP in working with WMD/CMOC. Using a combination of 
ADSI and EDGE, the FDP cell provides an improved impact ellipse to CMOC, vice use of 
SURENET warnings (too slow). A macroscopic report of a 3-5 mile ellipse will be used by FDP 
as an input to EDGE, which will refine the probable area to a centroid on the order of a few yards. 
03151405: FDP cell is receiving video feed from UAV and P-3 of the suspected WMD convoy 
(chemical weapons). A decision is pending within FDP as to whether the convoy should be 
struck, and the possibility of chemical weapons release. I& W indicates that the convoy is 
heading towards pier 35 and the vicinity of the CORONADO. JPJ and PRY indicate they are 
presently in LINEBACKER mode. 
03151410: MIUWU reports that the UAV and P-3 have sighted two contacts moving to the 
vicinity of CORONADO. 
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Comment: An example of a shared COP, and coordination of information between these two 
geographically displaced centers. 
0315151430: Fireball (TBM) alert is given over FDP command net. Received I&W from both 
TRAP and ADSI on JMCIS. JMCIS correlator was observed to operate correctly. Warnings 
were passed over the JMC net to city officials at 1432, with estimates of an impact area off of the 
city (no threat to coastal areas). 
MIUWU simultaneously reports two surface contacts which may be carrying a WMD. WMD 
cell is alerted by FDP watch, but FDP cell is unable to maintain comms with the SLICE boat. 
03151530: FDP and WMD cell met to develop consequence profiles ofTBM intercepts at 40k, 
60k, 80k and 1 OOk feet. 60k intercepts were decided upon, based on models of plume migration. 
Projections and information are sent to PRY for inclusion in RP&C based decisions for 
maintaining threat areas. Optimum intercept requires that the missile be intercepted between 60 
and 80k feet, with lowest lethality of CW. PRY is tasked to model and evaluate various launch 
and intercept profiles with these constraints. 
03151555: MIUWU detaches small boat unit (SBU) craft from defense of CORONADO for 
refueling, which takes this defense away from the HVU (high value unit). At the same time, the 
MIUWU reports that it has sustained a casualty to its navigation system is unable to continue as 
HDC (Harbor Defense Commander) until the problem is fixed. JPJ is tasked as HDC from 
anchorage 7. 
03151600: FDP cell contacts the MIUWU to report possible swimmer threat to HVU. MIUWU 
responds by tasking the Port Security Unit (PSU) to provide a layered defense posture around the 
HVU. 
03160735: PRY reports that they will not be able to defend the expanded DAL without 
additional Avenger support. Treasure Island is discussed to provide staging area for AVENGER 
units. 
Later in the same day PRY verified that it could cover all of the DAL except for the Sacramento 
area, and requested AVENGER support for this. 
03160924: Vessel Traffic Information Service (VTIS) reports a small aircraft in vicinity of 
anchorage 7. 
Issue: JMCISS does not allow simulated tracks to be merged with "real" tracks. This is an issue 
for further experimentation development. 
Issue: Strictly an outcome of the architecture designed in the experiment; that the FDP watch 
officer does not have direct communications with the VTIS. Instead, communications are 
conducted with the Coast Guard Cutter. 
03160940: PRY is directed to send CAPS information (overlays) during morning DCP session. 
Work continues with the AVENGER unit to find an authorized placement site for their mission. 
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Comment: Placement of AVENGER units is quite complex. Previous planning must be 
conducted with regard to their placement prior to mission definition. In other words, if littoral 
operations are anticipated in a specific geography and use of AVENGER is anticipated, sites for 
their placement should be defined in a pre-planning document. 
03160951: CAST defined 70% probability that a TEL site is located at 39' 00' Nand 118' 41 
W; based on type of vehicles, possible hiding sites and information operations with regard to 
chemical supplies. 
03161005: Beginning of multiple "FIREBALL" TBM launch reports via ELINT and SPY-1. 
Three missiles launched, with genesis and impact points reported. 
03161007: Birds away against three TBM targets. Impact points reported to CMOC for 
consequence management. 
Comment: One of the TBM targets is defmed as unengageable 
INFORMATION SUPERIORITY 
MAJOR POINTS 
See SPA WAR draft report in Appendix. 
CONCEPT 
Mission Concept: Provide sufficient and reliable networking of communication information in 
the battlespace. 
Operations Method: Naval Forces operating in the littoral will have access to signals 
previously unavailable to afloat sensors. The ability to monitor and report levels of activity about 
communications paths will enable command action to restore or enable connectivity and flow of 
information. 
System Solutions: Naval Communication Network 
Technical Solutions: SNIFFER 
SUMMARY 
See SPA WAR draft report in appendix. 
MEASURES AND OBSERVATIONS 
No hypothesis or measures were developed prior to the experiment. 
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SUBMITTED INFORMATION 
See SPA WAR draft report in Appendix. 
CASUALTY MANAGEMENT AND CIVIL MILITARY 
OPERATIONS 
MAJOR POINTS 
• DARPA One Way Multi-Lingual Interview System shows promising utility. 
• The Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE) 
using proprietary software SoftRisk enabled interface with CMOC's similar information system 
based on Lotus Notes with the emergency response network. 
• WMD identification, real time METOC data, and real time feed of WMD 
indications/warnings/analysis are required for command management ofWMD 
CONCEPT 
CASUALTY MANAGEMENT (CM): Network- centric Casualty Management would 
transform medical care for civilian and military casualties from a localized process, to a 
distributed process. In the localized process, each echelon does its best for the casualties 
presented to it In the distributed process care of casualties is planned, monitored, and distributed 
to the best location for that casualty. The status of each echelon and ability to re-distribute the 
case- load and medical resources would all be taken in to consideration. New tools for casualty 
estimation, planning, casualty interviewing, event monitoring, clinical reference, patient status 
reporting and in-transit visibility can provide needed capabilities. 
MISSION CONCEPT: Provide coordination between the military force and the domestic 
Civil-Military authorities to provide managed response to weapons of mass destruction as well as 
managing casualties in the operations area. 
OPERATIONS METHOD: Operate in an urban littoral environment while conducting civil-
military operations of a medical nature and provide military use of civilian medical facilities. 
SYSTEM SOLUTIONS: Medical Virtual Workspace; Casualty prediction and logistics 
models; Collaborative Medical Logbook; Multi-lingual Interview System; Incident Watchboard. 
HARDWARE SOLUTIONS: DOW; MAT; FORCAS; SHIPCAS; CASEVAC 
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SUMMARY 
CASUALTY MANAGEMENT (CM) 
Most CM, as opposed to CMO, occurred later during Phases 2 & 3. Only the DARPA One-Way 
or Multi-Lingual Interview System (MLSl) was slated for use in Echo. It is a small, portable 
device for asking non-English speaking casualties about their injuries. The system is a notebook 
size computer translator capable of translating specific phrases from English into a variety of 
languages, including Spanish, German, Korean, French and Arabic. The use of the device by 
medical corpsmen during the Urban Warrior Experiments was to test the system in a real 
environment, primarily to learn from the experience so that improvements could be made to make 
it an operationally useful instrument. At this time, the DOW is in the bench-top instrumentation 
stage. The developers, Dragonfly, Inc., and the DARPA contract monitor, Mr. Ace Sarich, are 
fully aware of its current limitations. 
In the Monterey operation the MLSI was available and several civilian Korean-speaking mock-
casualties were brought to the field medical site after a mock explosion. Unfortunately one of the 
two trained corpsmen was unable to come ashore because of bad weather. This overloaded the 
other corpsman that was unable to take the time after the explosion and consequent casualty 
gathering to use the MLSI. The exercise was terminated pre-maturely soon after the casualties 
were gathered, again because of the worry about helo operations in the fog. 
As a result of difficulties in the Monterey operation with media getting in the way, civilians were 
not allowed in the playbox in the Alameda operations. As a result only limited use of the MLSI 
was possible there as well because of the need for support from Mr. Sarich. 
NPS observers were able to use the DOW in an office environment and observe its performance 
in the field. Interviews with five Navy corpsmen were conducted after field use in Oak Knoll. 
Based on these interviews, the DARPA One Way Multi-lingual Interview System is not yet ready 
for field operational, but does show promising utility. 
The primary difficulty was the large number of times the user was forced to repeat the English 
phrase before the unit was able to match it to the foreign language equivalent. Although the 
system worked well in a laboratory environment the battlefield environment was apparently too 
noisy. This is particularly a concern in time stressed situations. Noise suppression is being 
worked on and should be incorporated into the next trial. 
It is likely that the MLSI should be considered a "no-test" in FBE Echo. However medical 
personnel looked forward to a time when a true two-way translation device will be available for 
use in refugee treatment situations. 
As an adjunct to the FBE-Echo CM, an evaluation of three casualty prediction I management 
tools was performed: Ship Casualty Projection System (SHIPCAS), Ground Forces Casualty 
Forecasting System (FORCAS) and Medical Analysis Tool (MAT). The purpose of these tools is 
assist the medical planners in preparing the medical annex Q to the OPLANS. The tools were 
tested by stepping through the beginnings of the OPLAN preparation. 
MAT requires a basic daily rate of occurrence of casualties as an input. SHIPCAS and FORCAS 
provide such a rate as their output. Both of the latter are based on historical rates of losses. On the 
average ships in the Pacific received .3 hits per hundred days engaged in WW!I, for example. The 
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wisdom of planning for such low occurrences, even adjusted for more modem circumstances, is 
very debatable. It would seem more appropriate to base medical planning for an operation on the 
possibility that one or more ships will be hit, rather than on some long-term average. Neither 
. model had a modem interface and SHIPCAS in particular was difficult to use ( translating actual 
ships into the SHIPCAS categories was difficult) and even dangerous in that the visibility of 
assumptions and inputs is not maintained for ease of checking. The treatment of uncertainty in the 
two models differed and was not obvious to the user. An alternative to the use of these models is 
the existence of a nominal rate of casualties per day that has at least the virtue of transparency. 
FORCAS and SHIPCAS were given low ratings by the assessment personnel. 
The Medical Analysis Tool translates the gross casualty rates into demand for resources at any 
medical support structure that is also input by the planner. The level of detail requires an in depth 
analysis of medical operations but that is appropriate to the subjects employing the tool. In the 
opinion of the medical planner involved, it was stated that the outputs were consistent with other 
estimates for Kernel Blitz. The software has a modem interface and has suitable documentation. 
Visibility into the calculation is not complete but satisfactory. The assessment personnel rated 
near the top of the scale and about twice as high as the other two models. 
During the USMC CM activities an excellent document "Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 
Relief' was encountered. It is one of a series of products of the USMC W arfighting Lab as a 
quick tum-around digest that is distributed widely within the Corps. A similar product from MBC 
might be appropriate. 
CIVIL- MILITARY OPERATIONS (CMO) 
The vision for civil-military operations of a medical nature is to develop a to share information 
and resources to responding to emergencies. This would allow the military to make maximum use 
of civilian medical facilities and to provide emergency military aid to civilian first-responders to 
avoid secondary casualties. 
In the Echo phase of Kernel Blitz Prime, CMO was the focus of the efforts that we were asked to 
assess. These occurred largely in the JMC and in the CMOC space aboard the USS Coronado, 
part of the Sea-based Battle Lab. A two-day experiment with the California Governor's Office of 
Emergency Services (OES) in Oakland was performed. The Center of Excellence in Disaster 
Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE) provide expertise to the OES's incident 
reporting system to the CMOC's similar information system based on Lotus Notes. This system, 
developed by Jim Rogers of COE, utilizes a piece of proprietary software named Soft:Risk. The 
JMC/CMOC was able to receive the California emergency reports via SoftRisk by the end of the 
exercise via Honolulu, the COE headquarters. In addition UHF, HF and phone circuits were 
planned. 
During the first day communications were not functioning, partly due to a power supply failure. 
During a scripted terrorist incident near the Bay Bridge, a predicted chorine gas plume was 
obtained by the JMC from the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and passed to the OES in about 
ten minutes by fax, which was difficult to read. Later it was discovered that this plume differed 
greatly from another plume obtained for the same scripted incident in the VVMD cell on board the 
USS Coronado. It is possible that the two different weather sources used were a part of the 
discrepancy. This incident pointed out the necessity for full communication capabilities and 
knowledge of the tools being used for sharing predictions with the civilian community. 
41 
On the second day the communications were vastly improved and the CMOC responded 
(provided messages concerning notional support) to about a dozen requests for aid from the OES 
during the five-hour experiment. Actual airborne imagery was requested and obtained and 
delivered at the conclusion of the experiment, for example. At the end of the five-hour exercise 
period the OES personnel came to the Coronado and an after-action review was conducted using 
the CMOC Group Systems decision support system .. A large amount of information was 
collected to serve as the basis for future doctrine development. The participants completed a 
questionnaire in which they rated all aspects except "All appropriate parties were included in the 
planning" with an average of "Agree". This points out the need for even more broad coordination 
of actions with the multitudinous civilian authorities. This exercise was focused on the early 
hours of the incident before FBI and FEMA points of contact would be in place. 
Both the OES and the CMOC personnel expressed great satisfaction with the experiment, which 
was a significant step in the potential direct real-time cooperation for actual emergencies before 
other command relationships can be established through FEMA, etc. 
MEASURES AND OBSERVATIONS 
Theme: No single model contains all of the features desired for all sizes of operation but one 
stands out as most appropriated for the battalion-sized operation. 
Hypothesis: Comparison of casualty prediction and planning models SHIPCAS, FORCAS and 
MAT. Note some additional tools were cancelled due to immaturity or logistical difficulties. 
Measure 1: Usability by a typical medical planner. 
Measure 2: Process validity & consistency fi inputs are appropriate and complete and match the 
output specificity. Outputs are easily translated into required actions such as triage, evacuation, 
re-supply etc. 
Measure 3: Scalability and ability to represent a range of size of operations with at least face 
validity. 
Theme: Test of DARPA Multi-lingual Interview System (MLSI) One-way translator 
Hypothesis: The DOW provides an acceptable medium for eliciting vital information from non-
English speaking casualties when no local language capabilities are available. 
Measure 1: Understandability of questions by the casualty. 
Measure 2: Usability of the device by the operator. 
Theme: Theatre Medical Core System (TMCS) - Phases 2&3 only 
Hypothesis: TMCS provides patient tracking on a near real-time basis and also summary 
OPORD Annex Q casualty management information. 
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Measure 1: Time to access patient location from higher echelons. 
Measure 2: Accuracy of patient location. 
Measure 3: Usability ofTMCS. 
Measure 4: Visibility of Annex Q information to participants. 
Theme: Usability of the StatRefCD-Rom Medical Library 
Hypothesis: StatRef is an easy-to-use reference to the latest procedures and treatments. 
Measure 1: Usability of StatRef in the military environment. 
Measure 2: Breadth of alternatives for treatment considered by the provider. 
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS (CMO) 
OBJECTIVE: The capability to interact with civilian authorities in a distributed collaborative 
planning mode can provide shared information for situational assessment and management of 
resources in responding to immediate life-threatening emergencies. This will allow the military 
to make maximum use of civilian medical facilities and provide emergency military aid to first 
responders to prevent secondary casualties. 
SUB-OBJECTIVES: To link the JMC and CMOC aboard the USS Coronado to the regional 
emergency center by voice and data. To utilize the Counter-Proliferation Analysis and Planning 
System (CAPS) of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory with meteorological data to provide 
predictions of casualties. 
HYPOTHESES: 
Theme: Consequence Management of Toxic Releases 
Hypothesis: There are effective civil-military responses to toxic releases. 
Measure 1: Military staff and civilian subject matter experts involved in the operation rate the 
operation as successful. 
Measure 2: Military staff and civilian subject matter experts involved in the operation rate the 
information flow and response as timely. 
Measure 3: Connectivity between the afloat authorities and any remote participants is rated as 
successful. 
Measure 4: Modeling to support the experiment was rated as successful. 
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Theme: Utilization of the Virtual Work Space display between the JMC and the CMOC 
Hypothesis: A Virtual Workspace can improve the coordination between the JMC and the 
CMOC. 
Measure 1: The military and civilian officials I subject matter experts rate the VWS as 
successful. 
Measure 2: The availability ofthe VWS is at least 90% of the time the JMC and the CMOC are 
both functioning. 
Measure 3: Discussion of classified information in the JMC does not hinder operation of the 
vws. 
Theme: Utilization ofthe Wireless Infra-Red (WIR) communications for the VWS 
Hypothesis: A Virtual Workspace can improve the coordination between the JMC and the 
CMOC. 
Measure: The connectivity of the VWS is available at least 90% of the time the JMC and the 
CMOC are both functioning. 
SUBMITTED INFORMATION 
EVALUATION OF 
DARPA ONE WAY MULTI-LINGUAL INTERVIEW SYSTEM 
(DOWMLSI) 
Xavier K. Maruyama 
March 13, 1999, DLI Monterey, CA 
March 17, 1999, Oak Knoll, Oakland, CA 
The DARPA One Way (DOW) Multi-Lingual Interview System is being developed by DARPA. 
The system is a notebook size computer translator capable of translating specific phrases from 
English into a variety of languages, including Spanish, German, Korean, French and Arabic. The 
use of the device by medical corpsmen during the Urban Warrior Experiments was to test the 
system in a real environment, primarily to learn from the experience so that improvements could 
be made to make it an operationally useful instrument. At this time, the DOW is in the bench-top 
instrumentation stage. The developers, Dragonfly, Inc., and the DARPA contract monitor, Mr. 
Ace Sarich, are fully aware of its current limitations. 
NPS observers were able to use the DOW in an office environment and observe its performance 
in the field. Interviews with five Navy corpsmen were conducted after field use in Oak Knoll. 




The system is currently a notebook PC system. With the increase in computation power, it should 
soon be able to be transitioned into a smaller unit, which would make it more user friendly. 
Right now, the users felt that too much attention needed to be paid to the DOW MLSI and this 
interfered with attention towards the subject being interviewed. A robust hands off unit with 
which eye contact could be maintained with the interviewee is desired. 
Background noise suppression is inadequate. In the office-laboratory environment, the DOW 
MLSI performed very well in understanding the phrases of the interviewer, but in the field 
operational environment, there were many instances in which the phrases could not be properly 
interpreted. An active noise cancellation system is needed. The medical care area usually has a 
diesel driven generator in close proximity. 
User interface: 
The phrases were chosen by an shipboard Navy M.D. Field use and future interviews with the 
field users should allow for a more meaningful and useful collection of phrases to be contained in 
the system. Here, there is a choice to be made between a unit which contains several languages 
and limited vocabulary or one which contains a more extensive vocabulary, but limited in the 
choice of languages. Perhaps an insertable memory chip could be incorporated to provide greater 
vocabulary in a single language of choice. 
The grammar in many cases was too educated. For example, a difficult phrase for the interviewee 
to comprehend in the stressful field environment was "What is your given name?" A more useful 
phraseology might be, "What is your name?" Colloquial language may be preferred to more 
grammatically correct phraseology. 
A frustration in its use if that two way language communication is not possible. Given the choice 
between the DOW MLSI and a human translator, the human translator is preferred. The choice of 
questions needs to be carefully evolved so that simple yes/no answers can be given. In the 
stressful field environment, the answer given by the interviewee may not always be simple. 
In a medical triage situation, the DOW MLSI may not be as useful as in a humanitarian assistance 
location where assurance and comfort is needed more than immediate medical attention. In a 
medical triage area, the corpsman will make judgments based on his/her immediate observation. 
The translator is probably more useful to create a less stressful environment for groups such as 
refugees. It would serve well to reduce frustration and alienation feelings among interviewees. 
At least one corpsman said that the Spanish sounded too American in accent and inflection. This 
is a correctable problem as the system reaches maturity. 
All the users recognized the utility of the DOW MLSI, however, they all felt that the device/ 
system had achieved sufficient maturity for field use. During the Monterey usage, the queries 
were separated with a computer-generated tone. This was eliminated in the Oak Knoll exercise 
so that the queries were not as obnoxiously electronic. The user comfort level was higher without 
this human factor annoyance. 
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Most of the users felt that the device would have more utility at places such as roadblocks and 
refugee interview areas. Its usage in for a medical treatment area was limited because of the 
stress and time factors encountered. 
To the casual observer the initial reaction to the DOW MLSI is that it is not effective because 
there are too many impediments to its use in the stressful field environment. However, if ease of 
use is improved and noise suppression is achieved, the DOW MLSI has promise for field use. 
All users would prefer a human interpreter, but given no other choice, the DOW MLSI is an 
improvement. A realistic problem to be overcome in a multi-ethnic or multi-cultural environment 
is the identification of the language to use. A simple systematic means needs to be developed to 
enable the user to switch to the language which the interviewee can understand. (Because of this 
problem, even a limited knowledge of foreign languages by the interviewer is extremely useful. 
This may emphasize the need for the need to teach foreign languages even at the rudimentary 
level in our national educational systems.) 
EVALUATION OF 
FLEET BATTLE EXPERIMENT ECHO 
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS 
Xavier K Maruyama 
March15, 16, 1999, USS Coronado, San Francisco, CA 
March 17, 1999, Regional Emergency Operating Center, Oakland, CA 
During FTBE-E, observation of activities aboard the USS Coronado, tied to Pier 35 in San 
Francisco, CA, were made as regards to their Civil-Military Operating Center (CMOC) on 
Monday and Tuesday, 15-16 March 1999. On Wednesday, 17 March 1999, observations were 
made at the California Regional Emergency Operating Center (REOC) in Oakland, CA. 
Observations from both locations allow for a perspective not totally available to those who have 
observed or operated from only one location. 
The main operational mission of the REOC is to respond to emergencies and disasters, so the 
civil disaster response mechanism is much more robust, mature and experienced than that 
available from the military. At the same time, the US Navy has capabilities which could be a 
tremendous asset in times of natural disasters and multi-casualty incidents (MCI). These 
capabilities are not necessarily the analytical capabilities such as plume prediction capabilities, 
but more logistical support assets. For example, UAV imaging for disaster damage assessment, 
ship borne equipment transport capacity for regions made inaccessible due to road damage (e.g. 
Northern California Coast), helicopter assets for medical evacuation and equipment transport and 
shipboard medical treatment capability when local hospitals are inundated or inoperable are 
examples ofNavy capabilities which can be exploited during a civil emergency. 
FTBE-E exercise of the CMOC starkly presented the shortfalls of the current Naval capabilities to 
render assistance to civilian agencies in the event of disasters or WMD terrorism events. In 
principal communication was established between the USS Coronado and the California State 
REOC in Oakland. However, in practice, the means of communication do not exist . Frustrations 
were felt on both sides because protocol to communicate did not exist. 
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The issue of non-secure communication arose during this exercise and will arise in future 
eventualities. 
Much of the information that needs to be transferred to civilian agencies exists via the SIPRNET. 
On board calculation of plume data will be done in an access controlled area and there is no 
established communication procedure to release the information directly to the civilian agency. 
When HF communication was attempted, one individual chief was found who knew how to 
communicate in a non-secure mode, but it took many hours before that individual was located to 
perform the task. In a military operation, procedures cannot afford to be individual sailor 
dependent. A well established procedure to communicate from a secure to non-secure 
environment needs to be established. 
On the other side, the USS Coronado communicated with Pearl Harbor in order to gain access 
into the California State Response Information Management System (RIMS). This system is also 
protected from non-authorized use and the authorization passwords were not available during the 
exercise. 
The civilian agencies are well suited to respond to civil emergencies. At the REOC there is 
capability to communicate with California Counties, capabilities to create large scale maps, and 
capability to re-allocate resources among the many agencies. The RIMS system is a well 
established system capable of keeping all affected agencies informed. The Navy Softrisk system 
appears to be doing similar functions as the RIMS system. There appears to be a duplication of 
effort in trying to create a parallel system without an in depth knowledge of an operation system 
(RIMS) with which it will have to interface. If the Navy is serious about assisting in domestic 
events, it would be worthwhile to allocate personnel to understand civil emergency procedures. 
In general, civilian agencies have a greater understanding of military procedures than military 
agencies understand civilian procedures. This can be attributed to the fact that many of the 
civilian agency employees have had military experience. Active duty military have not, in 
general, had experience in similar civilian jobs. To make a positive contribution to civilian 
disaster relief, the military, especially the Navy, needs to have people who understand civil 
disaster response. (This is especially true of the Navy since it traditionally have been able to 
work in isolation from civil affairs. The Army tends to be more aware of civil procedures since 
they operate more in an environment closer to civilian influence.) 
Multiple means of connectivity (e.g. landline, internet, hf, cell phone, etc) are needed in order to 
avoid single point failure. In addition to the difficulties in establishing non-secure hf links, the 
server in the CMOC went down several times because a coffee pot was plugged into the same 
outlet In retrospect, this appears like a problem which can easily be avoided, but in an 
emergency situation all circumstances cannot be individually anticipated. Redundancy allows for 
operational functionality. 
Technical content is important. During the exercise, shipboard plume calculations were created 
with particular local wind and environmental conditions. The output did not reveal what the input 
assumptions were, so judgement could not be exercised by the operator to determine if the 
calculated answers were correct or not. In any problem, it is GIGO, Garbage In -Garbage Out. 
The WMD cell which used a program different from the one used in the CMOC (Livermore 
ARAC, ARAC, Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability) created a plume picture considerably 
different from that in the CMOC. The civilian agency also has plume calculations models. The 
different models calculate differently in detail, but it is not obvious that any of these models are 
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any worse than the other in an environment where rapid response is necessary. The Russian 
adage "Better is the enemy of good enough" may be operational in calculating plumes during an 
event. At the least, any model calculation should provide input data to the user. 
Communication requires both sending and receiving. Without acknowledgement of receipt of 
communication, the sender is left in the dark as to whether the communication was received on 
the other side. Sometimes the problem existed in systems outside of the ships' control. A 
procedure to acknowledge receipt of message would be helpful to assure the sender that 
communication is intact. Responding after waiting for action requires waiting for decision and 
can give the impression that communication links were lost. 
In the event that the civilian sector required help from the Navy, there is not clear-cut procedure 
to ask for aid. At the local command level, it is not clear that a decision to provide aid can be 
made. Recently, the loss of military bases to BRAC in the Bay Area makes previously 
established communication links and ties unusable. Is there a DOD wide 911 system to which aid 
can be requested. Is this done at the Fleet level, National level, task force level or individual ship 
level? 
The UAV imagery would have been a tremendous asset to the civilian disaster response agency. 
Water and air transport capability may be the only means to reach certain remote areas. These 
needs could not be provided during this exercise. The Navy should not try to second guess the 
needs of the civilian agencies, but a rational discussion could be conducted to determine the 
assets that the Navy can provide. In some instances, it appeared that the Navy was trying to re-
invent the wheel. 
As a general rule, the civilian agencies can focus on their single mission of emergency response. 
The military is tasked to do many different things. Rather than creating something totally new, it 
would be useful for the military to become aware of the civilian capabilities and incorporate them 
in their procedures. 
As a practical matter, should another exercise or experiment be conducted, distinguished visitor 
access should be severely curtailed. As a practical matter, each time a DV tour was conducted on 
the USS Coronado, communication with REOC was lost. Demonstrations are fine, but they do 
not create an environment in which to learn lessons so that practical improvements can be made. 
FTBE-E at San Francisco was more a show than a learning experiment. 
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APPENDIX 
A. ASSESSMENT PLAN 
DATA COLLECTION AND ASSESSMENT PLAN 
BACKGROUND 
The Fleet Battle Experiments (FBE) are CNO-initiated series of operational experiments for the 
purpose of examining emerging systems, technologies and concepts. The Maritime Battle Center 
(MBC) of the new Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) is the CNO's agent for 
planning and implementing these experiments in conjunction with the numbered Fleets. FBE-E is 
the fifth in the series and is under the operational sponsorship of Commander Third Fleet 
(COMTHIRDFLT) in San Diego. The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has been asked to 
perform assessment for FBE-E during March and April 1999. The name for the Spring 1999 
evolutions of which FBE-E is a part is KERNEL BLITZ 99 (KB 99). 
FBE- Echo will draw upon the experience of the four preceding experiments, most directly on the 
FBEs Alpha and Bravo which were also COMTHIRDFLT experiments. In particular there are 
follow-ons to the Precision Engagement, Network Centric Land Attack and Theatre Aircraft and 
Missile Defense (T AMD) from Alpha and the targeting process from Bravo. As with the first 
experiment, Echo will occur in conjunction with Marine Corps (USMC) Advanced Warfighting 
Experiment (A WE). FBE-E is in conjunction with the USMC URBAN WARRIOR exercise for 
Phase 1 in Northern California and with the Extended Littoral Battlespace (ELB) Advanced 
Concept Technical Demonstration (ACTD) called Littoral Lightning during Phase 2 in Southern 
California. 
Limited Objective Experiments (LOE) will continue in Phase 2 and 3. Phase 3 ofKB 99 is in 
association with the KERNEL BLITZ Prime joint amphibious exercise at Camp Pendleton. NPS 
assessment will focus on Phase 1 (10-25 March) and to a lesser extent on Phase 2 (10-16) April, 
with only concern supporting analyses in casualty management/civil affairs, command and 
control and the SACCEX in Phase 3 (19-30 April). 
FBE-E will highlight new operational concepts and capabilities for dealing with Full Dimensional 
Protection with asymmetric threats in urban environments, network-centric undersea warfare, and 
also in Precision Engagement with fusion and reach back for information support of targeting and 
dynamic weapon-target against urban and Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) targets. 
EXPERIMENT CONCEPTS AND APPROACH 
NPS has performed assessments for several Joint Warrior lnteroperability Demonstrations 
(JWIDs) and routinely for the ONR Adaptable Architecture for Command and Control (A2C2) 
laboratory experiments. NPS personnel were also involved in the All-Service Combat 
Identification Evaluation Team field tests in 1995 & 1996. The Modular C2 Evaluation Structure 
(MCES) is a tool developed at NPS in conjunction with the Military Operations Research Society 
(MORS) for stepping through quantitative assessments that has applicability for FBE-E. NPS has 
conceptually applied the MCES in helping to define measures to gauge the success of each of the 
major areas ofFBE-E. 
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The concepts being explored in FBE-E are the following from the MBC FBE-E Experimentation 
Plan: 
• Full Dimensional Protection 
• Asymmetric Threat 
• Network-centric ASW with collaborative multi-sensor planning 
• Theatre Air and Missile Defense (T AMD) 
• Precision Engagement (PE) 
• Other analysis I experimentation areas: Information Superiority and 
• Casualty Management I Civil Military Affairs which will be conducted in all three phases. 
• Limited Objective Experiments (LOE) are continuation of the ASW and PE into later phases. 
Although the FBEs are labeled Experiments, they are not laboratory experiments but are 
operational experiments or better yet, explorations of new concepts, technologies and processes. 
In FBEs to date there have seldom been opportunities for experimental replication (several runs 
under controlled conditions) or control groups that constitute the standard case or experimental 
designs that systematically vary the very large number of factors in the operations. Usually the 
base case or standard is simply the "usual process and results". Perhaps more important than 
whether the specific experimental processes worked in this FBE, are the insights into how they 
can be made better for the next FBE. The FBE-E plan emphasizes the experimental process, 
establishing a baseline and gathering data to assess and mature the concepts. 
Given these goals, NPS recommends the emerging principle of "model-test-model" for the FBE 
to the extent possible. Following this principle, simple models of the processes will be suggested 
that can give an indication ofthe conditions necessary for the success of the specific experiment 
or even the general area. These models can be helpful in setting up FBE-E and, if compared 
against the actual results of Echo, may be even more useful in indicating directions for the next 
FBE by extrapolation in future, improved modeling or by indicating the need for Limited 
Objective Experiments (LOE) before the next FBE. In some cases more sophisticated models are 
available for the experiment through the presence of simulations or decision aids that can provide 
additional runs for extrapolation. 
Building the stable of these tools is an important goal for the FBE series. 
FBE-E NETWORK INSTRUMENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
SCOPE 
Fleet Battle Experiment Echo will conduct Bandwidth Analysis of selected Local Area Networks, 
(LAN's) and Wide Area Networks, (WAN's) to evaluate communications performance during 
FBE-E using the SNIFFER monitoring system. 
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS 
The SNIFFER system will utilize Network analyzers and evaluators to collect data both manually 
and automatically through direct observation and microcomputer-based monitoring devices, 
"sniffers". Automated data extraction will be accomplished through the use of Local Area 
Network (LAN) monitoring devices (sniffers) to quantitatively measure the amount of data 
exchanged over the Local and Wide Area Networks (LANs and WANs). This data represents the 
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communications link between FBE-E systems that depend upon the LAN/WAN infrastructure for 
communications. The network test will involve multiple sites that utilize interSite LAN/WAN 
connectivity. The Network monitors will be programmed to filter addresses and gather network 
usage statistics based on source and origination addresses. The data gathered during the 
execution of the exercise will be used to obtain network loading, traffic analysis, and 
recommendations. Another segment of the network performance analysis is the record of 
subjective/ observed network performance issues. Observations such as garbled voice, slow 
image transfer, low performance over a video teleconference session, will be recorded with time 
stamps (if such data is recorded), then made available to the network analysis group. This data 
will help isolate causes of problems in network performance. 
ASSESSMENT PLANS FOR EACH CONCEPT 
MARITIME DOMINANCE 
COUNTERING ASYMMETRIC THREATS 
The objective of this area is the improved protection of high-value units (HVU) at off shore 
anchorage or in port from asymmetric threats. Asymmetric here implies nonCOnventional or 
non-military threat, i.e. terrorists. Such threats range from combat swimmers to jet-skis to 
civilian aircraft with chemical or biological aerosols (WMD). The integration of sensors and 
networks with existing weapons is the central means for accomplishing the goal. The network 
will be directed by the Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit (MIUWU) and be coordinated 
with the USW cell on-board the USS Coronado. These activities will occur only during Phase 1 
in conjunction with URBAN WARRIOR. 
The ultimate purpose of the defense against asymmetric threats is to deter attack. Because this 
portion ofFBE-E will be one that employs an actual OPFOR it should be possible to measure the 
degree to which they are kept off-balance and discouraged by our force protection activities as 
well as how effective we are in protection against the specific attacks. The placement of 
command and control within the mobile MIUWU is one step in this direction. Our ability to take 
away the initiative will depend upon Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) in new and 
possibly unique ways. 
Previous FBEs have not featured asymmetrical threats of this nature. Because of the unusual 
nature ofthese threats and the small number of possible unalerted trials, the model- test-model 
approach is appropriate. NPS I Crane are developing initial models for some of the threats below. 
These simple models of the anticipated environments should be useful in determining 
experimental conditions and thresholds before FBE-E. After FBE-E they may prove useful in 
extrapolating the threat and zones of protection to reflect operations under more realistic 
conditions and with revised procedures. 
Hypothesis 1: Combat swimmers can be detected by the Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit 
(MIUWU) and other swimmer detection systems and countered by coordinated operations of the 
Port Security Unit (PSU). 
Measure 1: The percentage of trials in which swimmers are detected before reaching unit and 
estimated range at which detected. Modes of detection and confirmation and time to sort and 
declare threat should be recorded. Swimmer mode (surface, open circuit and closed circuit) and 
visibility conditions should be noted. 
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Measure 2: Time from detection to prosecution of detection by response force. This includes 
time to communicate to HVU and the PSU and time to alert and activate effective responses 
(weapon to bear on visually identified target at effective range). 
Implementation: It is planned that the MIUWU will record data and maintain the picture to be 
sent to the USW cell. Tip-off of likely swimmer threats will be provided in the MSEL. Event 
logs and interview I questionnaires will be obtained from the participants by the observers in the 
MIUWU and on board the HVU and PVUs. The end game of interception ofthe swimmer after 
detection and activation of response will not be assessed because of swimmer safety issues. 
Hypotheses 2: Attached mines can be located more quickly using a hand-held sonar. 
Measure 1: Ratio of time to locate mines attached to ship with and without the sonar. 
Measure 2: Usability of the hand-held sonar. 
Implementation: At least some ofthe attacks will culminate in emplacement of pseudo-limpet 
mines on the HVU in designated positions. Different EOD swimmer teams will attempt to locate 
the mines with half the teams using hand-held sonar locating devices. Time to find the mines will 
be observed beginning with entering the water at the HVU. A questionnaire will be issued to the 
participants concerning the features of the hand-held sonar to gain insight into the practical 
application of the device. The searches will not be modeled. 
Hypothesis 3: Networked multi-sensor surveillance and response forces in layered defense can 
counter asymmetric small-boat attacks. 
Measure 1: Ranges at which attacks are detected and at which they are declared threats. 
Measure 2: Time to initiate coordinated response to potential (sometimes WMD) threat after 
threat is detected, engaged or device is planted (final event of sequence). 
Measure 3: Perception of false alarms, fratricide and collateral damage risks. 
Implementation: The MIUWU will record tracks and observers will maintain logs. Video 
camera recording by observers should begin on detection and continue throughout event. Traffic 
and visibility should be noted at frequent intervals between events to establish baseline. Declared 
threat level, readiness levels, ROE changes, IFF procedures, system downtimes etc. should be 
noted regularly. Modes of detection and confirmation are important and communications log 
must be kept. 
Hypothesis 4: Networked multi-sensor surveillance and response forces in layered defense can 
counter attacks from personal watercraft (jet skis). 
From an assessment standpoint this is the same as Hypothesis 3 so measures and implementation 
are the same as above. However the range and velocity may make it very difficult to respond in a 
timely manner. 
Hypothesis 5: Networked multi-sensor surveillance and response forces in layered defense can 
counter night attacks on anchored HVU by covert rubber boat with SEA SHADOW drop-off. 
This is somewhere between swimmer attack and small boat attack in the importance of surprise. 
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Measure 1: Percentage of the attacks in which warning is given by the MIUWU. 
Measure 2: Percentage of the attacks that are detected by the HVU. 
Implementation: To avoid tipping off the HVU, video recordings of the event will be made only 
from the SEA SHADOW or other drop-off ship. Logs of the HVU, MIUWU and the attack 
participants will be compared for determination of the successes and a questionnaire administered 
for insights into the reasons for non-success. 
Hypothesis 6: Networked multi-sensor surveillance and advanced detection and management 
systems can mitigate effects of asymmetric WMD attack from low, slow-flying aircraft. 
Measure 1: Ranges at which attack is detected and at which it is declared threat. 
Measure 2: Time to issue WMD warning. 
Measure 3: Time to initiate coordinated response to potential WMD threat after detected, 
engaged or device planted (final event of sequence). 
Implementation: A larger number of sensors and participants are anticipated for this event. 
The MSCT tool for analysis of air tracks will be used to baseline activity in the area (possibly 
also for ship tracks). Again, the MIUWU will record tracks and observers will maintain logs but 
the LSS and air pictures are needed. Video camera recording should begin on detection and 
continue throughout event. Traffic and visibility should be noted at frequent intervals between 
events to establish baseline. Declared threat level, readiness levels, ROE changes, IFF 
procedures, system downtimes etc should be noted regularly. Modes of detection and 
confirmation are important and communications logs must be kept. DSW A analysts and software 
should be utilized for data recording. 
Hypothesis 7: Networked multi-sensor surveillance and response forces in layered defense can 
counter night attacks on the HVU anti-ship missiles launched from a truck which exits a known 
holding area and proceeds to a launching area in the hills above harbor. Tip-off may come from 
USMC recon patrol on watch above Concord NWS. 
Measure 1: Percentage oftimes exit is detected. 
Measure 2: Percentage oftime truck is detected in logical launch position or condition before 
simulated launch. 
Implementation: These runs will be conducted when UAVs are available to surveil the 
holding area and/or the potential launch areas. A GPS track on the truck should be maintained. 
Logs of the UAV control stations can be compared to the track. Separately as part of the 
Precision Engagement effort, the launch points and holding area should be examined for 
targetability and the link from UAVs through processing and targeting should be timed for 
responsiveness. 
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Hypothesis 8: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB), advanced sensors and 
networked control of the PSU by the MIUWU will allow more effective positioning and 
employment of the PSU against the variety of asymmetric threats. 
Measure 1: Ratio of time to reset protective grid using MIUWU control to time without reset 
control. 
Measure 2: Ratio of detections with IPB to that without IPB. 
Implementation: During first two days (15 & 16 March) MIUWU will designate end of each 
trial and tell PSU where to reposition for next run. PSUs will report when ready on station. 
During second period ( 17 & 18 March) MIUWU will not reposition units but time to ready 
positions will be recorded. For measure 2, for each set of attacks, an attack from directions I 
times outside of those determined in the IPB will be attempted probably late in each set of trials. 
In addition to these more controlled comparisons, if possible some "baseline trials" outside of 
MIUWUCOntrolled events may be possible for some forms of attack. Observer and participants 
will contribute subjective assessments of this hypothesis. 
DATA COLLECTION FOR COUNTERING ASYMMETRIC 
THREATS 
Asymmetric threats will occur in limited areas and numbers and are brief so it should be possible 
to make video recordings of most of the trial events. An observer should make the recording on 
the platform being attacked in most cases. In addition observers should be made part of the 
attacking force where practical. The MIUWU will be the central element and an observer there 
should make sure that systems logs and logs of actions and position/location data streams are 
obtained from the system during trials. A video of the activities in the MIUWU during trials may 
also be useful. The IPB activities should also be observed and logged and any predictive 
defensive activities noted. Time lines of response to the attacks are vital. 
It will be necessary to have two shifts of observers in the MIUWU. An observer in the USW cell 
on USS CORONADO will also be required but only during trials and may perhaps share duties in 
the USW function. The activities in the WMD cell must also be observed and logged but again 
that duty may be shared across other functions such as PE. 
In addition to the quantitative data above it will be necessary to collect perceptions of the OPFOR 
and other participants as to the practicality of the protection processes and their effectiveness. 
Insights into improvements will also be solicited on the questionnaires. 
NETWORK-CENTRIC UNDERSEA WARFARE (USW) 
The objective of network centric undersea warfare is a fully integrated undersea warfare 
capability contributing to full dimensional protection for forces in and beyond the Joint Area of 
Operations (JOA). Network-centric anti-submarine warfare using distributed collaborative 
planning for multi-sensor search and prosecution is the FBE-E concept for addressing this goal. 
An ASW Cell with improved connectivity, standardized models and databases will stand-up for 
training and contingency operation planning in FBE-E and will conduct both planning and 
execution during the associated Limited Objective Experiment (LOE). USW has not been a 
major area in the previous FBEs. 
The assumptions that drive this USW concept include availability of enhanced: 
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• C41 systems that provide high data rate connectivity, 
• fusion of a detailed underwater picture with surface and air pictures, 
• search planning and assessment tools, 
• battle management tools, and remote sensor management tools, 
• sensor systems that provide passive acoustic, mono-static active acoustic, multi-static active 
acoustic, non-acoustic detections plus environmental characterization, and 
• Weapon systems for shallow water ASW, for loitering and in support of distributed sensors, 
mine neutralization, and non-lethal options. 
For FBE-E these assumptions will clearly not be met, but some will be approximated or simulated 
by the ASW Anchor Desk as necessary to conduct the experiment. The Anchor Desk will have 
enhanced connectivity to ships, submarines, aircraft, national assets, environmental information 
resources, sensor platforms and other command centers. 
For this experiment, the ASW Anchor Desk will be within the USW cell onboard USS 
CORONADO. It will perform the following functions: 
• Develop and evaluate ASW search plans to support the fundamental campaign mission. 
For FBE-E, this mission will be advanced force operations in preparation for and 
amphibious assault. Maintain and distribute submarine threat data and cueing to sensor 
platforms. Fuse and distribute the coherent tactical and operational level pictures of the 
undersea battlespace. Evaluate the effectiveness of completed searches to identify the 
remaining threat. Consolidate and analyze inSitu environmental data from dispersed 
sensors. Cache and distribute METOC data and serve as the tie point for reachback to 
shore based support. 
• Manage the collaborative search planning process and employment of remote sensors. 
• Search plans from the Anchor Desk will be distributed to the affected units for update 
with local environmental information, assessment of compatibility with other assigned 
warfare duties and assessment of risk to that unit. 
• The capabilities to be explored in network-centric USW include a CONOPS for fusing all 
available information, distributed collaborative planning with shared models and 
databases, visualization of the essential elements of information (EED, deconfliction of 
sensors, and management of unmanned sensors. The specific experiments in network-
centric ASW portion are discussed in the paragraphs below. Initial hypotheses and 
approaches to measures are indicated and implementation of the measures is discussed. 
During FBE-E, the ASW operations will be limited to advance planning of ASW operations in 
support of the amphibious assault occurring in a later phase of KERNEL BLITZ. During the 
LOE, ASW operations will expand to include real time search planning, execution of these plans 
and an examination of alternative concepts for waterspace management enabled by a CTP and 
improved communications to BLUE Force submarines. The NPS assessment will focus on the 
LOE. 
Hypothesis 1: A collaboratively developed area ASW search plan improves overall search 
effectiveness. 
Measure 1: Ratio of the integrated, predicted probability of detection for the collaboratively 
developed plan over the aggregated predicted probabilities of detection of the independently 
developed search plans. 
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Implementation: In a model-test-model mode, search plans for the expected conditions can be 
developed before the FBE-E and compared to give a rough idea of the expected ratio. A 
threshold (like 1.3) should be agreed as the success criteria based on the results from the 
modeling. Doing this modeling before FBE-E will serve as a feasibility check as well. During 
FBE-E the platforms can develop their independent plans and the observers can compare the 
predicted detection capabilities to that of the collaborative developed plan managed by the ASW 
cell. Since this comparison is best accomplished by comparing snapshots of the various detection 
probabilities, several time stamped samples over the course of the LOE are required. An average 
of these ratios should be compared to the threshold. 
After the LOE, a comparison of the ratio from the actual experiment and the ratio from the earlier 
modeling should be explored to identify potential weaknesses in the process. 
Measure 2: Responsiveness of collaborative planning to changes in conditions. Although 
responsiveness might differ from that of independent planning, these differences will be very 
condition and situation dependent. 
Implementation: Since this measure is so condition and situation dependent, it will be 
evaluated through a subjective questionnaire and narrative log-book to collect commander and 
operator impressions and insights. 
Measure 3: Practicality of collaborative planning. This measure includes communication 
requirements, software incompatibilities, training difficulties etc. 
Implementation: This measure is also rather subjective and will be addressed using a subjective 
questionnaire and narrative logbook to collect commander and operator impressions and insights. 
Hypothesis 2: The use of identical, high-fidelity models and associated databases by all ASW 
participants improves the overall understanding of the overall search plan and individual sensor 
performance. Additionally, the use of a common model allows "drill-down" into the factors 
affecting performance. 
Measure 1: Value added to the planning process and the ability to effectively employ sensors. 
Implementation: A subjective questionnaire based survey and narrative logbook to collect 
commander and operator impressions and insights along the following themes: 
How does the use of common, high fidelity models and databases to visualize aspects of the 
overall search plan aid or hinder an individual platform's assessment of his risk in executing the 
search plan. (For example, how does the overall plan support the self-defense issues of a 
platform tasked to conduct active acoustic search?) 
How does the use of common, high fidelity models and databases to visualize aspects of the 
overall search plan aid or hinder an individual platform's understanding of his tasking and 
contribution to the overall search? 
How were high fidelity models and databases used to support tactical employment of sensors? 
How did high fidelity models and databases contribute to the development of the tactical picture, 
i.e., target localization based on physics based modeling of sound propagation (detection 
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envelope structure), analysis of the range dependence of various aspects of the target's signature 
structure? 
Hypothesis 3: Time integration of the tactical undersea picture provides additional significant 
information for all ASW echelons compared to the current real-time tactical picture alone. 
Measures: This is an exploratory effort to identify the comparative Essential Elements of 
Information (EEl) and the insights that can be gained at different ASW echelons from the 
timeiNTegrated picture. (i.e., derivation of operational patterns, etc.) 
Implementation: Again, a subjective questionnaire will be used to gain insights concerning 
this hypothesis. The questions will focus on describing the tactical insights gained through time 
integration and how to exploit these insights. 
Hypothesis 4a: The undersea tactical picture provides sufficiently timely positional and 
operational information for BLUE Force submarines to safely enable dynamic Weapons 
Exclusion Zones around BLUE Force submarines. 
Hypothesis 4b: An ASW Joint Engagement Zone (JEZ) will allow more successful prosecution 
of an adversary submarine than the current exclusive waterspace management policy protecting 
BLUE Force submarines. (Note the JEZ assumes a common tactical picture containing timely 
track information for BLUE Force submarines and reliable, real-time communications between 
BLUE Force submarines and the rest of the ASW forces.) 
Measure 1: Percentage of time that the sub was outside of the dynamic Weapon Exclusion 
Zone under various conditions. Note that success threshold for this measure is very close to zero. 
Measure 2: Ratio of percentage of detections converted to successful prosecutions in BLUE 
Force Submarine Operating Areas using the JEZ deconfliction method over the percentage for the 
traditional exclusive waterspace management method using NOTACK procedures. 
Measure 3: Ratio of percentage of detections converted to successful prosecutions in BLUE 
Force Submarine Operation Areas using the JEZ deconfliction method with continuous, two-way 
communications to the submarine over the percentage for a modified JEZ deconfliction method 
with continuous, one-way receive only communications to the submarine. 
Measure 4: Tactical impact of two-way communications with BLUE Force submarines through 
systems such as ACOMMS. 
Implementation: For measures 1, 2 and 3, model-test-model is applicable here again because a 
number of prosecution opportunities with multiple submarines and prosecution assets are required 
for a robust test, which may not be possible achievable given that the orange submarines are not 
limited to structured geometry runs. Before FBE-E a scenario should be built and modeled to 
obtain an estimate of a suitable success threshold. 
During the experiment, a ground truth reconstruction of all relevant participant tracks, blue and 
orange forces, will be produced from the detailed position and operational reporting from each 
participant. 
Reconstruction will assess: 
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• Validity of reported detections, 
• Success of reported engagements, 
• Missed detection opportunities, and 
• Effectiveness of the JEZ deconfliction methodology. 
For measure 3, a subjective questionnaire will be used to gain insights concerning this hypothesis. 
The questions will focus on describing the advantages gained, limitations incurred and methods to 
tactically exploit this type of communications capability. 
Hypothesis 5: The sensor network and contact management capabilities of the ASW network 
provides an improved ability to "finger-print" and conduct all source overt or covert tracking of 
high interest WHITE shipping in support of: 
Area defense against covertly armed shipping, 
Counter-proliferation operations, 
Counter-narcotic or other counter-smuggling operations. 
Measure 1: Percentage of correct target classifications, identifications and signature 
correlations. 
Measure 2: Riment area. 
Implementation: The experiment will exploit merchant traffic conducting routine transit of the 
exercise area without interfering or communicating with the ships. As a result, the ships will not 
report their ground truth tracks. The experiment control group charged with selecting suitable 
ships for the experiment will determine these parameters. The assessment will be conducted by 
comparing classification, identification and track data reported in the ASW network to the 
"ground truth". 
DATA COLLECTION FOR NETWORK-CENTRIC USW 
The COP for the LOE should be preserved for analysis. The RECAP logs of the ships and the P3 
log (ORION) should be reported every four hours to the USW cell for ground truth. The 
estimated positions of all participating units will be tracked and preserved in the IMA T system. 
The biggest difficulty is the position of the subs. The submarines will make RECAP reports at 
every communication period. The IMA T histories will be maintained. In Comparison to the 
Asymmetric Threat function, a more continuous record is required because the trials are largely 
undefined because of the non-observable interactions with the submarines. However the nearly 
continuous track in the USW cell may make it possible to video tape the action in the cell at 
important moments. 
Environmental data is especially important for USW analysis. Modular Ocean Data Assimilation 
System (MOD AS) data will be transmitted to IMA T every 12 hours. The units' Directional 
Ambient Noise will be will be reported maintained on the WeCAN and archived. The W eCAN 
will also maintain commanders notes and message traffic. 
Observers will be necessary in the USW cell on USS Coronado and also on major surface 
participants although some sharing of duties on the other platforms may be possible. 
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In addition to the data above, a subjective questionnaire for the capture of perceptions will be 
used at the end of the experiment phase for all participants. 
JOINT THEATRE AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE (JTAMD) 
JT AMD has been an important player in the FBEs to date. In FBE-E it must provide defense 
against conventional aircraft, theatre ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. In addition to the 
AEGIS I LINEBACKER capabilities it will draw upon other sensors for asymmetric threats. This 
area's objective is to explore the ability ofthe Expeditionary Force to make use of in-place 
civilian sensors to help establish a defensive grid. These sensors include airport and harbor radars 
and the supporting civilian communications system. 
UAVs, national assets and appropriate military systems will also be used as available. Fusion and 
control will be from USS CORONADO and the MIUWU as the asymmetric threat response cell. 
Defensive Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) will be simulated. 
In addition to maintaining an air picture with diverse sources active defense, IT AMD will include 
attack operations including planning and simulated execution of launch platforms, C2 nodes, 
missile stocks and infrastructure. Special software to support the planning will be installed on 
USS CORONADO and fire missions will be passed to LAWS. 
Hypothesis: The addition of information from civilian in-place systems can significantly 
improve the fused picture of air and surface conventional and asymmetric threats. 
Measure 1: Range at which a low, slow-flying threat can be detected and tracked. 
Measure 2: Range at which asymmetric surface threats can be detected. 
Measure 3: Time of warning of launch or range at which asymmetric cruise missile can be 
detected and engaged. 
Measure 4: Fraction of population warned of asymmetric threat. 
Implementation: To a large extent this area concerns adding civilian air track information and 
sophisticated processing to the force protection picture being generated in the Asymmetric Threat 
areas above. Measures 1 and 2 occur again below against the same threats and are treated in 
more detail there. Measure 3 assumes a cruise missile threat similar to that described below as 
well, but extends into the track and engage portions of the event. A model for this portion would 
be useful for both simulation and stimulation. A suitable model is not yet known to be available. 
Measure 4 can only be tested as far as passing of the warning from the military to civilian 
authorities. An event log should be kept for this purpose. To a large extent the success of this 
area will be assessed at two levels. The first is the ability to provide connectivity to the potential 
sources of information in an interoperable manner. This should be established by having the 
Force Protection Cell members (aided by observers) establish a log for nets and sources to be 
maintained during phase 1. At the next level is the added value of this information to that 
provided by organic assets. 
Because of the qualitative nature of value added a questionnaire will be administered by the 
observers at the change of shifts in the Force Protection Cell to obtain their ratings on a five-point 
scale. The design of the questionnaire should include identification of the specific contributions 
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of the various sources if possible. Otherwise the value may have to be determined for the 
aggregate of "non-organic" sources. 
PRECISION ENGAGEMENT 
Precision Engagement involves a diverse range of activities, including research and 
development, command and control and target designation. The processes to be examined in 
FBE-E will be targeting, fire order generation and dissemination- specifically, precision 
targeting of time sensitive surface targets, urban precision engagement and 4 dimensional ( 4-D) 
deconfliction. Targeting is the process of selecting adversary forces, geographical areas, 
installations, or activities planned for capture, degradation, destruction or neutralization by 
military forces and matching the appropriate response to them. The model used to describe 
how targeting is accomplished is called the targeting cycle. The targeting cycle is divided into 
six phases: objectives and guidance, target development, weaponeering, force application, 
execution planning/force execution and combat assessment. FBE-E will examine targeting 
procedures and advances in technology that may improve our ability to hit targets in an urban 
environment and be able to rapidly target and employ platforms/ weapons against time sensitive 
surface targets (land and sea surface targets). 
4-Dimensional ( 4-D) deconfliction is the process of deconflicting small volumes of airspace and 
ground areas that move with time. Each missile, bullet, aircraft and friendly ground operating 
area will have a "bubble" around it. Speed, ability to react and whether the missile, bullet, 
aircraft or friendly ground area is manned or unmanned will determine the size and shape of the 
"bubble". Recent improvements and impending improvements in technologies allow us to 
change our deconfliction procedures. 4-D Deconfliction will experiment with changes in tactics, 
techniques and procedures used for deconfliction based on improvements in capabilities produced 
by changing the concept of how we do deconfliction. 
For clarity sake, the FBE-E and Limited Objective Experiment (LOE) Precision Engagement 
processes discussed above are grouped under three execution groups: 
RING OF FIRE (ROF)- Rapid reaction network-centric warfare in an urban environment 
while simultaneously conducting interdiction, strike, and counterfire; 
VICIOUS BLAZE (VB)- Deliberate targeting (6-48 hours) experiments, examining all source 
imagery fusion, manipulation, and dissemination, and afloat roles in on-line electronic target 
folder (ETF) production; 
SILENT FURY (SF)- Utilization of tactical reconnaissance to support reactive targeting ( <2 
hours) in a dynamic environment. 
OBJECTIVE: Explore and evaluate targeting processes and technology to accurately place 
munitions on designated targets in a time constrained environment. 
HYPOTHESIS: Current weapons system targeting processes are disjointed and do not exploit 
available technologies. precision engagement is a resource-demanding endeavor that sacrifices 
execution speed for accuracy. fbe-e will experiment with new technology and supporting tactics, 
techniques, and procedures ( ttp) with the intent of improving integration among weapon systems 
and between operations and intelligence efforts. such activity will result in improved speed and 
accuracy of the targeting, planning, and execution processes, and reduce requirements for 
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restrikes. airspace deconfliction resulting from flight path conflicts, weapon trajectories, weapons 
effects, friendly aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicle (uav) flight are also problems that constrain 
the use of long-range weapons. improved technology and new ttp explored in fbe-e may allow 
inefficient airspace procedures to be amended for greater weapons effectiveness. 
IMPLEMENTATION: Explore, examine, and evaluate: targeting and effects of naval fire 
support in an urban environment; sensor to shooter continuum versus fixed and mobile targets; 
integration of imagery feeds and targeting tools in support of reactive and deliberate targeting; 
ability to rapidly deconflict airspace using 4-d near-real-time deconfliction; and conduct targeting 
and live missile shots in a gps jamming environment. 
Maximize use of GENSER SIPRNET LAN and WAN while ensuring distribution of imagery and 
electronic target folders to all customers. Maintain tasking authority for all FBE-E imagery 
sensors within the Joint Strike Center aboard USS CORONADO. 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS PLAN 
• Key metric for our measures of effectiveness are accuracy and timeliness of the targeting data 
provided, qualitative assessment and satisfaction of customer requirements. 
• Evaluate the increased effectiveness of the engagements using networked systems 
• Evaluate time to complete process allowing Watchstander to commit decision. 
• Evaluate ability to monitor available friendly response assets. 
• Evaluate probability of adequate weapon to target match (effectiveness). 
• Evaluate time to complete activity (time). 
• Evaluate ability to update orders, data and control info to attack on own and supporting 
platforms (update capability). 
• Evaluate ability to receive clear and sufficient orders and data (reliability). 
• Evaluate probability of transmit to target acquisition point (receive ability). 
• Evaluate time to respond. 
• Evaluate probability of transit to target acquisition point (survival probability). 
• Evaluate time to perform specific tasks (time). 
• Evaluate quality of task product. 
• Evaluate usability human interface to equipment. 
• Evaluate human workload processing rates of information (e.g. messages per second) 
CASUALTY MANAGEMENT AND CIVIL MILITARY 
OPERATIONS 
Casualty Management 
The Third Fleet Surgeon's office has proposed a number of experiments for FBE-E in both 
Casualty Management and Civil-Military Operations. In this area the use of model-test-model is 
not appropriate at this time because of the early stage of development and the difficulty of 
identifying and assessing specific outcomes for the experiments. Instead a qualitative approach 
will be taken to produce assessment and some insights. 
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COMPARISON OF CASUALTY PREDICTION & LOGISTICS MODELS MAT, 
FORCAS, SHIPCAS, AND CASEV AC (PRE-PHASE 1 AND PHASE 3) 
A comparison of four existing models of casualties will be conducted for the KB' phase of FBE-
E's amphibious landing. The comparison will be initiated prior to the exercise. The comparison 
will be executed during the exercise as a final test of usability. 
Hypothesis: No single model contains all of the features desired for all sizes of operation but 
one stands out as most appropriated for the battalionSized operation. 
Measure 1: Usability by a typical medical planner. 
Measure 2: Process validity & consistency - inputs are appropriate and complete and match the 
output specificity. Outputs are easily translated into required actions such as triage, evacuation, 
re-supply etc. 
Measure 3: Scalability - ability to represent a range of size of operations with at least face 
validity. 
Implementation: Measures 2 & 3 will be explored before FBE-E in order to prepare 
instruments for use in KB'. A written critique of these measures will be presented for each 
model. Measure l will be based on a subjective assessment by the KB' medical planner on a 
number of features. A log will be kept by the planner during execution in KB' identifying 
problems and performance. 
MEDICAL COLLABORATIVE LOGBOOK (MEDLOG) (PHASES 1-
3) 
MedLog is part of the COMTHIRDFLT LAN services that is used for preparing briefing material 
within the COMTHIRDFLT staff. MedLog will become the day-to-day tool for displaying the 
status of medical activities. This event integration tool will be used in all phases of FBE - Echo 
both internally and for integration with other aspects of operations including summary statistics, 
briefmg preparation and presentation. 
Hypothesis: MedLog is a convenient system for theatre-level situational awareness and daily 
management. 
Measure 1: Usability ofMedLog. 
Implementation: this calls for a subjective evaluation on a number of features using a 5-point 
scale for participants to fill out at the end of each phase. 
MULTI-LINGUAL INTERVIEW SYSTEM (DOW) (PHASE 1) 
This experiment uses the DARPA One-Way (DOW) hand-held voice-actuated computer to 
interview casualties with foreign language capabilities in Phase 1. 
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Hypothesis: The DOW provides an acceptable medium for eliciting vital information from non-
English speaking casualties when no local language capabilities are available. 
Measure 1: Understandability of questions by the casualty. 
Measure 2: Usability of the device by the operator. 
Implementation: A group of volunteer participants with English and foreign language 
capability will be obtained prior to Phase 1. They will be given a designated injury and symptom 
list. They will be interviewed entirely by the DOW speaking in the language of their capability. 
They will write their understanding of the question in English along with the answer. For 
measure 2 a 5-point scale questionnaire will be administered to the interviewers at the completion 
of the interviews. 
INCIDENT WATCHBOARD (PHASE 1 AND 2) 
This Web-based adaptation of the USMC CBIRF tool for tracking events and casualties will be 
tested for suitability. 
Hypothesis: Incident Watchboard (IW) can raise the situational awareness during a crisis at 
multiple levels of decision-makers. 
Measure 1: Usability ofiW in the shipboard and ashore environments. 
Measure 2: Impact or value-added by IW to decision-makers. 
Implementation: Subjective evaluations based on replies to a 5-point questionnaire provided to 
the participants. Measure 1 will be rated on a number of features to be developed. For measure 2 
the participants will be asked to compare to "normal" conditions without IW. 
THEATRE MEDICAL CORE SYSTEM (TMCS) (PHASE 2 & 3) 
The TMCS is a web-based DoD tool that can track patient information from Local Data Entry 
Tool (LDETs) or MeWS at lower echelons for reporting and resource management. It can be 
made easily available to staff to improve visibility of patient and resource status in everyday 
operations. 
Hypothesis 1: TMCS provides patient tracking on a near real-time basis and also summary 
OPORD Annex Q casualty management information. 
Measure 1: Time to access patient location from higher echelons. 
Measure 2: Accuracy of patient location. 
Measure 3: Usability ofTMCS. 
Measure 4: Visibility of Annex Q information to participants. 
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Implementation: At prescribed times the status of a sample of patients known to be in the 
system will be queried and the time to report recorded. An independent verification of the actual 
location will be made by observation or call to locations. Usability will be assessed by a 
questionnaire as covered for MedLog above. Visibility and completeness of the Annex Q 
information will be assessed by regularly noting the connectivity and by questionnaire. 
MOBIL MEDICAL MONITOR V 
(Now MeWS- Medical Work Station) (Phase 3) 
MeWS is a new portable field diagnostic tool with which care providers can which collect patient 
vital signs and transmit them along with patient smart card ID and field notations to the TMCS or 
other major stations. It can also serve as a Local Data Entry Terminal (LDET). 
Hypothesis: Semi-automatic collection and transmittal of physiological parameters from 
bedside will more speedily and accurately update local and higher level information systems. 
Measure 1: Ratio of time to update patient status in TMCS from MeWS divided by usual time 
for recording and transmittal. 
Measure 2: Usability of MeWS. 
Implementation: In Phase 1 the MeWS will be introduced to USS ESSEX and initial training 
and assessment of usability performed. In Phase 3 it will be implemented in the Ashore and 
Afloat Casualty Management Exercise. A log will be kept of times to report using MeWS and 
without using MeWS on a matched split of the casualties. 
STATREF AS FIELD REFERENCE LffiRARY ON CD- ROM 
Stat Ref is a standard medical treatment reference of 28 textbooks now available in updated form 
on CD-ROM. Its availability in all treatment centers could improve the currency of alternative 
procedures considered for treatment at low cost. 
Hypothesis: StatRef is an easy-to-use reference to the latest procedures and treatments. 
Measure 1: Usability of StatRef in the military environment. 
Measure 2: Breadth of alternatives for treatment considered by the provider. 
Implementation: Self-administered questionnaire for subjective ratings of StatRefby the care 
providers at the CRTS. 
CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT 
(MONTEREY EVENT) 
A USMC URBAN WARRIOR event will involve both military and civilian officials in a 
simulated biological terrorist incident in Monterey on March 13. A Civil Military Operations 
Center (CMOC) will be set up ashore. During this period, a small group in the Joint Medical 
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Center and a CMOC space aboard USS CORONADO will be developing civil-military doctrine 
for Navy support of such operations. 
Hypothesis: Doctrine for managing a domestic Civil-Military operation through the CMOC can 
be developed. 
Measure 1: Military and civilian officials involved in the doctrine development rate the 
operation as successful. 
Implementation: The measure will be established by a questionnaire distributed to the 
participants by the Analysis Team at the conclusion of the Monterey portion of the exercise. A 
five-point scale will be provided for the respondents to indicate their degree of agreement with 
statements of the measures, along with subsidiary questions. 
CONSEQUENCE MANAG~MENT OF TOXIC RELEASES 
This experiment will be a CPX aboard USS CORONADO only while in San Francisco Bay. Two 
sabotage-induced toxic releases will be modeled with special software (CAPS) and expertise. 
Subject-matter experts located in the Afloat CMOC space will provide a synopsis of the possible 
results and evaluate the response of the staff. 
Hypothesis: There are effective civil-military responses to the two toxic releases. 
Measure 1: Military staff and civilian subject matter experts involved in the operation rate the 
operation as successful. 
Measure 2: Military staff and civilian subject matter experts involved in the operation rate the 
information flow and response as timely. 
Measure 3: Connectivity between the Afloat authorities and any remote participants is rated as 
successful. 
Measure 4: Modeling to support the experiment was rated as successful. 
Implementation: The measures will be established by a questionnaire distributed to the 
participants by the Analysis Team at the conclusion of the San Francisco portion of the exercise. 
A five-point scale will be provided for the respondents to indicate their degree of agreement with 
statements of the measures, along with subsidiary questions. 
VIRTUAL WORK SPACE (VWS) 
This experiment is to test the VWS as a tool to support coordination between the Joint Medical 
Center (JMC) and the CMOC space aboard USS CORONADO. 
The VWS will be implemented by installation of cameras, microphones plus a projector on one 
wall of each of the spaces so that a virtual picture of what is happening in the other space is 
available to all the participants. The VWS will be tested in at least the two Phase 1 events 
described above. 
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Hypothesis: A Virtual WorkSpace can improve the coordination between the JMC and the 
CMOC. 
Measure 1: The military and civilian officials I subject matter experts rate the VWS as 
successful. 
Measure 2: The connectivity of the VWS is available at least 90% of the time the JMC and the 
CMOC are both functioning. 
Measure 3: Discussion of classified information in the JMC does not hinder operation of the 
vws. 
Implementation: The measures will be established by a questionnaire distributed by the 
analysis team to the participants at the conclusion of the Monterey and San Francisco portions of 
the exercise. A five-point scale will be provided for the respondents to indicate their degree of 
agreement with statements of the measures, along with subsidiary questions. A log will be kept 
in the CMOC and JWS to record non-operation of the system. 
The FBE-E Security Manager will approve the VWS set-up and a question concerning the effect 
will be given to the participants. 
DATA COLLECTION FOR CASUALTY MANAGEMENT AND 
CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS 
Observers should be in place in the Joint Medical Center during all three phases to ensure that 
operator logs are maintained and user questionnaires are distnbuted and retained. Since the 
assessments are largely subjective it is important that the proper personnel are identified and close 
to 100% of the questionnaires are completed. Evaluation forms for a standard set of features 
should be prepared for the usability of the various systems. More general evaluation questions 
may be necessary as well to solicit insights into improvements to the system as a whole. 
B. MEASURES 
MARITIME DOMINANCE COUNTERING ASYMMETRIC 
THREATS 
Hypothesis 1: Combat swimmers can be detected by the Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit 
(MIUWU) and other swimmer detection systems and countered by coordinated operations of the 
Port Security Unit (PSU). 
Measure 1: The percentage of trials in which swimmers are detected before reaching unit and 
estimated range at which detected. Modes of detection and confirmation and time to sort and 
declare threat should be recorded. Swimmer mode (surface, open circuit and closed circuit) and 
visibility conditions should be noted. 
Measure 2: Time from detection to prosecution of detection by response force. This includes 
time to communicate to HVU and the PSU and time to alert and activate effective responses 
(weapon to bear on visually identified target at effective range). 
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Hypotheses 2: Attached mines can be located more quickly using a hand-held sonar. 
Measure 1: Ratio of time to locate mines attached to ship with and without the sonar. 
Measure 2: Usability of the hand-held sonar. 
Hypothesis 3: Networked multi-sensor surveillance and response forces in layered defense can 
counter asymmetric small-boat attacks. 
Measure 1: Ranges at which attacks are detected and at which they are declared threats. 
Measure 2: Time to initiate coordinated response to potential (sometimes WMD) threat after 
threat is detected, engaged or device is planted (final event of sequence). 
Measure 3: Perception offalse alarms, fratricide and collateral damage risks. 
Hypothesis 4: Networked multi-sensor surveillance and response forces in layered defense can 
counter attacks from personal watercraft (jet skis). 
From an assessment standpoint this is the same as Hypothesis 3 so measures and implementation 
are the same as above. However the range and velocity may make it very difficult to respond in a 
timely manner. 
Hypothesis 5: Networked multi-sensor surveillance and response forces in layered defense can 
counter night attacks on anchored HVU by covert rubber boat with SEA SHADOW drop-off. 
This is somewhere between swimmer attack and small boat attack in the importance of surprise. 
Measure 1: Percentage of the attacks in which warning is given by the MIUWU. 
Measure 2: Percentage of the attacks that are detected by the HVU. 
Hypothesis 6: Networked multi-sensor surveillance and advanced detection and management 
systems can mitigate effects of asymmetric WMD attack from low, slow-flying aircraft. 
Measure 1: Ranges at which attack is detected and at which it is declared threat. 
Measure 2: Time to issue WMD warning. 
Measure 3: Time to initiate coordinated response to potential WMD threat after detected, 
engaged or device planted (final event of sequence). 
Hypothesis 7: Networked multi-sensor surveillance and response forces in layered defense can 
counter night attacks on the HVU anti-ship missiles launched from a truck which exits a known 
holding area and proceeds to a launching area in the hills above harbor. Tip-off may come from 
USMC recon patrol on watch above Concord NWS. 
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Measure 1: Percentage of times exit is detected. 
Measure 2: Percentage oftime truck is detected in logical launch position or condition before 
simulated launch. 
Hypothesis 8: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB), advanced sensors and 
networked control of the PSU by the MIUWU will allow more effective positioning and 
employment of the PSU against the variety of asymmetric threats. 
Measure 1: Ratio of time to reset protective grid using MIUWU control to time without reset 
control. 
Measure 2: Ratio of detections with IPB to that without IPB. 
NETWORK-CENTRIC UNDERSEA WARFARE (USW) 
Hypothesis 1: A collaboratively developed area ASW search plan improves overall search 
effectiveness. 
Measure 1: Ratio of the integrated, predicted probability of detection for the collaboratively 
developed plan over the aggregated predicted probabilities of detection of the independently 
developed search plans. 
Measure 2: Responsiveness of collaborative planning to changes in conditions. Although 
responsiveness might differ from that of independent planning, these differences will be very 
condition and situation dependent. 
Measure 3: Practicality of collaborative planning. This measure includes communication 
requirements, software incompatibilities, training difficulties etc. 
Hypothesis 2: The use of identical, high-fidelity models and associated databases by all ASW 
participants improves the overall understanding of the overall search plan and individual sensor 
performance. Additionally, the use of a common model allows "drill-down" into the factors 
affecting performance. 
Measure 1: Value added to the planning process and the ability to effectively employ sensors. 
Hypothesis 3: Time integration of the tactical undersea picture provides additional significant 
information for all ASW echelons compared to the current real-time tactical picture alone. 
Measures: This is an exploratory effort to identify the comparative Essential Elements of 
Information (EEl) and the insights that can be gained at different ASW echelons from the 
timeiNTegrated picture. (i.e., derivation of operational patterns, etc.) 
Hypothesis 4a: The undersea tactical picture provides sufficiently timely positional and 
operational information for BLUE Force submarines to safely enable dynamic Weapons 
Exclusion Zones around BLUE Force submarines. 
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Hypothesis 4b: An ASW Joint Engagement Zone (JEZ) will allow more successful prosecution 
of an adversary submarine than the current exclusive waterspace management policy protecting 
BLUE Force submarines. (Note the JEZ assumes a common tactical picture containing timely 
track information for BLUE Force submarines and reliable, real-time communications between 
BLUE Force submarines and the rest of the ASW forces.) 
Measure 1: Percentage of time that the sub was outside of the dynamic Weapon Exclusion Zone 
under various conditions. Note that success threshold for this measure is very close to zero. 
Measure 2: Ratio of percentage of detections converted to successful prosecutions in BLUE 
Force Submarine Operating Areas using the JEZ deconfliction method over the percentage for the 
traditional exclusive waterspace management method using NOTACK procedures. 
Measure 3: Ratio of percentage of detections converted to successful prosecutions in BLUE 
Force Submarine Operation Areas using the JEZ deconfliction method with continuous, two-way 
communications to the submarine over the percentage for a modified JEZ deconfliction method 
with continuous, one-way receive only communications to the submarine. 
Measure 4: Tactical impact of two-way communications with BLUE Force submarines through 
systems such as ACOMMS. 
Hypothesis 5: The sensor network and contact management capabilities of the ASW network 
provides an improved ability to "finger-print" and conduct all source overt or covert tracking of 
high interest WIDTE shipping in support of: 
Area defense against covertly armed shipping, 
Counter-proliferation operations, 
Counter-narcotic or other counter-smuggling operations. 
Measure 1: Percentage of correct target classifications, identifications and signature 
correlations. 
Measure 2: Percentage of time the contact of interest was tracked while transiting the 
exercise/experiment area. 
JOINT THEATRE AIR MISSILE DEFENSE 
Hypothesis: The addition of information from civilian in-place systems can significantly 
improve the fused picture of air and surface conventional and asymmetric threats. 
Measure 1: Range at which a low, slow-flying threat can be detected and tracked. 
Measure 2: Range at which asymmetric surface threats can be detected. 
Measure 3: Time of warning oflaunch or range at which asymmetric cruise missile can be 
detected and engaged. 
Measure 4: Fraction of population warned of asymmetric threat. 
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PRECISION ENGAGEMENT 
Hypothesis: Current weapons system targeting processes are disjointed and do not exploit 
available technologies. precision engagement is a resource-demanding endeavor that sacrifices 
execution speed for accuracy. Fbe-e will experiment with new technology and supporting tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (ttp) with the intent of improving integration among weapon systems 
and between operations and intelligence efforts. Such activity will result in improved speed and 
accuracy ofthe targeting, planning, and execution processes, and reduce requirements for 
restrikes. Airspace deconfliction resulting from flight path conflicts, weapon trajectories, 
weapons effects, friendly aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicle (uav) flight are also problems that 
constrain the use of long-range weapons. Improved technology and new ttp explored in fbe-e 
may allow inefficient airspace procedures to be amended for greater weapons effectiveness. 
CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT 
Hypothesis: Doctrine for managing a domestic Civil-Military operation through the CMOC can 
be developed. 
Measure 1: Military and civilian officials involved in the doctrine development rate the 
operation as successful. 
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT OF TOXIC RELEASE 
Hypothesis: There are effective civil-military responses to the two toxic releases. 
Measure 1: Military staff and civilian subject matter experts involved in the operation rate the 
operation as successful. 
Measure 2: Military staff and civilian subject matter experts involved in the operation rate the 
information flow and response as timely. 
Measure 3: Connectivity between the Afloat authorities and any remote participants is rated as 
successful. 
Measure 4: Modeling to support the experiment was rated as successful. 
VIRTUAL WORKSPACE 
Hypothesis: A Virtual WorkSpace can improve the coordination between the JMC and the 
CMOC. 
Measure 1: The military and civilian officials I subject matter experts rate the VWS as 
successful. 
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Measure 2: The connectivity of the VWS is available at least 90% of the time the JMC and the 
CMOC are both functioning. 
Measure 3: Discussion of classified information in the JMC does not hinder operation of the 
VWS. 
CASUALTY MANAGEMENT 
COMPARISON OF CASUALTY PREDICTION & LOGISTICS 
MODELS MAT, FORCAS, SIDPCAS, AND CASEVAC (PRE-PHASE 
1 AND PHASE 3) 
Hypothesis: No single model contains all of the features desired for all sizes of operation but 
one stands out as most appropriated for the battalionSized operation. 
Measure 1: Usability by a typical medical planner. 
Measure 2: Process validity & consistency- inputs are appropriate and complete and match the 
output specificity. Outputs are easily translated into required actions such as triage, evacuation, 
re-supply etc. 
Measure 3: Scalability- ability to represent a range of size of operations with at least face 
validity. 
MEDICAL COLLABORATIVE LOGBOOK (MEDLOG) (PHASES 1-
3) 
Hypothesis: MedLog is a convenient system for theatre-level situational awareness and daily 
management. 
Measure 1: Usability ofMedLog. 
MULTI-LINGUAL INTERVIEW SYSTEM (DOW) (PHASE 1) 
Hypothesis: The DOW provides an acceptable medium for eliciting vital information from non-
English speaking casualties when no local language capabilities are available. 
Measure 1: Understandability of questions by the casualty. 
Measure 2: Usability of the device by the operator. 
INCIDENT WATCHBOARD (PHASE 1 AND 2) 
Hypothesis: Incident Watchboard (IW) can raise the situational awareness during a crisis at 
multiple levels of decision-makers. 
Measure 1: Usability ofiW in the shipboard and ashore environments. 
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Measure 2: Impact or value-added by IW to decision-makers. 
THEATRE MEDICAL CORE SYSTEM (TMCS) (PHASE 2 & 3) 
Hypothesis 1: TMCS provides patient tracking on a near real-time basis and also summary 
OPORD Annex Q casualty management information. 
Measure 1: Time to access patient location from higher echelons. 
Measure 2: Accuracy of patient location. 
Measure 3: Usability ofTMCS. 
Measure 4: Visibility of Annex Q information to participants. 
MOBIL MEDICAL MONITOR V 
Hypothesis: Semi-automatic collection and transmittal of physiological parameters from 
bedside will more speedily and accurately update local and higher level information systems. 
Measure 1: Ratio of time to update patient status in TMCS from MeWS divided by usual time 
for recording and transmittal. 
Measure 2: Usability of MeWS. 
STATREF AS FIELD REFERENCE LffiRARY ON CD- ROM 
Hypothesis: StatRef is an easy-to-use reference to the latest procedures and treatments. 
Measure 1: Usability ofStatRefin the military environment. 
Measure 2: Breadth of alternatives for treatment considered by the provider. 
C. CONCEPTS 
ASYMMETRIC THREAT 
Mission Concept: Operate in an urban littoral environment while countering asymmetric 
threats. 
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Operations Method: Employ a boat with specialized sensors and flexible command and 
control capability to protect against asymmetric threats in port, at offshore anchorage, or in other 
littoral areas. 
Use response forces in a layered defense to include armed patrol boats and Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal units under the command of the specialized boat to increase speed of response and 
defensive posture. 
Use real time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data to achieve greater battlespace 
situational awareness to improve speed of command. 
System Solutions: Slice boat; MIUW Van 
Technical Solutions: Swimmer detection system; Hand held sonar 
NETWORK CENTRIC ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE 
Mission Concept: Maritime dominance relies on the traditional air, surface and subsurface 
superiority in the battlespace. 
Operations Methods: The employment of Network Centric ASW (NCASW) will improve 
the commanders ability to assess balance mission objectives with the risk imposed by adversary 
submarines. 
System Solutions: Distributed Collaborative area search planning; JEZ/JAZ 
Technical Solutions: 
PRECISION ENGAGEMENT 
Mission Concept: Operate in the littoral, provide Naval Fire Support to place munitions on 
designated targets in a time constrained environment. 
Operations Method: Employ sensor to shooter continuum versus fixed and mobile targets. 
Utilize Integration of imagery and targeting tools in support of reactive and deliberate targeting. 
Integrate the use of four dimensional near real time deconfliction in the execution of precision 
engagement. 
Conduct targeting and missile shots in a GPS jamming environment. 
System Solutions: LAWS, DAMS, EFT, CCT, JST ARS, ADSI 
Technical Solutions: ISAR P-3, Tactical UA V 
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FULL DIMENSION PROTECTION (FDP)- JOINT THEATRE AIR 
AND MISSILE DEFENSE (JTAMD) 
Mission Concept: If an Expeditionary Force is operating ashore, then the commander 
responsible for defense of those forces should establish an FDP cell to provide a single point for 
force defense. 
Operations Method: Linebacker, Ring of Fire, FDP Cell 
System Solutions: AEGIS Cruiser, AEGIS DDG, LAWS, ADSI, DCP, COP, nco, RP&C 
system 
Technical Solutions: JSTARS, STALKER, UAV, MATT, CAST, AVENGER, COMPASS 
INFORMATION SUPERIORITY 
Mission Concept: Provide sufficient and reliable networking of communication information in 
the battlespace. 
Operations Method: Naval Forces operating in the littoral will have access to signals 
previously unavailable to afloat sensors. The ability to monitor and report levels of activity about 
communications paths will enable command action to restore or enable connectivity and flow of 
information. 
System Solutions: Naval Communication Network 
Technical Solutions: SNIFFER 
CASUALTY MANAGEMENT AND CIVIL MILITARY 
AFFAIRS 
Mission Concept: Provide coordination between the military force and the domestic Civil-
Military authorities to provide managed response to weapons of mass destruction as well as 
managing casualties in the operations area. 
Operations Method: Operate in an urban littoral environment while conducting civil-military 
operations of a medical nature and provide military use of civilian medical facilities. 
System Solutions: Medical Virtual Workspace, Casualty prediction and logistics models, 
Collaborative Medical Logbook, Multi-lingual Interview System, Incident Watchboard 
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Hardware Solutions: DOW, MAT, FORCAS, SIDPCAS, CASEVAC 
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D P-3LOG 
March 14, 1999 
P-3(1) 
. 0700 off the deck, checking in with deathstar, at 13500 feet, 22k fuel, sys go, wx down 


















vectored by ATC setting up area 36 49N 12140W, 36 52 54N 121 44 48W 
check in with icepak, deathstar 
pioneer video feed to Deathstar 
fighting clouds 
convoy confirmed 
comms broken by cipher C . 
convoy in site I police car-left/2 rear/ 1 side/ left hand lane 
convoy possibly out of field regard-125R 40 
convoy visual15nm 36 35 121 48 54 
convoy on IRDS, not recorded 
complete looking for convoy 
36 49 N 122 01 13 W 
37 17 N 121 47 05 W 
37 23 33 N 122 01 13 W 
Track vehicle passenger targeting together with deathstar good 
good lock 
Radar aqh-4 bad/inop 
offsta 
land 
March 14, 1999 
P-3(2) 
. 0910 TOFF 
Back door 
POS-Manteca V ortae alt heading 
Fuel: 6+00 



















icepak,clear switch orange 
onsta solid layer 4500Ft, 
deathstar solid layer 
watch dog wizard Glen Court 
convoy underway 1 Omics 101 OL 
SL 718 4000' 3003 -4c. 
349 2 stats winds 
wizard reports 
low flying flier 374918 NE 
from wizard 122245200 140T 
37500N 
122 24 00 W low flyer 
using SAR for streaks on PTG 
at 18,000 14-16 miles affect 
res: 2 strip map 
3-3,500' 
report ps normal high speed target 
S SW of Alcatraz, unable 
Class by 
ALL TEAC reorders fail...3 total, 
3746N low slow, 1223100W 
report to Deathstar combatant poss 
going under golden gate high 
speed target west Teasure Island 
small attack in progress 
N 374909 340 stats 2 
1272423W 
SAR locked up 
374952N 
1222535W no T 25 2 
no tasking from Deathstar move to EA I Z move East 




37-33N 37-33 29N 
122 37W 122-152W 
repositioning 
convoy richmond marina 
3 7 56 N Richmond Marina 
122 23 22 w 





1221824.24W HWY 80 







































have convoy stationary target on move out clouds, HWY 80S 





relocated convoy on pier 
Berkley Pier stationary 
Take offtime 
On station back door I posit, alt, heading 34K 7 hrs; no orders; onsta 
1700L looking toward deathstar 
Check icepak SW deathstar 
Unable to check deathstar; solid layer 2000 over Moffett; GCS own 
discretion black X pier 35; SP point I in slice with jacket 
No joy 4850; on cell phone moving to fast for reception 
Deathstar man aloft-no C possible pioneer met with the slice boat; no 
joy on target GCS looking 
record Moffett, record hanger- time for 30 sec . 
101 best target path UHAUL truck X-24 ft. length; Pioneer 8.5 ft. Pioneer 
limited by stab( roll) of slice boat 020 P abecm 
neg. blockbuster UHFIHF; looking for needle haystack OT CCXS up 
changed track to 11 HWY 101 
repos Moffett net with Deathstar convoy not leaving Moffett until1330 
Slice boat N 1332L I 3731 o2N UAV posit I 122 1026W 
constrained by Airspace tract 
aircrft recorded Ed 
373537 
in for 1222214W I time for 60 sec. I 98% maneuvering to reset due to 
short for and airspace 
Take off I backdoor, check repak, llSOB, Travis, no order, FL heading, 
Deathstar 
Check in back door switch Deathstar I -1 16000 200 cloud stratus 
winds 196146kts 3 81 045N 1222221 W 
On station 
Go with knee board card 
OTCIES up 
Good pioneer 4850 I reversing track CCW 
Copying STYX ( exorcet eliot parameters negative on info, info not 
available cannot pass from CCDR Huntocn PTR, Emery, Berkeley 
112-m N 
flying NIS tracks, Coast Guard anchorage 7, Boston whaler anchorage 7 
3749.5N 12223.5W 
can switch to IRDS video 







































radar masts off on boat red force, Boston whaler, radar center blue force, 
VTR 1 working again after clearing 180ft. NNW C 
using IRDs for pioneet feed ancourage 7 
Boston whaler aft SLICE boat 
ELNE Alcatraz, found ferry moving towards it 
resume surveillance I Write grip or cleaning mirrors 120 lense 
3747.53N 12221.40W SS, looking for sea shadow 
SS 37-48N 12218W 5kts. 030T 
Yerba Buena TI to hid 8min. for max on current track I 3748.40N 
12221W 
3 7 49N 122-21 W red 3 high speed targets 20kts. 250T 
slow down 3748 33N 
friendly interest 12221 W target 
trackone 2 high speed chased by I more 3749N 12221 W 3 Boston 
whaler together East Treasure Island/ Anchorage 7 
target peirside 
3748N 12222W image etcs . 
IR saw helo lift 3750N 12217W off Bonne Homar Richard LPD DIW 
tracking helo follow airfields 
1. HalfMoon Bay 373l.ON 
2.Marine 3801N 
3. Grosse 3808.5N 
4. Concord 3800N 
5. Palo Alto 3727.5N 










high blue strip sea plane single engine 
sans. N.PTG on water plan pass TOI not target commodore 
6. commodore winds 186150 
Concord 
HalfMoon Bay 
seaplane - no activity Palo Alto, Marine no activity 
no image commodore I HalfMoon Bay 
coming up to Commodore 
blowoffConcord go to Commodore/HalfMoon Bay 
seaplane on pier commander 
no activity at Plo Alto seaplane 
3751N 12227W seaplane heading 300 TOO' 
37 53N low flyer I 12224W floating land 
require 3750N 12214W 050T 
backdoor RTB I offsta RTB 
Land 
Take off I TMS due to power shifts outage 











































TMS keyset of OASIS.ODS inputs to OAIS at NA VITACCO station tried 
with TIBS RCV1and no tibs ice pak fuel statw 9+00, back door 200 
FL180 check in incepak 
next on track 1, must remain by ATC 
container vesc NYK-VEGA, black Hull NYK on side white SJ, dark streak, 
red lights all stripes 3237.3N 117=14.7W, entr. Golden Gate Bridge 
blockbuster sweet 
3745N 12251.5W ship posit. 
primary sensor on Emery will Marine 
freedom navigate in Track 
cus spd COl VEGA 13745N 12230W 0501121 pos. 3746.09N Oak Knoll 
1220843W protest/3149N 12222.44W 
jet ski along shore ships to clutter for Radar ISAR 
Treasure Island jet skies 
37560822W 122275997VV 
Oak Knoll 
people on front 
ship 37-51-41 1224621 W 
name verified N' 
conformed PANAMA on ship 
ship broke in mership guide 
container cont M APL 3803308N MSMF 122-2943VV 
1. 3 752.4N UC Berkeley 
2. 37.48 on Oak Center Hall 
122-16.32VV 
frenchlobs radical prot I new tracking ptR ptB I !801580 2 24" UHAUL 
05 F AM complete PTC 3 80200N industrial 
12200C/VV plain white looking for truck found by UA 40 
track constraint orbit circle is choice-track 2 NE airfall east storage 
vehicle parked 114 mi N4 38-10N 12203W posit in track 2, still inhabited 
by lack of orbit 
on move (truck) time for FOR 1438L in FOR 
6 min. FOR PT Richmond circling enalve looking at several angles 
increasing prob. Of detection, xxxxxxxxx on target area 
375690N 12203 59W looking 37 57 12203.4VV 
found trucks heading west on HVVY 24 375749N 
trucks pull 12204N over to side-required after repos due to track 
trucks stationary, 1 vehicle behind part of exercises, other two not 
vehicles on move 3754 23VV 12209 32VV 
vehicle split, trail vehicle-stopped 28dec. 304JB orbit 6.7 37:52:28N 
on move again 122-10:44W 
tracks in tunnel 
out of tunnel space shuttle on side of truck 
received 15 opnotes, VG jam system 
5 80 West to Bay Bridge 
lost cte due to repos aircraft 
found Pelican target, moving down road 
found target at pier parking lot 1374836N 1225539W 
reqcquired targets 122-19VV 3751N 13500MHZ 
reacquired target 
tracking algorithm working 
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. 1655 offsta 
. 1656 chipped with Icepak 
. 1720 Land 
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E ASYMMETRIC LOG 
Asymmetric Threat Events Log 
(All Times Are Local Unless Otherwise Noted) 
15 March 99 
(Comms checks, etc.) 
0100 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit 11,forward stationed aboard United States 
Coast Guard Station, San Francisco, Yerba Buena Island for the duration of Fleet Battle 
Experiment Echo. Tactical control maintained by Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare 
Unit 105. Operational control maintained by Commander Amphibious Squadron 5. 
Detachments 55 and 64 are aboard. 
0805 EOD 11 attempted comms with MIUW (LP257A), no joy, standing by. 
0840 EOD 11 established HF plain communication with MIUW. 
0850 EOD 11 established HF encrypted communications with MIUW. 
0920 MIUW 105 underway .from USCG Alameda, RSSC is embarked on board Slice Boat. 
Destination: San Francisco Bay area. Mobile sensor platform is embarked on Slice Boat 
for FBE -E. Radar input up .from Slice Boat, Sonar up, Radio comms up, MIUW control, 
boat control, .MIUW safety C&R, GCCS down due to hard drive failure. 
0945 EOD 11 -Still no joy LP258A and LP258B. Hearing traffic but no connect. 
0955 Slice proceeding to Anchorage 7. 
1148 Good image from EOD Det 31 (WMD Cell) aboard USS Coronado to EOD 11. 
1445 EOD 11 received information on two vans from MIUW 105. Transmission garbled. 
(Note: This was a Precision Engagement Event.) 
1520 Deployed Det 55 to Pier 35 to respond to possible IEDs in two suspicious vans. 
1540 MIUW 105 reports possible swimmer attack against USS Coronado. (Note: This is a 
false alarm. The swimmer event did not start until 1700.) 
1550 .MIUW 105 called halt to swimmer attack-ex. Coronado requesting HTCM (MDV). 
1555 EOD 11 communicating with Det 55 via cell-phone. ''No Joy" utilizing VHF LO. 
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1610 Slice arrives Pier 35. 
1613 EOD 11 comms made Det 55 with manpack, ckt EOD 911M1 VHF LOW. 
1614 EOD 11 comms made with MIUW, ckt LP257A. 
1615 Power lost on YBI. EOD 11 operating from generator. 
(I700-2000U Combat Swimmer Event. Participants: USS Coronado, Seal Team I, .MIUWI05 
embarked aboard Slice boat, PSU 311, EOD.) 
1705 MIUW setup grid with USCG Long Island. 
1710 MIUW setup OPS with PSU 311. PSU reports OPFOR boat within 300 yards of Pier 35. 
1715 PSU reports 1 person may have gone overboard from OPFOR boat. 
1717 Slice underway from pier 35. OPFOR boat heading North. 
1720 EOD TAO (RSSC) in contact with EOD Det. 
1730 EOD divers on standby, Yerba Buena Island. 
1745 MIUW over-under voltage relay tripped main circuit breaker. 
1750 MIUW completed emergency shutdown ofRSSC. 
1820 MIUW Van Power-up complete. 
1845 MIUW comms with USS Coronado up. C and R circuit. 
184 7 MIUW comms USS Coronado down C&R circuit. Will check in at 0700U for radio 
checks. 
1920 Swimmer detection reported from USS Coronado. (Note: Seal Team I reported to 
Coronado, mission complete. Eight limpet mines deployed) 
1924 Request hull search ofUSS Coronado by EOD. 
1925 EOD commenced diving operations. 
1939 2 EOD divers commenced surface swim for USS Coronado hull inspection. 
1946 Secured PSU boats. 
1955 EOD divers completed surface search ofUSS Coronado. Report nothing found. 
Submerged search in progress. 
2028 Fleet Control Reported all OPFOR divers recovered safely. 
83 
2050 Fleet notified EOD TAO that they were requesting permission to bring out their divers 
due to excessive currents and re-insert at 2345U. 
2109 Securing from exercise. 
16 March 99 
0700 EOD 11 Communications watch set. Established HF w/MIUW. Set up MB16, C and R, 
EOD TAC, VHF, EOD TAC Saber. 
0715 EOD 11 RCVD SAT assignment from MIUW: Bird 172E 297.225 offset 5 ... setting up. 
0923 EOD 11 reports good UHF check Cutter Long Island C & R 381.75. 
0945 Chief calls CG from MIUW. MIUW can hear Fleet control but they can't hear MIUW. 
Contact made with CG Long Island. Acting as intermediary. 
0950 MIUW asked to contact Coronado by cell phone. No good numbers immediately known. 
0951 UAV Video fmds small boats near bridge, coming from back of Treasure Island. 
0953 Chief sends CG to investigate. Cutter Long Island goes. Chief asks CG to let Coronado 
know multiple crafts: PBR moving toward pier 35. 4 PSUs, 3 CG rib boats, 3 CG auxill. 
0958 MIUW radio out, can't contact Coronado. 
(1000-1300U HSMST Covey Attack Event. Participants: USS Coronado, MIUW105, PSU311, 
EOD, SBU122, USCGC Long Island.) 
(J000-1300U TruckAnti-ShipMissileEvent. Participants: USSCoronado, UAV, Naval 
Reserves (driving U-Haul trucks), USS Port Royal.) 
(1000-J300U Low Slow Flyer Event. Participants: USSCoronado, USS Port Royal, Cessna-
172.) 
1004 GPS in MIUW not working. 
1006 OPFOR boats reported inbound from Golden Gate, about 1 1/2 miles. 
1009 Four high speed boats inbound to Pier 35 via Alcatraz. 
1012 MIUW declares all inbound boats as threats. Sr. Chief asks CG to stay in position. 
1026 Sr. chief aboard MIUW asks to get control of Pelican (UA V). 
1037 Slice lookout reports sea plane inbound, over CG bridge. 
1039 2 High speed threats from Alcatraz to Coronado. CG intercepting. 
1040 3rd High speed boat stopped. CG asked for cover. 
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1042 4th high speed boat sighted by MIUW along coastline, an SBU. Low flying aircraft 
sighted. 
1043 Sea plane in water by Coronado. 
1045 Sea plane traveling down side of Coronado. 
1047 MIUW takes control ofUAV. 
1047 Another inbound boat. Commercial. Watchdog identified as full defense protection on 
Coronado. (Note: Watchdog is MIUW TAO.) 
1058 2 Jet skis off Baker Island. 
1108 UA V can only see tops of clouds. 
1110 Sea plane goes near Coronado two orange boats in sight. One is enemy, one is safety 
observer. 
1129 Report of decoys by Bay Bridge. 
1121 Slice forward lookout spots plane and relays to MIUW. 
1125 Another sea plane buzzes MIUW, then leaves. Another approached but turned. A third 
one came near MIUW, then headed for Coronado. (Note: A commercial sea plane was 
giving harbor tours from the pier 35 area. This plane was often identified as a low slow 
flyer although it was an unintended participant in the experiment.) 
1128 Seaplane goes out to Bay Bridges, then approaches Coronado and lands. 
1130 High speed boats appear off Alcatraz, then go back behind Island. Believed to be a 
diversion. Sea plane gone. EOD 11 notified SFVTS DET 31 to commence diving 
operations alongside USS Coronado. (Note: This is to recover limpet mines from 15 
March Combat Swimmer Event.) 
1136 PSU and 3 SBUs inbound from Alcatraz, also one SBU from Pier 33 and a small red 
boat. 
1139 All repelled by 50 cal fire-five boats, CG and PSU. 
1140 EOD DET 31A is onboard the USS Coronado, established comms. 
1142 2 Cobras inbound, heading 010, under Bay Bridge, circle around. 
1203 Slice lookout reports high speed boat at heading 270. 
1215 Multiple boats incoming, 4 from different directions. Another from behind makes 5. 
Repelled. 
1220 EOD DET31 divers have splashed. 
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1228 MIUW reports finally good UAV feed. PSU reports DIW OPFOR vessel to EOD. 
Currently investigating. 
1237 Return attack spotted by forward observers aboard PSUs. OPFOR goes close to the dock 
and follow along edge of bay. 
1250 EOD is requested to respond to disables vessel with possible explosives. 
1251 Cessna flies overhead. 
1305 EOD enroute from Yerba Buena Island. 
1318 EOD is on scene of disabled vessel with possible explosives. 
1323 EOD boards suspected/disabled vessel. 
1324 EOD has located possible Mustard Gas on the disabled vessel. EOD request to 
evacuate the area within 2000 yards from disabled vessel. Slice boat repositions 2000 
yards up-wind from vessel. 
1330 UAV Pelican secures. 
1350 EOD Det 31 still conducting limpet dive on Coronado. Det 55 reviewing safe 
procedure and attempting reachback on WMD. 
1400 EOD Det 31 reports four devices have been removed from the hull of the 
Coronado. 
1405 EOD Det 55 reports status ofWMD. Agent is Mustard Gas. Potential release of 
agent. Winds NorthWest at 10knts. DownWind hazard 1.2 km. Cloud Width 
80meters. X-ray results negative. 
1410 Watchdog reports possible weapons launch. Heading 055T from Port Royal. 
Possible WMD 53 09 03 N 117 55 W. Missile launch: Oakland point of 
impact. 
1411 TU 2055- Splash. 
1415 Slice arrives Pier 35. 
2015 Slice underway from Pier 35. 
2025 PSUs report all boats on station. 
(2100-23000 Combat Swimmer Attack Event. Participants: USS Port Royal@ Anchorage 7, 
Seal Team 1, MIUW105, PSU311, EOD.) (Note: This was an unscheduled 
event. Seal Team had requested an additional dive. This was to run concurrent 
with the Covert Rubber Raft Event but the event was rescheduled due to 
mechanical problems with the launch vehicle.) 
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2220 PSUs simulated launching concussion grenades in defense of combat swimmers. 
2315 FinEx. 
17 March 99 
0600 MIUW 105 underway from pier. 
(1000-IIOOU Single Jet Ski Attack Event. Participants: USS John Paul Jones, MIUWJ05, 
PSU311, SBU122, EODMUII, USCGC Long Island.) 
1005 Slice lookout reports inbound Jet Ski. Range I OOOyds. 
1 011 U A V reports will not be on station until 1100. 
1012 Jet ski investigated and is not hostile. 
1055 UA V on station. 
1059 MIUW lookout reports 2 Jet skis in vicinity oftanker Long-Beach. One inbound 
toward John Paul Jones from the North and 2nd Jet Ski inbound south of John Paul 
Jones. 
1100 PSU raider boat engaging jet skis. 
(1100-1400U Covey Jet Ski Attack Event. Participants: USS John Paul Jones, 
MIUWI05, PSU311, SBUI22, EODMUJJ, USCGC Long Island. 
1145 4 Jet skis commencing high speed run on John Paul Jones, PSU's engaging. 
1153 UAV reports 4 Jet skis are at 37 49 40' N 122 22' 44' W. 
1159 UAV reports 4 Jet Ski are at 37' 49' 40' N 122 22' 44' W. 
1209 2 Jet Skis make high speed run on John Paul Jones. 
1210 Slice underway to station 1000yds. North of pier 35. 
1215 2 Jet skis' inbound to John Paul Jones. 
1216 Jet skis circling John Paul Jones. 
1219 NYK Vega under Golden Gate- UAV reports 4 Jets on beach between Yerba Buena and 
Treasure Islands. 
1232 4 Jet skis making a run on John Paul Jones. PSU's engaging. 
1300 Finex. 
1320 Slice arrives Pier 35. 
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(1400-1700U Truck Anti-Ship Missile Event. Participants: USS Coronado, UA V, Naval 
Reserves (drivers for U-Haul trucks, USS Port Royal.) 
1630 Slice underway from pier 35, San Francisco Bay. 
(1700-2000U Combat Swimmer Attack Event. Participants: USS Coronado, 
Seal Team 1, MIUWJ05, PSU311, EOD.) 
(1700-2000U Combat Rubber Raft Event. Participants: USS John Paul Jones, 
Seal Team, MIUW105, PSU311, USCGC Long Island, Sea Shadow.) 
1732 USS John Paul Jones reports sighting Sea Shadow. 
1735 PSU engaging rubber raiding craft aft of John Paul Jones. 
1736 Slice Aft lookout made visual contact of Sea Shadow. 
1745 Slice at Pier 35 
1805 Slice is underway. 
1830 PSU engaging OPFOR off Pier 35. 
1835 MIUW reports to EOD that USS Coronado is under small boat attack. EOD 
DET 55 and 31 are on standby. 
1838 MUIW requests EOD support. USS Coronado reports bubbles towards hull. 
1840 PSU observed bubbles in water near Coronado, PSU engaging swimmers 
1843 Long Island engaging OPFOR Boat off pier. 
1844 PSU observes bubbles. 
1845 USS Coronado reports bubbles on port quarter. 
1847 PSU reports bubbles in water off Coronado port quarter heading East. EOD 
Det. 31 is underway with two MK V's and one RIDB. 
1855 EOD boats departed. 
1901 Slice receiving UAV imagery. 
1903 EOD Det 55 is underway in ground transportation. 
1917 EOD Det. 55 is on station at Coronado. 
1935 EOD Det. 55 has surface swimmers starboard side Coronado. 
1946 EOD complete hull and pier survey on Coronado. 
88 
1947 PSU engaging OPFOR near John Paul Jones. 
1952 EOD Det.55 reports surface swim completed, nothing found. Informed MIUW. 
2000 FINEX of combat swimmer exercise. 
2020 EOD diving Ops on hold due to equipment causality on Coronado. 
2021 Slice lookouts have visual contact of Sea Shadow. 
2023 Slice has Sea Shadow on TIS. Started VCR #1. 
2024 EOD divers commenced under hull survey ofUSS Coronado. 
2030 EOD divers found Mk48 limpet, frame 242, depth 20ft, quick step has been performed. 
2041 Finex of combat rubber raider craft exercise. 
2058 EOD Det. 55 reports 60% of stem has been searched. 
2115 Slice arrives Pier 35, San Francisco. 
2147 EOD Det. 55 divers are on the surface. Diving ops are secured due to current. 
2148 Liaison with Coronado to complete limpet recovery tomorrow. 
2237 EOD Det. 55 returns to base camp. 
18 March 99 
1053 USCGC Long Island Posit 37-49.0 N 122-22.6 
(1100-1400U HSMST Covey Attack Event. Participants: USCGC Long Island, 
MIUWJ05, PSU311, EOD, SBU122, USS Coronado.) 
1100 Slice Boat underway from Pier 35, San Francisco Bay harbor. Transiting to anchorage 7 
for Fleet Battle Experiment Echo operations. 
1133 GDFS in MIUW van is locked up. Three attack boats coming in from the North to Long 
Island position and one inbound from the South - PSU's engaging. (Note: USCGC Long 
Island acted as High Value Unit during this event.) 
1141 MIUW GDFS is non functional. 
1146 Slice sonar is secured. Sonar buoys are dead in the water. 
1201 CG PSU's boat are reporting unsafe boating tactics by SBU boats. SBU's are not giving 
way and are closing within 10 ft. 
1202 Death Star took control ofUAV. (Note: Death Star is the USS Coronado. There 
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were multiple events occurring in addition to Asymmetric Threats and the UA V was a 
shared asset.) 
1212 "MIUW regained control ofUAV. 
1237 Long Island under attack by small boats. 
1240 Slice repositioning to 2000 yds West of USCG Long Island. PSU boat positioned 
shoreward side of the high value asset. 
1258 Helos launched from the USS Bon Homme Richard. Notional playmate 
1300 Slice has returned to sector search. 
1302 HDC has instructed UAV to return to base. UAV watch station going offline. 
1315 Three small boats attacking HVU from the North, being intercepted by PSU. 
1321 A Samsonite suitcase was found to the stern of the HVU in the water by PSU craft. PSU 
towed the suitcase to a position 500 yds Southwest ofHVU. 
1327 Notified Watchdog of unidentified suitcase found on a vessel. 
1329 Position of Slice relocating South to take station area ofBlossum Rock. 
1331 Notified Watchdog of intentions to tow vessel with suitcase out to sea. 
1338 EOD is on scene of suspect suitcase. 
1342 Advise Watchdog that EOD will notionally tow suspect craft with suitcase out to sea. 
1344 Finex exercise. 
1411 Slice arrives at Pier 35. 
(1500-1800 Low Slow Flyer Event. Participants: USS Coronado, Cessna-172.) 
1500 Slice underway from pier 35 
1505 PUB intentions completed all PUBS accounted for. 
1530 Slice arrives Pier 35. Asymmetric Threat Events complete. 
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F FULL DIMENSION PROTECTION LOG 





Today, DCP session with PRYL. PRYL didn't get good IPB during Northern Edge. Our 
challenge is, since there is no dedicated J2 for FBE-E, is to generate a believable, challenging, 
IPB to support PRYL planning for air and space defense. What we are passing them during IS-
Mar IDP follows: 
Probable Cruise Missiles origins, routes, and probable launch sites. 
Additionally pass them probable airfields that are related to low slow flyer launch. 
Work on CAPS to increase DAL, include Sacramento and Marian Co. This should force PRYL 
to discuss Patriot requirements and positions with SMDBL and then come to CJTF with a formal 
request for additional defense assets. FDP commander with force them to show justification 
using CAPS displaying DAL laydown Vs. SM-2 BLK-N A and Patriot (PAC-3), will task them 
to show justification by 16-Mar and recommendations for TPFFD modification. 
Need to know what additional assets required from CINC to cover expanded DAL. 
SMDBL will be tasked in DCP session to provide detailed documentation on Avenger 
capabilities and limitations. Additionally, FDP commander will visit Avenger unit to discuss best 
use with Army commander and USMC expeditionary commander. 
nco currently at the ML V at Golden Gate to debrief link status with FDP commander on board 
Coronado today. A key issue is to get the nco linked up with JST ARS link technicians in FL to 
ensure JSTARS link connectivity on the 16th. 
Jet ski pre exercise (17-Mar) info in, good comm stuff. Key issue with jet ski with all surface 
surveillance is that Slice boat has no link capability (even their JMCIS is down), FDP cell will be 
their eyes and ears and task slice boat and their assets by Hot Vector. 
For every MSEL event, need the launch time. 
1039 
Orange launched two test missiles to intimidate green. three space systems each detected the 
launch and reported individually over stred. Individual tracks were received for both launch 
vehicle and impact points. FDP CDR used space warning to make warning over network to not 
only military but also through CMOC and Medical to warn city. Key C2 item during launch was 
that because the impact prediction for space warning is so inaccurate a large illipse was generated 
by spacecom that actually not only showed impact in water but showed missile could have 
impacted land north of city. 
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Key ... In that we did not have visibility of either AEGIS tracks of BM's which will give a much 
more accurate prediction of launch and impact. Over cmd net FDP cdr assessed impacts over 
water engaged holdfire on both launches. Other C2 issues JMCIS which does correlate different 
inputs from space did not receive and display and that ? need to investigate. Issue 
ADSI tracks received from space should also be rebroadcast so that non-tre or trap capable units 
can see space predictions. Confirmed with JPJ that they did not receive them. 
ISSUE 
LAWS did not receive launch or impact points. Intent is to hook launch points in LAWS and 
schedule for targets in PE cell immediately after it is determined that impact points are in green 
territory. ISSUE is that tracks need to displayed on LAWS from ADSI, track numbers on ADSI 
are not correlating with LAWS track numbers .. 
All units need to launch DTT's for all MSEL events. What this should show is 4 sourcesa for scud 
launches JNTF, PRL, JPJ and SSC SD sim. Once Coronado is up Link 16 and we are able to 
receive PRL, JPJ and SSC tracks need to ensure ADC conducts manual correlation of multiple 
tracks so only one vehicle is engaged. Contact PRL to ensure they are able to manually corellate. 
Intent to bring Patriot assets into scenario. 
Discussion on Patriots. Recently met with city officials and it is apparent that the extent of 
defense will require CJTF to bring in additional air defense assets. Based on the request, location 
of additional defended assets, Patriot will be required. PRL has been passed this additional 
requirement via compass and will reenforce in the intentions message to have them prepare new 
defense diagram in CAPS. 
1048 
Met with fleet surgeon who is the focal point for CMOC for connectivity with civilian officials. 
Fleet medical well equipped with C4I, including three radio terminals. It is imperative that fleet 
medical be up on FDP command net to ensure he can receive timely warning from FDP cell and 
then relay to Govenor's office of emergency services. Briefed current defended asset list and will 
meet with gov's office am 16-Mar to determine modifications to support civilian desires for 
defense. Additionally discussed the intel on orange and FLA plans to move sarin chemicals via 
truck from outside the city to somewhere inside the city. Concern that requires CJTF level 
decision is the issue of terminating the vehicle prior to arrival in San Francisco. This is a FDP 
cell, PE cell, WMD cell, CMOC, and medical decision. Intent is to get a WMD cell best guess at 
proliferation following attack and attempt to obtain route from intel sources, and then try to select 
the least harmful point on the route to destroy the truck. Force medical feels that intel's 
assessment on the amount of sarin is inaccurate and should be reverified. We'll meet with the PE 
cell at 1100 to close the loop on planning and have already scheduled use ofFDP cell tools such 
as Stalker, LAWS, EDGE to track and predict truck movements to support PE and medical 
coordinated strike. 
1055 
Additionally offered CMOC/City officials use of mobile US Army air defense unit Avenger for 
city use in providing additional downtown defense (Avenger can only be used against air 
breathing threat, not TBM). During meeting on 16-Mar, we'll confirm with Gov's office DAL, 
probability of defense against ballistic missile, and vulnerabilities from both sea-based or land-
based FLA (insurgent) forces. 
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Medical advised FDP cell that they had been receiving warnings via surenet and this was too 
slow. We confirmed that the pipe that surenet is using was only experimental and was too small, 
and that the primary method of warning which should be very timely would be via voice net 
(FDP command net ch 57). Using combination of ADSI and EDGE, FDP cell will provide first a 
mesoscopic warning followed by a microscopic warning. The scale we're dealing with here is 
that the first report should be able to provide them with an impact area of a 3-5 nm elipse and 
once the track could be displayed on EDGE, we would provide them a centroid prediction down 
to a street comer. 
1055 
Medical call sign is Big Dipper. 
1338 
Status of the link is, because of linebacker's unique capabilities, he has a multi freq link 
capability, UHF and VHF on Port Royal. 
The multi link van is up. They receive HF. 
We have link 16 with Avenger and Bon Homme Richard. Network problems with JPJ. 
1415 
Channel 57 was to be used to communicate with the Joint Medical Center. When JMC gets on 
the channel, they're told that it is for ship to shore movement and that they shouldn't be on it. We 
are back to ship's phones to communicate with them, or sneaker net. 
1405 
Additionally we're now getting P-3 and UAV video coming on the convoy. We're tracking a 
convoy with chemical weapons. Decison is going to be made by the commander to hit the 
convoy or attack the convoy without releasing chemical munitions. The IW stated that the 
convoy was heading to Pier 35 (the Coronado). Right now we have several vehicles tracking. 
1410 
JPJ just reported comms with the PRYL is up in linebacker mode. Based on I&W JPJ is up on 
NTDCmode. 
1420 
MIUWU boat called in. Reported two UAV contacts headed toward Coronado. Position 
37'34'32" N 122'19'28" W. MIUW lost power to their van, so they called over the phone. 
1430 
Second fireball. Single salvo from Fallon area received IW both TRAP into ADSI and into 
JMCIS. JMCIS correlator operated correctly. Went out with voice warnings on surface defense 
net since Battle group command net down. The warning was passed to the city via JMC at time 
1432 once the impact area was determined to be off the coast and no threat. 
Additionally, right before launch, Slice boat reported two possible surface contacts carrying 
possible WMD. Allerted WMD cell. Crew tracked using slice boat. Negative comms between 
FDP commander and Slice boat. Slice autonomous. Awaiting report from Slice on nature of 
threat from two craft. 
1535 
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Directed that information be passed to MIUW ofiW of swimmers in vicinity of Coronado. 
1530 
FOP met with WMD cell to discuss impact of intercept ballistic missile carrying chemical 
weapons. WMD cell developed plots for expected plume if a scud was intercepted at 40 k, 60 k, 
80 k, 100 k, and 140 k. Plots indicate that it is best to intercept above 60 k, because of direction, 
and whether plume drifts over water. Plots will be sent to Port Royal to help develop TMD 
autodoctrine to help engage ballistic missiles at optimum position. We do not want to intercept 
beyond the FAT part of the window, so Port Royal will have to take a look at not trying to 
intercept the missile too far out, and accept a lower pk, but intercept between 60 and 80 k to be 
able to engage in support of lowest lethality of CW. Port Royal has the capability to run intercept 
models using dynamic test targets. FOP will task them to do this and evaluate engagement 
strategy during DCP session 16-Mar. 
1555 
Report from MIUWU regarding boats to protect Coronado at Pier 35. SBU was required to go 
off station to refuel. Consider this unsatisfactory in that Coronado is defenseless to small boat or 
swimmer attack. MIUWU, as scene of action commander, must manage both EOD and SBU 
assets to support 24 hour coverage with boats. Slice boat supporting MIUW sustained casualty to 
navigation system and is not able to maintain harbor defense for FOP commander as tasked. 
Until Slice is operational, JPJ will be tasked to support harbor defense from anchorage 7. 
1603- From CPR5N2: What real-world impact will occur on JPJ by having her provide harbor 
defense from anchorage? 
1600 
FOP contacted slice boat to report possible attack swimmer threat to Coronado (HVU). the miuw 
unit onboard the slice boat acting as harbor defense control initiated I activated the port security 
unit (PSU) to provide a layered defense of the HVU. The PSU maintained a layered defense 
posture around the HVU using two small boats to patrol the area immediately around the HVU. 
1645 
From FOP commander to CPR5 N2 and N3: In response to question of 1603. Intent was to have 
all ships either at anchor or underway maintain a surface and air watch during the 0600 to 1800 
time period daily in support ofFBE-Echo. Intent is to build an accurate air and surface picture 
with sensors and then link. We need to make sure all A TF units are up on both surface sensors 
link and ATF command UHF net with COMTHIRDFLT, call sign Watchdog from 0700 to 1800 




Avenger guys with us today. 
Port Royal won't be able to cover the extended defended asset list. This should result in a request 
for more Army support, Patriot or Avenger. They'll discuss the needs in the two-hour FOP 
meeting this morning. 
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0830 
Correction, two-hour FDP meeting should be DCP (Distributed Collaborative Planning) meeting. 
Morning meeting, cont: The Avenger batteries are on link 16 and are communicating through the 
JICO, currently. The air defense commander may take direct control of the Avenger units. The 
possibility of staging the Avengers on Treasure Island to improve coverage of the anchorages and 
DAL was discussed. The Avenger personnel also received a scenario briefing with emphasis on 
their role in the overall picture. Their means for requesting additional protection was discussed. 
The Avenger Batteries will participate in this DCP meeting to discuss optimal placement of their 
firing units and the Sentinel radars. 
0840 
JPJ reports turnover of situational awareness and patterning in the Bay Area with Port Royal. Port 
Royal will be at anchor at 1000. Watchdog has good comms with the JPJ and PRL. 
Since the start of the experiment, the JMCISS setup hasn't allowed the experiment staff to change 
the classifications or ID on the JMCISS air picture. The Third Fleet Staff can change things 
from their command center, but not the experiment staff. They're working on the fix now. 
0914 
The DCP event did not go down on time. PR working the collaborative plan to include 
SHORAD unit. 
0916 
Received word from PR that it can cover almost all ofDAL. Exception is Sacramento, they 
request Patriot coverage for Sacramento. 
0920 
The VTS reports small aircraft in vicinity of anchorage 7. 
0924 
JMCISS won't allow sim tracks to be merged. 
0925 
JPJ reports Orange launched ballistic missile, launch track number 3036. Impact track number 
3035. Trying to determine if actual ballistic missile was launched since no space track number is 
associated with the launch or impact point. 
Sit was a JPJ DTT (Dynamic Test Track) that was launched was not in timing with the FDP 
MSELs. 
Response from FOP cell was to verify tracks and not call Fireball. 
JST ARS is 15 minutes from station, beginning to pass IPB (Intel Prep of the Battlespace) 
planning information. 
0931 
Time of last report was 0930 
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0930 
Shortcoming of comm plan is watch officer has no direct link to VTIS (Vessel Traffic Info 
Service) directly on a net V s. telephone. He can talk to Coast Guard cutter, a good thing. 
0940 
Passed to the PR to make sure they send the CAPS overlays on the Compass call in the morning 
for Avenger stationing. 
We're working with the Avengers restationing and communications. Lesson learned: There's a 
lot of concern about where we can and can't put the Avengers. We should get clearance ahead of 
time about where to station them. 
0950 
JPJ as previously planned, exited harbor and conducted turnover of inner harbor defense with PR. 
PR now headed for anchorage 7. Intentions are to fight this morning from anchorage 7. Earlier, 
conducted a DCP session to go over the additional DAL locations and PR has requested 
additional assets to go to cover Sacramento. 
0951 
Keep out zone for PR for TMD missiles raised to 60,000 ft. 
0951 
Received from CAST 70% probability TEL site is at lat 39'0011 N, Ion 118'41 11 W. Reasons 1. 
The vehicles. 2. Possible hiding site. 3. I/0 chemical supplies. 
1000 
Track number 0679 is a suspect SAM site, received via TRAP. 
1005.25 
Multiple Fireball Fireball 
Three missiles launched genesis: 38'11 11 N, Ion 121'51" W. 
TN 4952/3/4 
Area at risk Concord 
Sensor ELINT SPY 
Time oflmpact 1610.07 local 




San Francisco incorrectly reported as impact point to CMOC. Corrected to Concord. 
Redefine Richmond as impact point 
1011 
We had a good link so we saw the ship tracking. This makes a better elipse of impact. 30-40 
seconds faster to JMC than yesterday. 
1011 
PR TBM track unengageable. Used engageability bypass. System still did not fire. 
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TN 2007 
Impact point was not on the DAL 
1014 
Sit rep for PR is that the single profile scud impacted near Concord. 33 nm N outside their DAL. 
They attempted to launch 2 missiles. Both went into engageability bypass. The system would 
not let them fire. No missiles left the rail. No missiles were fired. This is a realist sit in that one 
ship can only cover so much territory. Impact area was outside the DALby 33 nm so the missile 
was unengageable. 
1018 
Fireball Fireball call to JMC I CMOC 
Low slow flyer 2027 
TN 3060 
49153 
Genesis: 15 miles SW of Fallon 
Crater 3759 N 
SHORAD Avenger has been told to take responsibility for low slow flyer. 
1022 
Coast Guard relayed via HF secure comms four unidentified high speed small boat threats. Four 
high speed boats heading for PR. Tasking Coast Guard. Coast Guard Cutter Long Island relayed 
info to Slice Boat so that it could activate harbor defense assets. 
PR engaged with SM2 block 4 A. The missile engaged at 39 A. 
1026 
PR reports impact point looks like it is over water. 
1026 
The third fireball is 31 miles NE of Oakland. 
1027 
Small boats are declared hostile. 
1027 
CG has ID'd four boats hostile. 
1027 
No hostile intent shown by low slow flier. 
1027 
Low slow flyer is hostile. Unable to engage. Contacting Avenger units for engagement. 
1029 
Low slow flier. PR is in linebacker mode unable to engage with missiles. 
Will try to engage with guns. If unable to engage with guns it will turn over to avenger 
Tgt is headed SE over Treasure Island 
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1031 
PR reports unable to engage with guns. They never held the track. 
Track headed NW 
Lost visual on it. 
1032 
Track changed direction. 
PR holds air track visually, within gun range; but doesn't hold track, so unable to fire. 
1031 




no spy radiation in harbor 
Preplanning would have helped 
takes 8-12 min to go out of lineback mode 
surface radar limited 
PR's (?) initial contact was visual 
Lesson learned: 
We put our own blinders on by agreeing to restrictions on not radiating SPY in the harbor and 
being in linebacker mode. 
1037 
low slow flyer contact - visual contact - came from the north. It approached ship from the stem, 
made a radical maneuver to go outbound, then made a dispense. After dispense, ship realized it 
was a hostile act. With no spy radiation in harbor, a lot of the normal things we would have done 
preplanned could not happen. PR was in linebacker, so unable to pick up contact with camera or 
radar. 
Low slow flyer was never made a track number on LAWS. 
Question: Was there ever a visual location of where the low slow flyer landed or took off from? 
Get more about tack memo on linebacker and TTP's for low slow flyer. 
Filling in previous record on fireball: 
TN 4829/34/4955/4956 
Area at risk: East Oakland 
Sensor: ELINT 
lmpe of impact 1022 
Genesis: 38'34" N 118'32" 
Crater: 37-56 N 121-44W 
1043 
TN 6112 reported over net. possible low slow flyer 
Filling in prev record on fireball: 
TN 4952/3/4 
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Area at risk: concord 
Sensor elint spy 
time of impact 16 I 0 07 lacal 
genesis 39-10 N 118-59 W 
crater 38 II N 121 15 w 
Filling in prev record of fireball: 
1N 4959/58 
Area at risk E Berkeley 
Time of impact 10 27local 
genesis 39-04 N 118-38 W 
Crater 37-=54 121-49 W 
At 1043 report on command net that "low slow flier track 6112" was observed. Confirmation of 
call was made. Confirmation by FDP does not hold this track however. No other information 
available and no action taken by the FDP. 
1052 
IW indicates that Orange has dispatched a CM-capable truck from a base NE of the city toward 
the city. Possible launch sites, Richmond and Berkeley. PH, COR, PR, BHR at risk. 
1053 
All ships bring up slick 32. 
Prepare for conventional or directed energy weapon. 
1055 
Confirmed band steady believe it is commercial radar, hostile J-band emitter, coordinate defense 
using 
Bearing is 000 from PR 
MIU 1 OS (HDU) activated blue forces to provide a layered defense around the high value unit 
(HVU)COR. 
In response to potential high speed boat threat. 
1100 
Currently tracking both a truck and a boat. 
1100 
NCS operating from CG vessel traffic service reported two merchant ships passing through the 
operating area during exercise. The two merchant ships are ID friendly and requiring protection 
from HDU (Harbor defense unit). The merchant ship info was passed to the HDU for protection 
and deconfliction of the merchant ships. 
1101 
Debrief of possible CM attack. Area Defense Commander of PR reported I-band emmitter 
bearing 004 at 1055. The PR went to general quarters in estimation that CM attack was 
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underway. Air Defense Coordinator alerted other ships, BHR, PH. They did not, as tasked, put 
an ESM bearing line in the link and did not coordinate to try to get ESM fix with other ships 
The track drifted from 004 to 000 and the scan type never changed from search to acquisition. 
After approximately three min of tracking PR evaluated the bearing line as non hostile and stood 
down from CM defense. 
Lessons covered between FDP and PR were that PR needs to use the link to give visibility to the 
tracks not just for the FDP commander but for all ships and will do better at coordinating a 
defense not just with PR but with other ships in the harbor. 
PR is still remaining in the linebacker mode which is risky in that they have no missile defense 
against either aircraft or CM using SM2. This is according to plan though, because they still need 
to maintain BM defense for the city. 
1116 
Low slow flyer TN 2041 reported over command net by PR. 55 radar contact. Lost track. Track 
picked up by SHORAD and re-recorded as a link track 6062. 
1120 
The low slow flier has zigzagged. Now 6062 inbound low slow flier. Headed east toward city. 
Coming toward port appears to head over COR. Maneuvered to port. Now over COR. 
1126 
MIUW reports two trucks carrying missiles at Richmond wharf. JST ARS requested to take for 
action. 
1129 
Low slow flier inbound PR now turned inbound toward PR. Located 3nm north ofPR. PR 
covering with small arms from deck. Avenger covering. 
1131 
MIUW report wrt truck carrying missiles- sensor is "intel report". 
1132 
Request made for lat/long on truck carrying missiles to be used on EDGE. 
1135 
Lookouts on COR identified something. An unidentified Rl boat. 
1135 
PH went into air defense posture. 
1139 
Harbor defense requested to order PSU to investigate the RIB heading towards CO. 
1140 
Reference point for the possible warhead carrying trucks is set as 2044. 
1143 
100 
PRY reports to BHR that there is as possible cruise missile threat. Watchdog requests that the 
SLQ 32 be turned on by all possible units lnd create LOBs that can be placed into the link system. 
PRY requests he net to do coordination with BHR as ADC. 
1150 
Issue raised that the Avenger was never given the signal to take the LSF for fire. This is being 
deconflicted via landline.(ADC is raiding this as an issue). 
1150 
B asks for Stalker information to be displayed. 
1155 
ADC reports that they are unable to reach BHR on AADC&R. Changing to another ~ net(?) 
1156 
JST ARS has small boat tracks. Passed to CCG cutter Long Island. ADC will pass via ADC&R 
in event that there are no other possible comms available. 
1157 
PRY cannot come up with harbor defense commander and will try to pass via bridge to bridge. 
FDP coordinating through SCC. 
1159 
JSTARS reports to SCC that a small craft is paralleling shore in vicinity of pier 35. Not 
established as friend or foe at this time. · 
1200 
ADC reports no communication with the CG cutter via Bridge to Bridge, requests Wartchdog 
contact CG cutter Long Island. 
1205 
Request by Watchdog (WD) to have the cutter come up on PRY bridge to bridge comms. 
1206 
JSTARS reports fast mover one mile south of Alcatraz. Heading towards CO. Reported over 
command net to PRY until PRY can come with comms to the cutter. 
1213 
PR has contact, a boat, heading away from PR. Crew wearing military uniforms. 
1217 
Discussion with FDP commander and ground commander in CMOC (Civil Military Ops Ctr). 
This morning's low slow flyer attack showed how vulnerable we are over the water for chem 
dump. PR was in BM mode. Trying to modify defense by extending defender coverage by 
pushing two or more trucks on Angel Island, we would provide better protection against low slow 
flier. No JSTSAR assets available. 
1219 
Small craft approaching N to S approx 112 mile N of BHR position, reported to BHR. 
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1221 
confirm three small craft in group. 
1221 
PRY reprots small boat crossing bow. PH holds a zodiac and JSTARS is reporting as well. 
1222 
PH reports 6 small attack boats south of Alcatraz. 
122 
PRY report amplifying info on LSF. Avenger was never pulled off of the LSF track, and was 
being fed info from JSTARS. Possible disconnect with respect to JST ARS-A venger. Additional 
info may be helpful with respect to the C3 issue-for later consideration. 
1225 
BHR IDs 3 Boston whaler type craft. MIUW is still trying to determine whether players or port 
traffic. BHR assesses as regular (non-player) traffic. 
1230 
Late entry. Comms with the cutter established. C3 link through the SCC to Bravo Uniform 
(MIUWvan). 
1231 
Watch note that most of the contact reports are being made visually. As of this time the SCC 
holds none of the surface small boat contacts as hostile. 
1239 
ADC reports possible LSF in vicinity ofPR. FDP covers by communications with Avenger. 
1242 
PRY reports 3 small boats coming out behind Alcatraz and moving towards San Francisco. 
Requests ROE on LSF. 
1245 
Pelican video up in FDP cell. 
1248 
Trying to tell the PR where to go based on the video from Pelican 
1252 
Having trouble interpreting what we see over Pelican. Can we get someone from Pelican to 
explain? 
1255 
Carol recommends stepping outside for a visual. 
1255 
Coordinating JST ARS, Pelican and PRall together. 
1255 
Need Pelican picture to display GPS and track number to clarify what we see. 
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1255 
Request to the Pelican to go to the Richmond coast to show those tgts. 
1256 Confirm PR also has LAWS up. 
1256 
Message to medical for him to bring up picture as well. 
1257 
We were able to correlate Richmond here with Pelican Lat long stamp. 
1257 
PR unable to copy LAWS images ofPelican video. Software not installed. 
1302 
Pelican is going to refuel, back at 1500 
1303 
BHR reports a jetski. 
1304 
Jetski circling BHR. Has a camera, believed to be civilian. BHR unable to ID as anything other 
than civilianjetski. Advice is: Check for origin, also challenge them verbally. BHR, direction: 
came from Alameda. Advice from Roy: Send him away from BHR. 
1308 
Jetski is outbound toward San Francisco. Camera was video camera. 
1308 
Jetski did not affect anchor chain that it was circling in any way, constant anchor watch confirms. 
Jetski toward Pearl Harbor now. 
1310 
Coast Guard Cutter Long Island to intercept. 
Correction, jetski headed toward PR. 
1320 
PR reports jetski is hostile. FDP cell recommends proportional response. An orange boat is 
attempting to intercept jetski. 
1321 
Low slow flyer is in contact with PR via VHF. LSF is not known if hostile by PR. FDP is 
recommending 5" guns ifLSF is hostile. FDP CDR is giving PR approval to engage if deemed 
hostile. PR is unable to determine intentions of LSF since it could be civilian a/c. 
1324 
Joint Stars has identified an object approaching the PR on a heading of 0 I 0. 
MIUWU is reporting possible chemical agent release in water around COR. FDP cell has 
deemed it as not a threat to ship operations 
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1339 
Pelican has returned to station 
1345 
After two days of trying to establish Western Area Defense Network, we have been unable to link 
to the FDP cell. 
1349 
l&W on truck mounted missiles-trucks will be operating continuous wave at 9GHz. Slick 32 
should be looking in that range. 
1354 
Line of bearing has been produced by a SLQ 32 hit. 
1358 
Correlation ofESM and LOB to missile alert. CWIS has been placed in alert based on threat at 
050. PE Cell has video on truck convoy in vicinity of LOB. 
1359 
FDP watch CC does not authorize use of 5" guns on convoy due to possible collateral civilian 
damage. 
1359 
ESM detected from vicinity of trucks. 
1400 
Sweeping ESM from dir of truck convoy without lockon. 
1401 
Simulate activating V3 from PRY 
1404 
Vectoring small craft assets along 055 from PRY to investigate missile carrying truck. 
1406 
Fireball track 6001 est time of impact 13; track 2057 is impact point. 
1410 
PRY intends to engage; could be chemical weapons; est'd to land in water; FDP has granted 
permission to engage. 
1411 
PRY indicates second fireball; birds away on track 2055. 
1413 
splash track 2055 
1415 
fireball track 2062; PRY reports it is unengageable; 
mission cease on 052 true. 
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1417 
track 2062 beyond DAL coverage; assessed as no threat 
1420 
we would simulate call to CMOC for assist by local PD to recon possible truck mounted Cruise 
missile in vicinity of point Bravo (watch captain note) 
1430 
Concerning DEW event; truck assessed by intel to be in a position at which no shot is possible. 
This is confirmed via STALKER. Experiment can continue iftruck is moved to another location 
in which a shot is possible. 
1345 
Found two possible CM trucks. 37 52 09 N, 122 17 38 W. They are stuck in traffic on the 
freeway right now. 
Stalker will run some possible destinations. 
1550 
Comms with PR. Stalker shows Richmond Pier area. 
1550 Pelican discovered staging area of two trucks believed to be carrying CMs. Watchdog 
directed PR to place a reference marker in the link on the two trucks. TN 2076 (Link 16) 
Engaged Stalker to place the trucks position, use a 35 mph transportation model and calculates 
the amount of time to get to optimum launch position. 
Moving UAV to follow. Provided CM threat info to ships in harbor. 
1555 
Stalker found 12-16 minutes traverse time. 
1602 
Trucks are moving again. 
1603 
Based on stalker, trucks could be in optimal CM-launching position in 12 min. 
1605 
FDP cell requested launch of tactical TLAM to loiter points one and two. 
They're being launched at this time as per request. 
1549 
EOD disarmed the Chemical threat that was set to go off at 1600. They separated mustard gas 
from the explosive devices that they found. 
1610 
Two trucks monitored by Pelican UA V (position noted). Stalker is being used in case UA V loses 
track on the trucks and needs to reacquire. FDP commander is relaying target position every 
three minutes to PR. PR is using that position for the center of the CM threat sector. 
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All the ships in the harbor are monitoring link 16 and if the trucks start to radiate, they are 
prepared to engage them with CM defense. 
1419 
PR? requests a still from the video be relayed over LAWS or another whiteboard. 
1N 2204 
1422 
Previous models showed that we were going to launch the CM only in the Richmond area. The 
vehicles have crossed over into San Rafael. Asked Stalker to do a new model to see if now on 
this side of the bridge what the optimum launch positions are. Working with PR to see how 
accessible the CM launch position might be from that side of the coast. 
1426 
Speculating on the threats. It could be a ship, a commercial ship, a land target. 
1630 
Based on latest look at trucks in San Rafael, they may be positioning themselves to shoot at 
something commercial in the harbor, or shoot at a ship in the turnover in the harbor tomorrow 
(VIPs on board). Called down to CMOC, they are tracking as we are and passing info to 
govenor. Recommend we use the CMOC to contact local authorities to see if we could put a 
shadow, FBI or a SWAT team from the police on the trucks tomorrow. 
1630 
The SOC (Surface Defense Coordinator) contacted Navy Control Shipping for updates of 
possible targets of interest for the suspected mobile CM trucks. 
1435 
Battle Watch Captain just came back from the Precision Engagement cell. They are tracking the 
trucks. They also have a street map called ALARME??? They want a decision by the 
commander when they approach the fork in the road. They've established two interdiction points, 
one if the truck went left, the other if the truck went right. The truck has entered an area that is 
wooded. 
1435 
We've regained the tracks. 37 54, 122 28 Looking at a map. They've taken the eastern branch. 
There are two roads down the We've alerted the CMOC and they've alerted the FBI and the 
police. They'll go to an interdiction point on the southern peninsula. They'll just monitor, wait 
until a truck commits a hostile act. If they radiate, we'll take down the trucks before they can 
launch. 
1445 
SOC contacted NCSO at vessel traffic service. Based on possible missile threat, all ships 
inbound and outside 40 miles to stay out. 
Correction, NCSO will notify all ships inbound and outside of 40 miles from the Golden Gate 
bride to stay out. 
1653 
we have call into Naval control of shipping and Coast Guard VTS; if the trucks want to pick a 
commercial target, there are 4-5 excellent targets entering and exiting right now. We recommend 
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to Coast Guard that they close the harbor until we get the intent. CG via normal system for all of 
the pilots are going to stop all traffic outside and let remainder of traffic pass through and then 
seal harbor. 
1701 
Fireball; Oakland area at risk; time to impact 3 minutes; medical informed 
1705 
Birds away track 2032 PRY missile track 2041; sensor DSP; time of impact 0108Z; genesis 38-
4 7N 118-03 W; Crater 3 7 -48N 121-51 W; called fire mission over LAWS against the launch point; 
1708 
PE targeting launch point (simulated DD21) 
1710 
position of intercept 37-50-28N 121-59-37W 
1711 
Firebali1N 3570/3576 2045/57; area at risk East Oakland; sensor DSP; time of impact 0 118Z; 
Genesis 38-51N 117-52W; Crater 37-49N 121-54W; LAWS did not receive track; impact point 
2044 
1715 
birds away 2045 
1718 
Scud missile launcher destroyed 
1729T 
rucks still on move continuing procedure to pass lat/long to both Stalker and PRY; giving updates 
to Stalker in case we lose UAV; passing updates to PRY to give them SA; they have tried to clear 
traffic in harbor in case trucks did set up. 
1800 
Trucks have stopped at position 37 55 55/122 24 35 (some type of industrial complex); passing 
info to CMOC to set up surveillance for this evening; raising PRY in accord w/ pre-sched DCP 
meeting; passing truck file to them; tomorrow am will pass Stalker material via COMPASS to 
PRY; PE informed us that they have two helos overhead if we need to engage. 
Nighttime events from 16 March 
BU taking station in vicinity of anchorage 7. 
B 7,8,1 sectors for Long Island 37 49.12 N, 122 22.6 W 
2041 
EX: Intel. May be attacked Pier 7. 
Long Island 1-2 k OOOT-270T 
BU .5-1 k 
2042 
Anchorage 7 may be attacked by boats (CRRC) I swimmers 
Corr 090 4.5 kts 
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** threat axis 000-270T 
2 PSU's circling PR 
300-500 




Contact near A7-PSU enroute 
2120 
Sea Land Tracker detected two small unlighted I uniD'd small boats. HDU detached CFC Long 
Island to investigate 
2130 




Diver Possibly in water 250 yds N of PR via PSU 
2210 
PR reports two small boats 25' SBU 250 yds N of PR 
2218 
PSU recommends dropping concussion gren. 
2223 
BU RPB 2 sm vessels fr ALCA 
2225 
PSU --> 
BU simulates contacting EOD via contact fit ctrl re: secure ofUAV 
2230 
sm contact HOG SSE; PSU to intercept, pier 35 
2232 
2 more contacts 
2233 
Blue contact ID'D by PSU "Popeye" PSU Returns to ALCA 
2238 
Simulate EOD boarding PR for inspection 
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2239 
PSU ID's poss SBU entering marina 
2242 
PSU ID's OPFOR SBU and interdicts it 
2243 
Fast mover from A-B span, by CG Long Isl. 
2244 
Belay CG, Long lsi's last 
2247 
2 uniD'd vessels by Pier 35 
2318 




Talked to SMDBL re getting the Avenger data to the PR over COMPASS and CAPS overlays. 
Discussed capabilities of Avenger with all participants (Avenger commander present). 
Got a new DAL. Need to make sure PR received it and find out whether they have any stationing 
recommendations for the Avengers. 
Two Patriot batteries should be in theater Friday. Discuss with PR stationing requirements I 
recommendations. 
Evaluate positioning of USMC to ensure Avenger coverage. 
Working theW ADS data link. 
Pass the WMD FTP files over COMPASS. 
There are lots more morning meeting minutes on tape. 
0845 
CAST TEL site 70% probability pos 37.48 N, 122.30 W. Reasons: tracked vehicle possible hide 
site biochemical supplies. 
0852 
Fireball fireball. From space threat. TN 2074 from PR, sensor is PR's SPY. We confirm on our 
display. 1242 is launch track number, we don't have it from linebacker ship. 
0855 
One minute to impact, East Oakland or E Berkeley 
0857 
Received IW from CAST, they had info from satellite. COMINT, SIGINT and overhead 
imagery. Trucks in area, tels in area, cl 74% 
IW from DSP first, not seeing linebacker track, operating on less than accurate information 
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Killed at 78000 ft 
More below. 
0901 
Fireball fireball, second track. 
0903 
Watch captain Informed Medical that impact point is Antioch. 
0904 
Birds away against missile threat. 
0905 
Kill reported against missile at 75K feet. 
0926 
Notes: About ten minutes after the report from CAST we were able to receive a DSP STRED 
warning of a launch. Received three separate events. All STRED events displayed launch and 
impact positions. CMOC was called almost immediately as soon as we received the crater 
position (vicinity of Oakland) and Antioch in San Francisco. All of the presentations were 
engaged were engaged by PR with SM-2 block 4A. Unfortunately we did not see the fly out of 
the missile. That is critical because we are trying to tie in EDGE here and in WMD so that we 
can provide the intercept position and altitude so we can provide expected lethality to the CMOC. 
Bottom line is that we need to improve link connectivity or the ability to get tracks from the PR 
including the DTT of the actual missile and SM-2 fly out, crater and genesis. JPJ has had no luck 
getting any force-track video. Intent now is to direct them to come out of that mode and go into 
the DTT launch. They are set up to do a test of that at 0930 to check on the connectivity. 
Concerns about the link at this point...JPJ and BHR are reporting that they are not getting any 
comms from the ML V. The ADC is checking with the JI CO to see what the problem is. 
0938 
report the ML V is down due to loss of power. 
1100 
Prior to sensors lifting off this morning confirmed w/ Sensor Cell that we would have a P3 w/a 
Pioneer sensor from 11 00-1700; Pelican 
1000-1400 
w/ 45min break for refuel and back on station at 1500; concern that we have no eyes on cruise 
missile trucks and we have other tasking to monitor and hand off and take down to harbor police 
of a weapons carrying WMD contraband carrying cargo ship. We've selected a live ship by going 
through CG and the VTS was due to enter the harbor at 1130. Right now the Pelican controller 
is BU, MIUW, and harbor defense commander have the info. Once the UAV is over the 
container ship, by the ROE the FDP cell will make an eyes-on-target confirmation that this is our 
guy and work w/ Naval Ctrl protection of shipping to get the info to harbor police to intercept the 
container ship prior to arrival at pier. 
Interesting thing w/ link this morning: only way COR is getting Link16 (critical to see launch and 
impact of an SM2 block 4A missile) is via phone line from ML V. All ships are sending their info 
to the ML V and it is translated to phone line and we recv via Link 16 phone line. Critical issue is 
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we worked hard to get regular installation ofHF LOS Link 16 system, but unable to get it 
operating. So we have a single point of failure for FDP CDR to observe scud launches and 
impacts and engagements which is critical for us to get info to CMOC. Bottom line here is we 
loaded an LMS 16 but it went to the PE cell. This was an incorrect installation and should have 
come into the FDP cell. We found out that it is a completely different phone line coming from 
the ML V and all morning we have not been able to observe Linebacker ops. ID'd that we had 
another LMS 16 system that had a completely separate phone line from the ML V to here. LMS 
16 is an excellent tool that can color code all reporting responsibilities and shows launch and 
impact and fly-outs. This morning's event in FDP cell we didn't see any of the fly-outs. We put 
in all of the events on LMS 16, so it has a great recording device. We should have brought in 
LMS 16 and made part of cell. We will try to work on night of 17th and shift the installation in 
here so we have redundancy in monitoring BM ops and LINK 16 ops. 
Update on WADS: WADS supposed to be est'd at 1000 and the pipe which is different from 
original set up is to take WADS info at San Diego via FCTCPAC send it up via SAT link 11 to 
ML V which has capability via USQ125 to recv satellite TADIL A and send it out over broadcast 
by MLV on Link 11 to all ships which would be an Link 11/Llnk 16 mix. Right now we still do 
not have that connectivity and the problem has been getting the satellite access. We were 
supposed to have sat access from the beginning. We found out that conflicting req's w/ JSTARS 
who also req'd Satellite for their systems. This req't ended yesterday and are in the 12th hour 
w/out satellite access. We should have it by 1200. 
1140 
5 Minutes ago the level of air activity increased ten fold; the Western Area Defense System link 
appears to be up. WADS takes FAA civilian tracks and military tracks pumping them up via 
satellite from SD to the ML V. The ML V rebroadcasts them out to the ships. Confirming right 
now that has been rec'd. 
1255 
Passed to JPJ last known location of cruise missile trucks, additionally passed them via stalker 
model optimum location for cruise missile engagement. Setup a cruise missile defense sector to 
the north of JPJ. JPJ is prepared to engage using conventional or directed energy weapons. 
Running Pelican, and we just broke off from the contraband carrying ship, running Pelican to run 
up the line of bearing to find the trucks. 
1218 
Inbound merchant vessel NYK Vega initially tracked by NCS Shipping Control Team at VTIS. 
Tracking info relayed to MIUWU. Unable to enter track data onto JMCIS from MIUWU van to 
FDP cell. FDP has to manually input the track data. Once we had track data, we tasked BU to 
collect imagery via P3, until the vessel passed the Golden Gate bridge. Once in the Bay, imagery 
responsibility was passed to UAV. After thorough imagery collection and capturing stem name, 
Watchdog was able to simulate releasing of civil authorities to intercept target. MSEL event 
successfully completed. 
1300 
Finex MSEL event involving NYK Vega. UAV then tasked to proceed to point Charlie to 
investigate two ASCM trucks. 
1311 
Based on ESM hit 349 degrees true from JPJ, Watchdog vectored UAV to point Romeo. 
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1315 
BU tasked to return to base. Watchdog maintains imagery of target area via UAV. 
1310 
We received an alert from JPJ. JPJ trying to correlate an emitter, but before she could, she lost it. 
Sending UAV to Richmond coast to try to find source. Based on the fact the emitter ceased, will 
pass to the UAV that the truck may be on the move. The intent is to try to go from there and to 
expand the search. 
1320 
UAV vectored to point Charlie to search for ASCM trucks based on imagery from last three days. 
1347 
U A V detects ASCM trucks at point Charlie. 3 8 01 N 122 0 I W. ASCM trucks are parked 
imagery is clear. 
1400 
Two Uhaul trucks located by Pelican, now using Pelican & P3 with Predator tied together 
operating as a team under the J2 cell. Location of the trucks 38-01-36 N 122-00-42 W; based on 
non-movement, waiting on any movement to pass on to JPJ for CM defense; negative activity on 
Scuds; have sniffers out for ELINT, SIGINT and any other usual indications w/ overhead assets; 
NYK Vega has been diverted by harbor police to a safe place; continue to monitor link which is 
probably the most urgent priority in doing the work in establishing a WADS link via land line or 
satellite; focusing, since we have satellite access; also have low confidence that the ML V is able 
to forward link 16 tracks which again are life blood for systems like Edge and DAMS and 
LAWS, etc. that are tied to FDP. w/out Link16 tracks we don't get the BM launch impact or 
vehicles. 
1415 
Pelican video ceased according to plan, with P-3 standing by to reacquire. P-3 not situated to 
observe the vans in their present location. FAA flight plan will not allow the aircraft to be north 
of their present position. When FAA approval is obtained, P3 will move and reacquire video. 
1418 
PE cell reports the vans reacquired with video by P3. 
Per previous note, tried to see the feed from the P-3, but no joy in the JOC. Is the feed coming 
in? 
1428 
Feed from P3 is not available in the FDP cell. It is being fed toPE cell, but last word was that the 
P3 had to maneuver, and lost track of the trucks. FDP is awaiting word of reacquiring the 
vehicles. 
1450 




Crater report. Track 3472. Antioch/Concord area is the impact area. 
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1454 
Second fireball report. Impact area north San Francisco. 
1456 
Third fireball report. Second fireball impact is in the water. 
1458 
Area of risk is East Oakland. 
1500 
Third area of risk is San Francisco. 
1501 
Report of birds away on last group of missiles. 38K feet intercept over San Francisco. 
1503 
Fireball reports summary: Track 3471/3, sensor SPY/SIRED; TOI 2252; genesis 38-59N 118-43 
W. Crater 38-03N 122-01 W. Track 3502 area of risk East Oakland; acquire by SPY. TOI 
2258Z; genesis 38-57N 117-57W with crater at 37-44N 122-38W; missile kill by birds at 38K 
feet over Hunter's Point. Track number 3502/3501; area at risk is A South, acquired by SPY; 
genesis 39-07N 188-33W; crater at 37-56N 121-53W 
1515 
UA V (Pelican) video back up. Trucks are not yet located. 
1535 
UAV acquired trucks. 
1556 
Line of bearing established for truck position. Intel reports provided data for LOB. 
1600 
Sitrep by watch captain. Trucks split up. P3 is taking the north truck and UA V is taking the 
south bound truck. Concern is that the trucks are moving further south than they were able to 
move yesterday (Berkeley) and they could be moving as far south as Alameda. Have alerted PH, 
and attempting to reach BHR. PH reports that the SLQ 32, RAM and DEW are ready to activate. 
Have alerted JPJ, which is presently shielded by Treasure Island. Will attempt to get a Link track 
on both tracks and put up two threat areas for CM defense. 
1608 
Both trucks are heading south. JPJ has reported a hostile emitter that was only active for 30 
seconds and the frequency did not match the frequency from yesterdays cruise missile alert. JPJ 
evaluates non-threat, because what did not correlate was the position of the trucks and the 
position of the emitter. Have already alerted BHR and PH to have a cruise missile defense set up. 
1615 
The two trucks have a mile and a half separation. Continuing to proceed south. Latest position 
37 50 42N 122 17 57 W. JPJ continues to report about 13.6 GHz which is higher than J, which is 
beyond what the cruise missile emitter is. The emitter is NE of her in the Berkeley area. This is 
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evaluated as non-threat based on the fact we have VIB coverage of both vehicles. Both trucks are 
working through traffic and are considered non-threat. 
1715 
Watch captain sitrep. Watch captain was in J2 cell and observed that both of the trucks had 
joined up (they had separated and UAV on one with the P3 on the other). They were observed 
moving into a parking lot and backing into parking spots, where they swung their back gates up. 
In this position they were placing weapons facing out over water in the direction of ships. This 
was viewed as possible hostile intent. All three ships PH, BHR and JPJ were alerted. 
Immediately following this a steady CM emission was picked up by CO, PH, JPJ and BHR (SLQ 
32). For CM defense both JPJ and BHR activated DEW, with JPJ using CWI emitter with 5 sec 
on and 5 sec off, repeated. JPJ CO concerned with keeping the CWI going over Treasure Island 
and ceased after 3 bursts. BHR and PH continued (simulated) and tried to put camera on the 
target. PH reported emitter cease. This is an indication that the DEW was effective. Permission 
was obtained from C3F for use of 5 inch guns based on urgency. Attempts were made to get 
rounds on top ofthe truck via CMOC, vice call for fire directly from ships. Yesterday were able 
to get gunship helos to track trucks. Once all units reported that emissions had ceased, assumed 
that the trucks had been hit or that the DEW or SLQ 32 had defeated the missile. We did not 
command any SBROC firing because of testing which showed that chaff would impact the 
performance of DEW. Camera recording from both BHR and JPJ (PH does not have capability). 
PH CO reports that they have a GPS track with the MK 34 GFCS. No confirmation as to what 
type of ammunition was selected. At this time we are staying on the area of the trucks (UAV). In 
a real world scenario, we would be able to report a call for fire from the ships, to lock them on the 
target. 
18 March 
They also use the experiment for training, could train more. 
0730 
meeting 
Plan response to IW faster today to do a pre-emptive strike. 
UAV hasn't had sim UAV, so the exercise hasn't used it as much as it might have. 
ADS! hardware doesn't support sw upgrade. 
Lessons learned as per conversations last night: 
1. Many tools present. It has been a big advantage to overlay them, share information. 
2. Command relationships: JAOC was to be only TBMD, not FDP. ECOC would have been a 
better place to sit. Should PE have been part of FDP? 
3. DEW event: everyone wanted to have eyes on the target. Must get optical feed on new 
weapons. 
0843 
Following the intensity of the orange SCUD attacks on the 17th, FDP went to the JTF 
commander pm 17 mar and requested a pre-emptive strike against orange scud forward operating 
bases. Tasking was conducted using LAWS. Predictive analysis methods were used to select 
two orbit locations for tactical TLAM at 0730 both JPJ and PR were alerted and tasked via both 
voice and LAWS. PE cell was advised and PE cell helped coordinate execution. Issue here 
again, does PE work for FDP commander? or is PE on a level plane with FDP? Recommend that 
by using the technology developed by the FDP cell (LAWS and LAWS connectivity) that the 
FDP cell be authorized to conduct their own engagements without PE interference. All that 
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should be required is that they know about the upcoming attack to prepare deconfliction. JPJ and 
PR were placed in a ready 30 using Aviation Concepts' TLAM. Ships bring up their system and 
are tasked to put all missiles into mode 7 (ready for launch). Launch is scheduled for 0830 with a 
25 minute time of flight in order to have missiles in place when the IW is received from CAST. 
Once IW is received tactical TLAMS are vectored into the area that CAST recommends. Again, 
this type of targeting is meant to be interdictive in nature. TLAM were tracked with spy after 
launch and broadcast over link to provide required deconfliction in SA for air defense units so our 
own friendly CMs were not mistaken as FLA. 
0913 
comms with PR not available. PR moving out of position. Using JPJ to relay messages to PR. 
FDP commander unhappy with the situation. PR has had equipment problems and therefore are 
not going to participate. FDP doesn't think it was his decision. PR has been trying to contact 
watchdog for 3 hours. PR can communicate over DSA. 
0919 
IW show two launches. Tactical TLAMs vectored to area. 
0920 
BHR asks about low slow flyers on screen. None detected. 
Correction, BHR should be JPJ 
0921 
Fireball. SCUD launch. 
Correction 0919 should be IW of two potential launches. 
0922 
EDGE predicts impact in E Oakland, impact in 3 min. 
0923 
TN 3571 
Correction 0922 was JMCISS, not EDGE 
0924 
Ordered launch of SM4 against SCUD if available. 
TN 3601 
0927 
Fireball TN 3611 
0928 
Fireball TN unknown 
0930 
Don't see link tracks 
Full worksheet. 
TN 3601 
Time of impact 17232 
Genesis 38 47, 117 56 





Time of impact 17552 
Genesis 30 57, 117 57 
Crater 38 16, 116 45 
Worksheet 
Area at Risk: Oakland 
Sensor STREO 
Time of impact 17232 
Genesis 38 48, 117 57 
Crater 37 53,121 45.9 
0935 
Medical unavailable at either JMC or CMOC 
Watch commander SITREP: The continuous harassing of the SCUDS and the intensity of the 
level of the activity of the 17th went to the JTF commander on the pm of the 17th received 
approval to conduct a preemptive strike on orange SCUD base. This is a change of the flow of 
the battle; rather than going defensive every day because of the SCUDS, we go offensive. USED 
the CAST system that's been providing us IW to set up early warning launch of two TLAMS 
from the PR and two TLAMS from the JPJ to TLAM orbit points one and two, close to Fallon. 
Sent tracks via link and sent the TLAMS out to the area so that prior to the normal morning 
launch, the tactical TLAMS ... so that when the I& W was received, we gave the lat long from 
CAST to strike. Approx 3 min after the strike command the first fireball was hit. These were 
missiles that were used not for precision but for interdiction. 
Decision by FDP CDR: Since PRY Linebacker is unable to launch SM2 block 4A this morning, 
believe there is a capability per PEO to shoot the SM2 block 4 only at scud and implement 
decision to have JPJ to come up in NTDC mode and engage the scuds w/SM2 bl4. 
Based on C4I configuration, we are set up to receive ballistic missile indications in both TRAP 
and S-TRED so should be rec'd in EDGE and JMCIS. Also, with JPJ launching the DTTs we 
should be seeing them as link tracks. The JPJ is passing the tracks, however we are not seeing the 
link tracks. Looking at that right now. 
Situation: we are getting WADS data coming across JMCIS via TADIL B. Maybe we have the 
T ADIL B landline working. 
Info from JNTF next time we should go to JNTF for correlation. 
I st MSEL event: WADS is up; conducting patterning ops Thor 18Mar 
Linebacker has casualties to tape drives which prevents her from shifting from one load to 
another. We have a program configuration that is a lot harder to shift SM2 Linebacker mode and 
normal tactical ops. We are trying to task JPJ (since Linebacker is not an option) to develop 
OTis for scud launchers and SM2 Bl4. There is an SM2 Bl4 scud capability and it is less than 
that because there is no IR seeker for the SM2 Bl4, only the normal RF and Blast Frag warhead. 
LCDR Huxjust coordinated again successfully a TLAM engagement using LAWS making a 
strike in the Fallon area that the scuds have been operating out of. The tactic used was to mix 2 
C's and 2 Dl's to get both interdiction using the Dl's and effects on C. 
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1105 
Sit Rep. When initially tasked to conduct and engagement of a SCUD, ADC I PR reported that 
she was not in the linebacker mode and could not engage. This was a surprise to the FDP 
commander in that PR had a casualty to her tape drives and had not reported this to the FDP 
commander. JPJ was up the NTDC IBM mode and was tracking the SCUD so the FDP 
commander tasked JPJ to engage the SCUD with an SM2 blk IV. JPJ initially questioned the 
order because SM2 blk IV is advertised as not having any TBM capability. Lab tests have shown 
however that there is some capability, so FDP commander told JPJ to use engageabilty bypass 
and engage. JPJ was able to fire dual salvo yet when you use engageability bypass, your Pk is 
very low (.35). Lesson is to ensure all AEGIS platforms are configured for flexible defense with 
redundancy in fires. 
Continue to have problems onboard COR receiving link information. All week reception ofBM 
track data from AEGIS platforms, specifically J3.0 and J3.6 tracks have only been observed about 
30% of the time. FDP commander uses these essential messages to make warnings, evaluate 
engagements, and execute defense. One of the key lessons from the FDP commander's 
perspective is that if a command tactical picture can be developed in all dimensions, this link 
must be interfaced with new predictive tools such as EDGE and HP AC and additionally 
interfaced with precision engagement tools like LAWS. This allows the commander to conduct, 
no shit, FULL DIMENSION PROTECTION. FDP commander fear, earlier in the week, was that 
we had organized C2 and command relationships to support FDP, but the C4I was not organized 
to allow him to execute a defense in all dimensions. As additional tools were made interoperable, 
for example ADSI and EDGE, and ADSI and LAWS, the commander had more confidence in 
transitioning from defense to offense. (Reliability is important. Know the interoperability, and 
get operators that have the SA to make it work.) 
In the area of surface defense, our initial problem was that we did not set up a formal command 
relationship between the FDP cell and the MIUWU commander. In the real world, a commander 
must pull in all sensors and weapons systems under a common defensive and offensive umbrella. 
By developing a FDP cell that included watch stations and representatives from every medium of 
defense (space, air surface, subsurface), the commander consolidates both sensors and weapons 
and by doing so, not only achieves conservation of assets, he additionally improves his span of 
control and his execution. Initially, FDP commander was not tasking the surface watch properly 
because the asymmetric pillar I asymmetric dominance working group and they FDP working 
group did not work closely enough together to work out the command relationships in advance. 
Even up until game day (15-Mar), C3F was still working with commphibron5 (CPR-5) regarding 
their role and their command relationship with the FDP cell. According to some areas of the Ex 
plan, the OTC for the FBE was CPR-5. This did not make sense to the FDP cell, since C3F, as 
CJTF and responsible for all assets, should have been identified as the OTC. In order to repair 
this situation, the compromise was that C3F would be the FDP CDR and run the exercise 
simulation and CPR-5, as the OTC, would have TAC on all ships and execute real-world 
movements. This approach was doomed to fail and was not accepted because the experiment 
needs to be able to use live assets, task and direct live assets, and have freedom of movement and 
authority to control all assets. FDP commander did negotiate with CPR-5 use of ATF command 
net to direct all assets (live and sim). All units were directed to be up on all FDP circuits and 
execute guidance of C3F. The only thing left unsaid here was that C3F, although senior to CPR-
5, was on a separate phone line requesting to move assets from CPR-5. This was screwed up. 
And we fixed that by taking the approach that ifC3F issued the FDP plan under C3F pen, then 
the FDP plan was actually an order from C3F to all assets to comply with guidance and direction 
from FDP cell. End of log 
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G SPA WAR FBE ECHO DRAFT REPORT 
General 
SPA WAR Systems Center, San Diego (SSC-SD) continued in their support of the Maritime 
Battle Center (MBC) during Fleet Battle Experiment-Echo (FBE-E), with regard to network data 
collection and analysis. This brief report provides details on the results of the network collection 
and analysis effort. The information herein is provided in the form of a white paper or 
engineering position paper rather than a formal report, thus facilitating its incorporation within 
the official MBC FBE-E report. 
Network data collection was performed in support ofFBE-E Phases I and ll; phase I was 
conducted from 10-18 March and phase II was conducted from 10-16 April. SSC-SD provided 
two network engineers on USS CORONADO (AGF 11) during each phase, allowing coverage of 
events within multiple spaces in addition to concurrent data collection and analysis during 
exercise conduct. 
Instrumented sites included the USS CORONADO (AGF 11) during phases I and IT and the 
Modeling & Simulation Operations Support Cell (MOSC) at SSC-SD during phase I. Most of the 
discussion herein will address findings associated with AGF 11, however, where MOSC 
instrumentation supported findings of interest, they will be elaborated upon, accordingly. 
The objectives of the network data collection and analysis effort included: 
• Evaluation ofUSS CORONADO (AGF 11) Local Area Network (LAN) and Wide 
Area Network (WAN) architecture 
• Assessment of on/off ship/site bandwidth usage 
• Characterization of traffic content by protocol 
• Identification of traffic as generated by experimental and normal shipboard systems. 
Network Architecture 
The paragraphs that follow describe the network architecture as observed during FBE-E. This 
architecture will focus on those locations as instrumented with network data collection tools 
during the course of the experiment. These included AGF 11 and the SSC-SD MOSC. The 
MOSC facility possessed a relatively simple network architecture. Thus the focus of these 
paragraphs will be on AGF 11 LAN and WAN connectivity. 
The network architecture aboard AGF 11 consisted of a LAN backbone, with several routers, 
hubs, and switches attached, enabling various connecting media. As ofFBE-E, AGF 11 had yet 
to receive its IT-21 installation, which on other platforms provides high bandwidth ATM 
switches, enabling high volume network segments against an OC-12 backbone (up to 622 Mbps). 
Ships previously reported as having IT-21 installations (during FBE-D) included the USS BLUE 
RIDGE (LCC 20), USS KITTY HAWK (CV 63), and USS BELLEAU WOOD (LHA 3). 
AGF 11 's backbone is generally not segmented, which is to say that most LAN and WAN traffic 
from the various attached subnets traverse the 100 Mbps fiber media at any given time. While 
this arrangement is less than optimal, in terms of network efficiency, it has provided flexible 
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support to the various FBEs and other experimental system evaluations conducted on AGF 11. 
Moreover, within the context ofFBE-E, the AGF 11 architecture provided an excellent 
opportunity to evaluate WAN traffic across shared LAN media, thus characterizing the impact of 
the various LAN data on inter-site traffic. 
During phase I of FBE-E, network data were also collected at the Modeling & Simulation 
Operations Support Cell (MOSC) located at SSC-SD. The configuration at the MOSC is 
relatively straightforward, with several workstations connected on a common LAN, which is 
connected to a router handling Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) traffic. The 
MOSC accommodates up to 512Kbps of SIPRNET traffic. Another key facet of the MOSC' s 
architecture is its support for Multicast routing (selected broadcast) over SIPRNET. The MOSC, 
through its Multicast router (mroute) workstation, provides routing services for most Dynamic 
Collaborative Planning (DCP) participants, employing SIPRNET and the Common Operational 
Modeling, Planning and Simulation Strategy (COMPASS) tools, embedded within a variety of 
UNIX-based planner stations. More information regarding this subject is provided in Appendix 
A of this report. 
Network Topology 
Understanding of the network topology for any such data collection and analysis effort is crucial 
to its success. Without such an understanding, it is nearly impossible to properly characterize the 
origin and general content of the traffic collected, much less any tactical/operational ramifications 
implied. 
The preferred means of obtaining network topology information is to participate in the early 
planning for a given FBE. In this manner, the network data collection and analysis engineers can 
begin to derive logical system relationships and perform the necessary queries to obtain specifics 
regarding network segmentation, routing, subnet identification, and subsystem/network 
relationships. Unfortunately, participation in the early phases ofFBE-E planning was not 
realized by the network data collection team. Therefore, an alternate means of establishing the 
network topology was required. 
For FBE-E, network management tools available onboard AGF 11 provided a unique opportunity 
to establish the topology "on the fly". The tool was the "UniCenter" network manager by 
Computer Associates. This tool used Simple Network Management Protocols (SNMP) to 
establish the location of workstations, servers, and routers across the AGF 11 LAN. Given this 
information, network data collection personnel were able to provide an accurate representation of 
those portions of the network instrumented for the FBE. The use of the UniCenter tool, along 
with the generic application of network management tools and policies, is discussed in greater 
detail in appendix C. 
A high-level view of the FBE-E topology, from the standpoint of the data collection effort, is 
depicted in figure 1, illustrating WAN connectivity between AGF 11 and the MOSC. Figure 2 
focuses strictly on the AGF 11 portion of this effort. Both figures 1 and 2 illustrate the network 
analyzer data collection tap points associated with the collected data in green. More details 
regarding network analyzer placement are provided in a later paragraph. 
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Figure 2. AGF 11 FBE-E High-Level Network Diagram 
AGF 11 Exterior Communications 
The paragraphs that follow provide a brief description of those components comprising AGF 11 
external network connectivity (WAN connectivity) instrumented for this FBE. These exterior 
connections are illustrated in Figure 3 (along with details of router connectivity) and include the 
Secret Internet Router Protocol Network (SIPRNET), Portable Surface Terminal (PST), and 
Wireless LAN subsystems (WaveLAN & VRC-99). 
The SIPPRNET connection formed the primary focus of this collection effort. SIPRNET 
connectivity was obtained via a CISCO 4000 router, which had 4 Ethernet LAN ports and 2 
WAN ports. One ofthe WAN ports was connected to the ship's SHF SATCOM system. This 
provided 128Kbps of SIPRNET connectivity. One important facet of this connection is that 
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SIPRNET on AGF 11 does not currently employ its Challenge Athena connectivity, but rather is 
handled by a 128Kbps SHF WAN segment. 
The PST actually consisted of a point-to-point interface between AGF 11 and another station. 
This system did not actually attach to the ship's network, but rather included its own dedicated 
equipment. Therefore, this connection was not considered during the course this data collection 
effort. 
The VRC-99 provided an off-ship "wireless LAN" capability and was evaluated as part of the 
Extended Littoral Battlespace (ELB) effort. The VRC-99 connected to AGF 11 's LAN via one of 
the ELB routers attached to the Unclassified LAN as encrypted or "black" packets. These 
packets were then converted to unencrypted or "red" data via a Network Encryption System 
(NBS) and forwarded to the AGF 11 Classified LAN as appropriate. This external connectivity 
had the potential for the observation of a higher bandwidth off-ship connection. Unfortunately, 
such data collection largely went unrealized, due to the late availability of planning information 
to the network collection and analysis engineers. 
Functionally, the WaveLAN was similar to the VRC-99, in that it was being evaluated as a means 
for wireless external connectivity by the ELB project. The WaveLAN was essentially a 
Commercial Off-the-Shelf(COTS) variation on the VRC-99, with a number of performance 
specification differences. Since data from these "wireless LAN" technologies was not collected, 
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AGF 11 Interior Communications 
AGF 11 interior communications of interest included the Classified LAN, Unclassified LAN, and 
JMCIS LAN. These networks are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 above. 
The distinction the Classified and Unclassified LANs aboard AGF 11 is implied by their name. 
Information passing from Classified to Unclassified and back, is encrypted I decrypted through 
the use of the Motorola Network Encryption System (NES). These LANs essentially form the 
AGF 11 backbone and are comprised of 1 OOBaseFx fiber media, installed by CORONADO 
personnel. Much of this network system will be replaced I superceded by the pending AGF 11 
Information Technology for the 21st Century (IT -21) installation. 
The Unclassified LAN provided the means (via CISCO router) to integrate the VRC-99 and 
WaveLAN during this experiment. Data transferred between AGF 11 and other sites via the 
VRC-99 or WaveLAN were encrypted /decrypted via the NES. 
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The AGF 11 backbone LAN (Classified I Unclassified LANs) essentially handles most traffic 
destined for off-ship data transfer. Moreover, it also handles the majority of internal shipboard 
traffic. As a consequence, the majority AGF 11 traffic traverses the backbone, without the 
benefit of the network segmentation afforded via the use of switches. Much of the data makes its 
way on the backbone via "unintelligent" hubs, where no filtering or segmentation is offered. 
While not inherently efficient, this topology does carry with it the benefit of flexibility. 
Essentially an experimental system can be carried aboard and physically connected to most other 
systems aboard through a simple port on a hub. Note: this does not apply in cases where "smart" 
hubs are used. Such hubs provide filtering capabilities, with regard to connected addresses on a 
given port. 
The JMCIS LAN provided JMCIS connectivity throughout AGF 11 and was the primary means 
of connecting the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) space to the backbone and other sites (via the 
SIPRNET router). The JMCIS LAN is comprised of a Fiber Data Distributed Interface (FDDI) 
interface, which employs a "token ring" topology. This network connects to the lOOBaseFx 
backbone network via a Xylan "Omnistack" hub. 
Network Instrumentation 
During FBE-E, the network data collection effort continued to employ the Network Associates 
''NetXray", network analyzer tool. The NetXray is a commercial product, developed by Network 
Associates, which is MS Windows 95198 compatible and is hosted in notebook PCs in support of 
the FBE network data collection I analysis effort. 
The network analyzers are configured with 10/100 base Network Interface Cards (NICs), 
allowing them to be attached to any 10 or 100 Mbps Ethernet port or Hub. The network 
analyzers employed (using the aforementioned software) are configured to be entirely passive. 
Moreover, these analyzers are not even assigned IP addresses, relegating them to a receive-only 
state. The network analyzers are capable of collecting all data available on the attached port. 
Thu~ traffic filtered by "smart" hubs, routers, or switches, is not visible to the network analyzer. 
Network Monitor Points 
Phase 1 
During the period leading up to phase I ofFBE-E, selection of network data collection monitor 
point was complicated by two factors: 
(1) The network data collection/analysis team had not been integrated early into the planning 
phase 
(2) Due to recent (and quite valid) network security concerns by AGF 11 and the 3rd Fleet staff, 
the network analyzer notebooks had to undergo an approval process which largely precluded 
an early ship-check or approval of the TEMPMOD. 
Given these factors, network monitor taps were selected with limited knowledge of the 
capabilities of the identified ports. The AGF 11 network monitor points selected for phase I 
included: 
• 04-86-1-Q: ASW Planning Cell. Access to the LAN was obtained at port 11 ofthe 3Com 
Super Stack hub 
124 
• 02-53-2-Q: Electronic Data Processing (EDP)-2. Access to SIPRNET was gained through 
connection to port 4 of a hub mounted on a Cat 5000 router in the space. 
• 02-80-0-Q: Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) Intelligence Annex. Access to theW AN 
was gained via port 16 of an OMNISTACK hub. 
• 2-104-1A-C: Joint Strike Center. Access to the LAN was gained via Port 16 of an 
OMNISTACK hub. 
These monitor points appeared to provide good coverage of both the internal and external 
networks. Unfortunately, this later proved not to be the case, as the selected ports were contained 
within "smart" hubs. Smart hubs filter out nearly all addressed traffic not specifically destined 
for the selected port. As a consequence, only broadcast traffic, not associated with WAN 
connectivity, was available to the network analyzers on AGF 11 during phase I. More 
information regarding the issues with such connections is provided under the "omissions and 
issues" paragraph of this report. 
The SSC-SD MOSC tap location was on the MOSC LAN, which provided a good view of 
external DCP traffic. These observations and their corresponding conclusions are further 
elaborated in later sections of this report, as appropriate. 
Phase2 
During phase 2 ofFBE-E, selection of monitor points was modified, based on data already 
collected for phase I and a refined understanding of AGF 11 hub and router capabilities. The 
following monitor points were employed on AGF 11: 
• SIPRNET port - The monitor point was selected for the direct access to one SIPRNET port 
from the Shipboard router to the Timeplex port. 
• JMCIS port (ASW Cell)- This monitor port was chosen for the access to the 205.40.5.0 
network, and the JMCIS data. 
• Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC)- This monitor port was selected for its access to Land-
Attach Warfare System (LAWS) data. 
No monitor was set up at the MOSC during phase II. The captured data was already more than 
sufficient to fully characterize the nature ofDCP communication, from the standpoint of the 
MOSC multicast route (mroute) server. 
Another location that was not monitored was that of the unclassified net containing the ELB 
CISCO router(s), which provided access to the WaveLAN and VRC-99. In retrospect, this would 
have proved quite useful however, due to the limited information available to network data 
collection/analysis personnel prior to FBE-E, a network analyzer could not be properly prepared 
to tap this media. Collection of such network data (from experimental non-SIPRNET sources) is 
highly recommended for the next experiment. Similarly, the dedicated PST connection was not 
tapped. This would have also proved valuable and should be considered a target tap for future 
collection and analysis efforts, if reintroduced to the FBE environment. 
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Omissions and Issues 
Phase I 
During the course of phase I, little was known regarding the use of "smart" hubs on AGF 11. 
Smart hubs are designed to only forward traffic on a port in cases where addresses of interest are 
attached (e.g., an addressed IP address). In cases where an unaddressed "node" (e.g., network 
analyzer) or an address that is not intended for receipt of the message is attached to one or more 
ports, the data are not forwarded to the attached components. Consequently, only unaddressed or 
broadcast traffic is actually forwarded to such ports on a smart hub. Since the thrust of this effort 
(both phases) was to observe traffic through the on/off ship bottleneck, observation of broadcast 
traffic was of little interest or value. Unfortunately, all AGF 11 network analyzer connections 
during phase I were attached to smart hub ports. Thus, most relevant AGF 11 observations herein 
were obtained during phase II. Confusion regarding the use of smart hubs largely stemmed from 
the belated entry of the network data collection and analysis team into the FBE-E planning 
process. 
Procedural issues, with regard to the classification of collected network data should probably be 
reviewed as a consequence of this FBE. Due in large part to the lateness of data handling 
agreements between AGF 11 I 3rd Fleet staff and the MBC, confusion abounded with regard to the 
procedures for checking in network analyzer PCs and for ensuring collected data disks could be 
legally removed. This proved to be less a problem during phase II, however, such procedures 
should be reviewed and agreements made much further in advance for follow-on experiments. 
Phase II 
As previously noted, phase II possessed a number of dedicated external experiment interfaces. 
These included the Portable Surface Terminal (PST) and WaveLAN I VRC-99 wireless WAN 
systems. The PST was actually a dedicated point-to-point interface. Effectively, the same was 
true for the WaveLAN and VRC-99, although some of their data may have been available on the 
AGF 11 classified LAN. While these dedicated interfaces appeared to be adequate for their 
respective experimental loads, they would have required measurement to evaluate their potential 
contribution to shared media for a typical shipboard WAN environment. As previously stated, 
the application of these external interfaces within the context ofFBE-E was not entirely 
understood. Thus the significance of such early FBE participation on the part of the network data 
collection and analysis effort cannot be overstated. 
Another area that remains under investigation is the impact of the large network load on the 
SIPRNET router tap, which was a by-product of the previously described "flat" network design 
on AGF 11. The network analyzers were set up to collect 4MB files. Due to the ambient traffic 
load on the Classified LAN (ostensibly the backbone), the 4MB files filled up quite rapidly 
during the collection process. Oftentimes, these files contained virtually no data destined for or 
received from off-ship nodes. When attempting to apply filters during data analysis, the resulting 
files caused errors in the analysis program that rendered the data unusable. Moreover, when 
attempting to reduce the 4MB files individually (rather than through concatenation, as typical for 
this type of multi-file reduction), many ofthe files were found to be entirely filtered (containing 
no relevant data). Given this onslaught of data, it is quite likely that the network analyzers were 
inundated to the point where significant portions of the traffic were not collected. Assuming this 
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did not occur, tapping such an active network segment (in this case, the classified LAN 
backbone), is certainly inefficient. Therefore, one can conclude that either future such taps must 
be applied to more dedicated network segments (e.g., the serial connection on the other side of 
the SIPRNET CISCO router). 
Network Subsystems and Applications Observed 
A variety of subsystems were employed during the course of FBE, each with their own unique 
contribution to the overall network load. For phase I, while numerous subsystems were 
introduced, two appeared to make the most notable contributions to the analysis rendered herein. 
These included the COMPASS and a simulation of a series of DD-21 workstations. During phase 
II, the most notable system contribution was that of the Web-Centric ASW Network (WeCAN), 
with its use of World Wide Web (WWW) Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) to transfer chat 
and graphics files. A brief description of the use of each of these subsystems and supporting 
applications is contained in the paragraphs that follow. 
COMPASS 
DCP sessions were typically planned and executed 1-2 times daily (with occasional impromptu 
sessions in between). These sessions employed portions ofthe COMPASS tool set within various 
UNIX-based planner stations. These stations included the Air Force Mission Support System 
(AFMSS), the Tactical Aircraft! Automated Mission Planning System (TAMPS), and Ballistic 
Missile Defense Organization, Commander's Analytic and Planning Simulation (BMDO CAPS). 
Most of the COMPASS traffic generated for these sessions required a subnet level broadcast over 
the WAN using the multicast protocol. Multicast is used to broadcast unaddressed data (e.g., 
video and audio streaming applications, which are sensitive to time delays encountered with 
acknowledged protocols such as TCPIIP) to a designated subnet mask, applicable to the group. 
Specific applications employed within the COMPASS service set were the chat, white board, 
digital voice, and screen capture overlay sharing. Each of these services employ the User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP), for the broadcast of unacknowledged packets, coupled with multicast, 
thus ensuring data packet transfer to a specific multicast group. All COMPASS DCP data were 
transferred over SIPRNET, which does not inherently handle broadcast or multicast information. 
Therefore, a series of connections, known as IP tunnels, were established between a multicast 
router (mroute) workstation at the MOSC and all participating platforms. The use of these 
protocols and their ramifications are described in detail in Appendix D of this report. At this 
point it is noteworthy to mention that the network data collection effort for phase I of the FBE 
largely focused on the use ofthese protocols in support ofDCP. 
DD-21 Simulation 
The DD-21 Simulation was observed during the first phase of the FBE. Essentially, an attempt 
was made to simulate the various activities anticipated for a DD-21 system during various 
operations. While a description ofthe DD-21 system is beyond the scope of this report, its 
general purpose is to provide shipboard connectivity services with various supporting shore sites, 
thus allowing for reductions in shipboard manning and services not otherwise available to 
forward deployed units. The DD-21 simulation employed within phase I used a set of Protocol 
Data Units (PDUs) to provide traffic similar to that as projected for actual system use. 
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WeCAN 
WeCAN provided a set of tools in support of the ASW Cell and other ASW units, where 
participants could collaborate via WWW tools using HTTP protocols. These included chat 
sessions, file transfers, and graphic transfers. This tool proved to be quite efficient, in that it 
employed chat, rather than voice tools. For the ASW problem, the chat capability appeared to 
support the relatively slow tempo of ops and was received with great enthusiasm by all 
participants. These tools were used atop the JMCIS workstations in the ASW cell, with all 
resulting on/off ship traffic being forwarded via the JMCIS FDDI LAN to the SIPRNET router 
and vice versa. 
JMCIS 
JMCIS maintained its typical set of intelligence links (e.g., OTCIXS, TADIXS, TRE, etc.) and 
employed the LAN to transport that data between workstations. Within the context of this effort, 
however, the most significant contribution observed from JMCIS was its hosting of the WeCAN 
tools, which resulted in the on/off ship traffic described above. 
COTS Tools and Services 
Much of the traffic collected during this effort was attributed to the widespread use of 
Commercial Off-the-Shelf tools and services such as Microsoft® NetMeeting, Microsoft® 
Outlook, Microsoft® Exchange, Microsoft® Internet Explorer, and various other commercial 
products. Much of this information consists of chat, email, and Web Browsing, which have 
become a primary means of moving information both intra and inter-ship. 
Network Observations 
In her capacity as a Sea-Based Battle Lab, AGF 11 possessed one of the more extensive early 
network configurations. The CORONADO has extensive off-ship bandwidth in the form of 
Challenge Athena as well as additional capability via a separate SHF connection. During the 
course of this effort, only those systems employing the SHF system for on-off ship connectivity 
were observed. As AGF 11 's LAN connectivity developed, it did so without the benefit of those 
network components that have become standard within IT-21 installations. For example, AGF 11 
does not possess the OC-12 capacity (622Mbps) Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) backbone 
found on other IT-21 ships. More significantly, it is not segmented via switches, resulting in a 
"flat" network topology, where virtually all nodes (servers, workstations, and routers) function as 
if they're attached to the same Ethernet bus. Thus, all nodes attached to the AGF 11 backbone 
are required to sift through all traffic on the LAN, without the benefit of segmentation. 
AGF 11 's network has evolved in this manner somewhat intentionally, in that such open 
connectivity between systems afforded a level of flexibility required in light of the dynamic 
nature of its experimental systems. Moreover, this flat connectivity has also been a by-product of 
the incredible changes in the systems and their respective configurations. Thus a great deal of 
credit is due those who have maintained this network, in that any network failures would have a 
tendency to effect many systems, rather than a few on a single segment. 
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AGF 11 is now preparing to receive her IT-21 installation. Therefore, while IT personnel aboard 
certainly recognize the need to improve the network architecture, any significant changes have 
been deferred, pending receipt of the new IT-21 installation. With this, it is important to 
understand the impact of a flat network configuration on the various routers providing 
connectivity to other networks (e.g., those connecting WAN and LAN media). 
In effect, WAN routers (e.g., SIPRNET) are inundated by LAN traffic not intended for disclosure 
on theW AN, thereby requiring the router to sample all traffic and discard most of that as 
intended solely for LAN use. This was quite evident when attempting to attach network monitors 
to ports on the SIPRNET router. The network analyzer would generate 4MB data files rapidly, 
mostly filled with traffic intended for the consumption of LAN nodes and much of it overhead 
and broadcast traffic. This large amount of traffic rendered data collection difficult in that 
collection disks would fill more quickly than was considered reasonable to alternate devices 
(move another analyzer in and archive the data off to a backup drive). When attempting to 
analyze this data, most of it appeared to be comprised of local broadcast traffic, other than that as 
actually intended for this collection effort. With the objective of observing traffic at the most 
restricted points (e.g., on/off ship exit/entry points to the WAN "cloud"), this traffic was 
generally considered extraneous. Moreover, while the evidence is somewhat inconclusive, it 
appears that the extraneous traffic might have precluded capture of some of the more significant 
on/off traffic intended for collection. In short, AGF 11 network observations appear to make an 
excellent case for many of the features found within IT -21 installations. 
Communications Observations 
PST 
This point-to-point off-ship connection was not tested, however some system claims are that this 
system can work through SIPRNET. The Maritime Battle Center (MBC) desired to measure 
bandwidth used on the dedicated PST circuit to provide a comparison with bandwidth available 
on SIPRNET, however the attempt was too late to get permission from all concerned parties prior 
to the underway period. 
WaveLAN I VRC-99 
This communications pipe was dedicated and advertised as being so in any production version, 
thus no competition was perceived and no instrumentation planned. Afterward it was found that 
the competition for bandwidth within the ELB itself caused problems and instrumentation would 
have been highly enlightening. Should another opportunity avail itself, it would be desirable to 
tap whatever 10/100 base Ethernet media adjacent to these "wireless" LAN technologies is 
available. 
SIPRNET 
This WAN pipe formed a "classic" choke point and was thus the primary subject of 
instrumentation for this effort. Unfortunately, difficulties were encountered in determining all 
LANs feeding the SIPRNET connection. Moreover FBE-E network data collection planning 
occurred too late to obtain a version of the network analyzer capable of tapping the serial 
connection on the other side of the SIPRNET router. In so doing, much of the aforementioned 
extraneous traffic would have been filtered by the router, thus focusing collection on the area of 
interest. 
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An example of the SIPRNET data captured is contained in Figure 41• This figure illustrates 
SIPRNET activity over the course of several hours during phase II. The data was obtained by 
tapping the Classified LAN feed into the SIPRNET router and then filtering out all but those 
packets with off-ship source or destination. Most of the activity indicated the use of HTTP 
protocols, generally associated with WWW browsing. SIPRNET activity also included HTTP 
chat sessions originating from WeCAN participants however this is illustrated in a separate graph. 
For reasons yet to be established, the graph also indicated two periods of total inactivity. This 
indicates one of two things: (1) a SIPRNET outage or (2) the inability of the network analyzer to 
cope with the ambient traffic load on the Classified LAN feeding SIPRNET (ostensibly the AGF 
11 backbone for this type of data). The results support either one of these conclusions. 
Particularly noteworthy is the length of the "drops" in activity. There appear to be gaps of over 
30 minutes in each case. Figure 5 illustrates the Classified LAN activity with fewer subnets 
filtered, allowing a greater degree of internal LAN traffic to be plotted. This analysis was run 
against the same sample data set as figure 4 and illustrates that large data spikes (of up to 6.4 
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1 When observing these scatter-chart graphs, note that bandwidth usage is represented in Octets (Bytes or 
Kbytes) along theY-axis and that time is represented along the X-axis. Statistics are generated in bytes 
versus bits by the collection and analysis programs. When converting to bits (e.g., Kbytes/s to Kbps ), 
simply multiply the value along the Y -axis by 8. 
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Classified LAN 
The AGF 11 "classified LAN" was instrumented. The classified LAN essentially comprised the 
AGF 11 backbone. This backbone consisted of 1 OObaseFx Ethernet fiber media, which 
ostensibly carried most shipboard classified traffic and thus provided connectivity for most 
shipboard classified workstations to the SIPRNET. As previously noted, this LAN evolved into a 
flat network, without the aid of multiple segments as typically provided by modem switches. 
Therefore, all attempts at collection were inundated by the large amounts of ambient traffic on the 
net. Figure 5 illustrates a portion of that large traffic load (still with significant filters applied). 
While outside the scope of this analysis, actual loading would likely have been significantly 
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Figure 5. Partially Filtered Classified LAN Traffic Showing Peaks 
Other Observations 
A large number of dedicated communication pipes were encountered in this experiment. The 
actual burden on SIPRNET seemed minimal, but if traffic was on dedicated pipes only for 
experimental convenience and is intended to go out on SIPRNET in any operational installation, 
real analysis will have to be performed. For example, WaveLAN used 2Mbs and PST supported 
1 0 Mbps. Actual use was not measured (but apparent saturation of W aveLAN with video at one 






JAOC instrumentation was essentially pursued to obtain LAWS data thought to be coming in 
through that space. Attempts to get traffic between JAOC systems, however, were frustrated by a 
"smart" hub, which filtered all traffic not intended for the specific port tapped. Unfortunately, 
this was not known early enough for it to be avoided. The same problem occurred on a larger 
scale during phase I, when many of the network data collection taps were applied to "smart" hub 
ports. Figure 6 illustrates the network activity visible to the analyzer via the "smart" hub port. 
Note that virtually all traffic consists ofUDP broadcasts. Thus, no on/off ship activity was 
observed due to the type of the hub involved. 
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Figure 6. JAOC Network Activity Captured Illustrating Broadcast 
Collaborative Planning 
Much of the network data collection performed during phase I was oriented toward Dynamic 
Collaborative Planning (DCP). This involved the continued evaluation of bandwidth utilization 
as incurred by COMPASS services during DCP. It also provided an opportunity to instrument 
the MOSC and observe DCP operations from the "support side". With regard to DCP, MOSC 
serves a number of functions: 
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( 1) It provides a cadre of experts and associated services concerning topics such as modeling 
Chemical I Biological weapon dispersion, as well as the simulation of other such tactically 
relevant events. 
(2) It provides a central point of simulation scenario-control TMD exercises, as required. 
(3) It provides support with regard to DCP troubleshooting, as needed during exercise conduct. 
( 4) It provides actual connectivity services in support of virtually all events involving 
COMPASS DCP. 
The fourth item above will be the topic of continued discussion in this area. One of the by-
products of this collection effort has been an increased understanding of the role of the MOSC as 
a "DCP forwarder". By way of background, COMPASS DCP is currently being exercised over 
SIPRNET. Many of the services involved in this valuable capability require the use of non-
addressed, unacknowledged protocols (e.g., UDP). Such services include voice and video, where 
acknowledgements would otherwise interrupt the data stream. Thus UDP protocols are required. 
Unfortunately, these can only be delivered either via broadcast or through a "limited scope" 
broadcast, known as multicast. Multicast employs a special subnet mask (known as a class D 
address), which is assigned to all participating nodes. While this sounds like a great solution, it 
turns out that SIPRNET does not allow for the use of this protocol. This appears to be due to its 
routers not being configured to handle multicast. It may even, in fact, be a matter of policy that 
such messages are discarded, since outside users, with knowledge ofthe multicast address(es) 
could induce "broadcast like" traffic in an attempt to deny service. Regardless, SIPRNET does 
not, in its current state accommodate multicast. 
In spite of this limitation, SSC-SD's MOSC personnel devised a solution, using a protocol over 
multicast designed to transport multicast packets in and out of the established, nationwide 
multicast backbone (a.k.a., mbone ). This protocol involves the use of an outside Internet Protocol 
(IP) wrapper, referred to as "IP-in-IP". These packets are used to traverse "connections" 
established over media not designed to forward multicast packets, known as "IP Tunnels". This 
creative solution was quite successful, in that COMPASS services have been demonstrated at 
various distant locations using existing SIPRNET media between workstations configured with 
the IP tunnel connections. A more detailed description of the problem with multicast over 
SIPRNET is contained in Appendix C, along with a description of the IP tunneling protocol. 
One of the more interesting aspects of the use of IP tunnels is the requirement to establish a 
connection between pairs of participating nodes. A tunnel forms a direct point-to-point 
connection, and thus must be established between each pair of nodes participating in the 
"conversation". For COMPASS DCP this is handled using a Multicast Route Server (via mroutes 
entered at each participating site). While duplication of traffic is unavoidable in such an 
environment (see appendix C), the use of a single site to "relay" such point-to-point broadcasts 
does mitigate this to a large degree, at least from the standpoint of most individual participating 
sites. The solution thus far has been to use the mrouter at the MOSC (hosted in the "greyhound" 
workstation) as the "relay" point. When any participating node transmits DCP multicast data, it 
actually does so via its IP tunnel with greyhound. Greyhound, in turn then retransmits this same 
data out (in the order received) on each of its IP tunnel connections to all other participants. 
While this form of relay does induce noticeable latency (audible delay of up to 1 second), it does 
ensure that the packets are received in the same relative time sequence at each terminating node, 
thus providing a reasonably high quality receipt of voice data. 
Overall, however, this use of tunnels does drive up bandwidth usage. At the MOSC, in particular, 
each voice "broadcast" results in voice traffic across each of the tunnels over SIPRNET. In other 
words, if there are 5 participants (besides the MOSC), SIPRNET traffic is increased fivefold. 
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This can be significant, when considering that the voice compression technique used for 
COMPASS employs up to 13Kbps per node (five nodes could use up to 65Kbps ofSIPRNET 
bandwidth). Moreover, should an individual site employ multiple direct connections to the 
greyhound rnroute "server", the traffic would be increased by an ordinate amount (resulting in a 
duplication of on/off ship bandwidth usage). While the policy is to have a single mroute-
configured station at any COMPASS site (which would "unpack" the multicast packet and 
forward it to other multicast nodes aboard), this type of duplication was observed on the USS 
BLUE RIDGE (LCC 19) during FBE-D. It's likely that this may have been used as a work-
around, since there were some difficulties encountered setting up multicast via the IT-21 switches 
on board, however, it is an example of how this method, while effective can result in increases in 
bandwidth usage. 
Figure 7 illustrates the capture ofiP-tunneled multicast during phase I ofFBE-E. This DCP 
session involved IP-tunnels set up to a handful of stations. Note the actual bandwidth usage by 
the tunnels far exceeded the 13Kbps that would otherwise have been required by the digital voice 
compression employed. It should also be noted that this graph uses a significantly different time 
scale than others represented within this report. This was for the purpose of observing activity 
associated with "microphone key" activity during the DCP session. 
While use of the MOSC as a mroute I IP tunnel "server'' simplifies the use of tunnels and 
alleviates the even greater bandwidth usage that would otherwise be required at individual sites 
(having to maintain numerous tunnels to other individual sites), it does carry with it the potential 
for failure. Assuming an outage at the MOSC or failure on the workstation handling the tunnels, 
all DCP connectivity would effectively be disturbed, until alternate tunnels could be established. 
While not impossible, this would likely prove inordinately difficult for deployed personnel afloat. 
An alternate set of mroutes or tunnels should be established for such contingencies, to provide a 






















































For planning or relatively slow-tempo operations, "chat" (transmitted typewritten text) appears to 
be a viable, low-bandwidth alternative to digital voice. Moreover, chat also tends to resolve 
ambiguities resulting from otherwise unclear transmissions, which cause the recipient to transmit 
"say again" in response (adding further to the bandwidth consumed). The ASW Cell (see next 
paragraph) employed chat successfully, given the relatively slow-paced tempo of operation 
typically encountered in that environment. Chat, however, does not always compare favorably, 
given the environment. 
During one FBE debrief, personnel indicated that attempts to use chat for "call for fire" 
coordination (via LAWS) resulted in slow reaction times. In this case, the additional bandwidth 
required for voice transmission would have been preferable to the operational impact of increased 
reaction time. 
ASW Cell 
The ASW Cell extensively employed the WeCAN tools for collaborative planning as well as a 
means to almost entirely of HTTP protocol Web traffic. During most periods, where chat was 
employed, the traffic averaged well under 2Kbps. Peaks are representative of graphic data and 
other file transfers as required in support of the ASW problem. This data was collected via the 
JMCIS network tap, using filters to/from external sources in/out of the ASW cell. exchange files 
and images. As previously noted, WeCAN employs the WWW HTTP protocol as its transport 
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mechanism. From the standpoint of the ASW Cell, WeCAN chat was employed quite effectively. 
Bandwidth usage for chat itself was relatively low, leaving greater reserve bandwidth for other 
data transfers. Moreover, ASW Cell participants not only found chat adequate for the op-tempo, 
but also were quite enthusiastic with regard to its utility. FBE-E distinguished itself as 
highlighting the op-tempo as a basis for the selection of chat or other means to disseminate 
information in "real-time". Figure 8 illustrates the filtering of ASW Cell data either received 
















Figure 8. ASW Cell Contribution to SIPRNET Bandwidth Usage 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Given the observations noted above, a number of conclusions can be drawn with associated 
recommendations for future application. This paragraph provides a general summary to that end. 
One of the more notable observations, while not new, was that "chat" is conservative of 
bandwidth and, when tactically viable, should be preferred over voice. Other advantages inherent 
in chat sessions is the resolution of ambiguities often found in speech -text is clear and can be 
clarified in relatively short order (with little cost in bandwidth) as necessary. 
Network administration tools were essential in the identification of the AGF 11 configuration 
within phase II. Moreover, experience with the AGF 11 network indicated that management and 
maintenance ofthe ship's LAN and WAN components would be virtually impossible (given the 
large number of users) without such tools. Thus net administration tools should be an integral 
part of any network installation. However, there needs to be a database that relates IP or MAC 
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addresses to shipboard location and tactical system names and I or functional application, so that 
depiction of network elements is tactically meaningful. This would greatly aid in the ship's use 
of such information, which otherwise, by its very nature is rendered somewhat cryptically. 
There is clear contention for bandwidth on some nets. This situation seems to change with 
mission and operations of the ship. It therefore seems that management of bandwidth on and off 
the ship is much more dynamic than in shore-based enterprises. In addition, the view afforded of 
bandwidth users by typical network tools is in terms of IP or MAC address rather than in terms 
meaningful to a tactician or network administrator trying to adjust the network to support a 
specific tactical requirement. 
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Appendix A - Lessons Learned 
Packet-Level Analysis 
In spite of previous advertisements, some packet data needs to be collected by the network 
analyzers in addition to packet headers. This is because some of the information required 
collection personnel to understand the source and application of the packet is included as "data" 
immediately below the header data. The "data" is actually header data from the highest 
(application) layer in the ISO seven layer protocol stack because some protocols (e.g., "real time 
protocol-RIP") use the upper layer for header type information. 
Network Analyzer Capacity 
Data collection for as little as 24 hours fills up the network analyzer hard drive requiring that the 
data be zipped for storage (compression about 4:1 ). After the data is zipped, it is more difficult to 
"pre-process" to remove data as required by C3F ADP security. In addition, the "data" removed 
by pre-processing is actually required for effective analysis (see above), so if pre-processing is 
done prior to compression, the retained data has lost needed information. Once several days of 
high capacity data is collected and zipped, the disk is too full to inflate a zipped file for pre-
processing. Thus, for effective processing, data has to be reduced and analyzed prior to pre-
processing and zipping. However, since the data is SECRET, it can't be readily transferred to 
another computer for processing. Another network analyzer was substituted when analysis had 
to be performed during execution. If, however 
High Bandwidth Usage Impact on Key Subsystems 
Although it was not instrumented with network analyzers, the ELB WaveLAN exhibited classic 
bandwidth starvation. Voice and file transfer communication between LAWS on Coronado and 
John Paul Jones was precluded (even pinging didn't work). When video transmission ceased 
over the WaveLAN, pinging worked and WeCAN, voice, and other comms passed through. The 
WaveLAN pipe could really benefit from bandwidth management. 
Advance Network Instrumentation 
Need to analyze the networks well prior to experiment. It would be useful to instrument the 
networks well prior to the experiment to: (1) validate instrumentation and tap point, (2) 
familiarize shipboard personnel with operation, use, and information from instruments, (3) gather 
sample data to validate reduction routines and, in particular, subnet and system filters, and (4) 
identify and correct existing network traffic and configuration issues. 
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Serial Network Media Monitoring 
Need to adapt to serial data format from routers to SIPRNET. Could be useful to use a real-time 
analysis device such as a packet shaper for better information to support the FBE during 
execution. 
Addition of Network Administration Tool 
Need to add net admin tool into one FBE to determine impact of database creation and 
maintenance. 
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Appendix B- Network Bandwidth Management 
This appendix addresses the capability of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) bandwidth 
management products and the applicability of that capability to on I off board shipboard digital 
communications. 
Capability 
There are currently several COTS products that control the use of bandwidth in a network by a 
very flexible number of filter criteria based on measurable parameters in the communications 
message stream. 
Control of message bandwidth use can be both on a basis of priority and of rate control. This is 
important because Navy tactical traffic cannot be controlled on the basis of priority alone. An 
application with high priority can command bandwidth to the exclusion of all other applications 
when only a portion of the bandwidth would be sufficient for the priority application leaving the 
residual for others. 
Rate control coupled with priority control provides the flexibility for a more effective bandwidth 
control strategy. 
To define a bandwidth control strategy, you need to: 
Identify traffic characteristics and behavior 
Classify I identify traffic according to source, application, and minimum latency, latency 
variation, or bandwidth requirements. 
Devise a policy to control access and allocation of bandwidth on the basis of the identified use. 
Navy Requirement 
Bandwidth management could greatly benefit shipboard systems. For example, during FBE-E the 
ELB system communications between USS Coronado and USS John Paul Jones was via a 
Wavelan wireless LAN. When the 2 Mbs bandwidth was used for streamed video, the video 
consumed all available bandwidth. Attempts to pass simple files using TCPIIP failed because 
there was not even enough leftover bandwidth to support consistent "pings" across the interface. 
As soon as video transmission ceased, other transmissions passed through. This is clearly a case 
where a bandwidth management tool with appropriate strategy could have allowed concurrent 
operation of all applications. 
Traffic classification, identification and bandwidth allocation policy development for shipboard 
applications is different from commercial enterprise, but the controls afforded by the COTS 
bandwidth management products are applicable. Tactical applications require significant 
bandwidth control flexibility. Tactical applications have a wide variety of missions and use a 
wide variety of protocols with mixed tolerance to packet loss, latency, and latency variation. 
It is not apparent a priori what the exact bandwidth management strategy should be, or even if a 
static strategy is satisfactory. It may be necessary to adjust bandwidth management strategy as 
the tactical situation (mission requirements and communications channel operability) change. If 
the strategy turns out to require dynamic control, then it seems best to initially leave that control 
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to a human while patterns of operation are experimentally determined that later may permit 
automated control. 
Bandwidth management strategy requires tactics and procedures, probably best developed 
experimentally, as do communications use in any other area of warfare. Moreover, as in other 
warfare areas, any management strategy is susceptible to information warfare, and that 
susceptibility should itself be evaluated during the experimental process. 
Recommendation 
Bandwidth management is a requirement for successful shipboard digital communications in 
general and for FBE in particular. 
Current COTS bandwidth management products should be investigated to 
1. Learn all factors associated with their implementation (in part by learning from the 
adversarial presentations of competing vendors.) 
2. Pick the "best of breed" for Navy application. 
The selected product could be evaluated in a land-based environment if a suitable mix of 
protocols and applications can be provided. Whether evaluated land-based first or not, the 
selected product should be installed on an FBE ship for experimentation with trial strategies. 
Postscript 
This technote is directed at on I off board communications. Evolving warfare techniques call for 
the transfer of large bandwidth products within the ship. These bandwidth requirements also 
warrant attention and management, but are left to future FBEs. In addition, no fleet-wide 
communications bandwidth management has been investigated. 
141 
Appendix C-Network Administration 
The current situation is that networks aboard Navy ships generally do not have network 
administration tools or strategies. For small deck ships, where systems are not changed too often 
and personnel and their ADP tools do not move within the ship too often network administration 
may not be a major issue. However, on large deck ships where systems frequently change, 
personnel spaces are realigned, and whole groups move on and off the ship with associated ADP 
to support varying mission requirements, network administration is an on-going issue. 
Network administration requires both tools and a strategy for their utilization. The strategy must 
address both utilization of the network administration tools (NATs) and the procedures to be used 
in managing ADP assets on the networks. 
USS CORONADO has introduced a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) NAT by Computer 
Associates called "UniCenter". The presence ofUniCenter during Fleet Battle Experiment-Echo 
(FBE-E) presented an opportunity to evaluate how such tools might be introduced to administer 
the flow of ADP equipment on and off the ship's networks for the FBE-arguably a worst case 
example of embarked force impact. 
This appendix proposes one way in which the UniCenter NAT could be utilized to support 
administration of network assets in a situation such as presented aboard USS CORONADO. 
Attention is paid to asset management and connectivity monitoring. The experiments proposed 
herein also establish the background for bandwidth contention management within the ship. 
While the UniCenter software is referenced because it was on Coronado, there is no intention to 
endorse the use of any specific product. In fact, the research of all available products of the type 
should be conducted to determine the best features from all for shipboard applications. 
Connectivity Determination 
The first challenge in network administration is to establish a picture of the network 
connectivity-all the net units2 on-line and how they are connected to each other. COTS NATs 
are typically software running in a PC attached to the network. They search the network to 
discover the on-line units by their media access control (MAC) address and I or assigned Internet 
Protocol (IP) address. Requests to on-line units are responded to in Simple Network 
Management Protocol (SNMP). All commercial units of interest support SNMP. There may be 
military systems attached to the network which do not support SNMP, however most military 
systems attached to networks are based on COTS processors and ADP equipment which do 
support SNMP. 
On Navy ships, IP addresses are usually assigned dynamically when a unit logs on and kept for 
the duration of their log-on (although it is possible for a maximum time for IP "rent" to be 
implemented.) Therefore, to avoid ambiguity, the MAC address will be used for reference in this 
technote. Some components such as "dumb" hubs or passive PCs (i.e., those used as network 
analyzers) will not provide a MAC address. This does not significantly impact the administrative 
problem. Network administration policy should also ensure that all units capable of being 
assigned an IP address are assigned an IP address to facilitate the NAT unit discovery process. 
2 A "unit" herein is a CPU, switch, smart hub, router, or other device attached to the network. 
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Human Factors 
Most COTS NATs provide a graphical interface to reflect results of the unit discovery process. 
The discovered units are presented as they are connected to each other in a hierarchical fashion. 
A high level view is presented first in which major subnets are represented by symbols. Clicking 
on a subnet symbol explodes the view of that subnet to the next level, which may also include 
subnets as symbols. The sequence continues until the "drill-down" process arrives at units, 
represented by their MAC or IP address, on the subnet terminal segment. 
While the drill-down process works well, the representation of units by their address is not very 
meaningful. In performance of his role, a network administrator generally has to account for all 
attached units, determine where a problem exists, determine what units will be affected by an 
upgrade, determine where a unit is located, etc. The administrator thus really needs to know the 
type of unit, its name, its use, and where it's located (space frame number and name). Moreover, 
this information needs to be available and organized for the current application, by space, 
equipment type, etc. 
This information requirement suggests a supporting database to the NAT connectivity discovery 
tool. 
(Even greater benefit could be gained from information about which terminals I ports are actually 
connected and from a communication load model for connection. These latter data, while useful, 
require considerably more effort to enter and maintain. They are therefore left to a latter 
evaluation.) 
Adjunct Database 
Most COTS NATs contain an adjunct database for just the purpose described above. Such a 
database is called a Unit Locator and Purpose Database (ULPDB). 
The main challenge in creating and maintaining a database is to minimize the effort required and 
work the effort that is required into the normal procedures for network administration. The 
process used should minimize induced errors and the system should be tolerant of the few errors 
that are induced. 
The actual database format is usually dictated by the COTS NAT. The way in which the database 
is used, however, is up to the ship to describe. The following describes one way that a database 
maintenance process could be defined. 
Initially, all units have to be defined to the database. There is no substitute for this effort. Each 
unit is referenced by its MAC address. The MAC address for a unit is its reference and the item 
by which the database is indexed. Thus each unit's MAC address has to be determined. The best 
time to accomplish this is upon initial network installation. Beyond this time, there is little work-
around to determining the information unit by unit. Using a laptop to enter the information at the 
site of the unit, and then transferring it to the NAT computer later, could facilitate the process. 
(Even, better, the laptop can host the NAT so that the information is entered directly into the 
NAT.) 
After initial database setup, the process consists of maintaining the database as units enter or 
leave the ship. That process can be that the owner or installer of the unit checks with the 
network ground before installation I de-installation. At that time, the network administrator can 
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demand the required information. For units that attach to the network without "signing in", a 
query will show them attached and the network administrator can find them and complete the 
information. 
Since a sign-in of sorts is required for ADP security, the ULPDB can be updated in conjunction 
with ADP accounting so that the effort further integrated into the overall accounting required. 
Physical Connections And Audits 
The network administrator needs to perform queries on the database such as the following: 
What are all the units in space xx? 
What are all the units of type xx? 
What and where are the units associated with purpose xx? 
Another query important to the network administration is to find all MAC I IP addresses not listed 
in the ULPDB and the units, to which they are attached, possibly organized by connected unit 
location. The purpose of this query is to fmd units that have escaped the accounting process, find 
them, and enter their data if they are valid additions. 
Queries 
In order for the queries described above to work, the values of the parameters unit type, name, 
purpose, location number, and location name need to be consistent. The way to ensure value 
consistency is to provide a user interface for entering unit data that selects parameter values from 
lists (i.e., not by literal entry). The network administrator should maintain the list for each 
parameter 
Concept Validation 
FBE operations are very dependent on good network administration. In addition, it would be 
useful for FBEs to demonstrate the utility of a full NAT implementation in support of shipboard 
network administration. A NAT should be purchased and installed on a big deck ship involved in 
a future FBE. Full implementation of the NAT for FBE should be plarmed with the ship in time 
for the target FBE. The NAT should be used to automatically identify and illustrate the network 
configuration in support of FBE. 
This effort would simultaneously validate the network administration strategy and illustrate the 
utility of the NAT in support of a dynamically changing network environment. 
The ability to clearly define the network environment is a necessary first step to attacking the 
network bandwidth management challenge. 
Issues 
Most ships have multiple networks. There are multiple networks to support multiple security 
levels (unclassified, SECRET, and SCI). In addition, when a ship receives a new network (e.g., 
IT -21 ), it frequently retains preexisting networks. It is not clear that a single NAT can maintain 
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information on multiple networks. The SCI network is probably more stable in configuration and 
better administered simply because of the requirements at the higher security level. The most 
important network to administer is the SECRET network (usually connected off-ship via 
SIPRNET) because it is used for tactical purposes. (Although NIPRNET is occasionally used to 
support FBE, it's used as a convenience; the NIPRNET does not support tactical requirements.) 
Legacy networks are usually reserved for internal administrative purposes. Therefore, if only one 
network can be administered with a NAT, it should be the SECRET network. 
Summary 
Network performance is critically dependent on good administration. Network administration is 
dependent upon visibility into the network connectivity of the moment. COTS network 
administration tools exist which greatly facilitate network administration. One such tool, partially 
implemented on USS CORONADO, demonstrates its use in a shipboard environment. More 
complete implementation would materially improve configuration of shipboard networks for FBE 
and demonstrate the utility of full implementation for routine shipboard network administration. 
The next FBE should include complete implementation of a COTS NAT in support of operations. 
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Appendix D - Multicast over SIPRNET 
Network data collection and analysis for Fleet Battle Experiments (FBEs) have been supported 
since FBE-C. As the process of network data collection and analysis continues to be refined, 
additional information regarding system use of various shared Wide-Area Network (WAN) 
media, in particular, is uncovered. This appendix describes such information, which was 
uncovered as a by-product of continued analysis for FBE-D, TMDI-98, and FBE-E. As network 
data collection and analysis continues to be integral to the FBE process, information observed in 
earlier exercises can be analyzed with greater clarity and understanding, thus facilitating an 
increased understanding on the part of fleet network users and planners. 
This paper describes the results of network bandwidth utilization analysis associated with 
Dynamic Collaborative Planning (DCP) using COMPASS middleware in conjunction with 
various UNIX-based planner workstations (e.g., AFMSS, TAMPS, BMDO CAPS). 
Discussion 
DCP, by its very nature, employs a set of tools that necessitate protocols that differ from a typical 
file data transfer (e.g., email, FTP, HTTP). Internet Protocol (IP) file transfers typically employ 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCPIIP), which addresses each message to a specified recipient 
and processes acknowledgements. In the event of a failure to receive acknowledgment from the 
receiving node, the sender simply retransmits the "lost" packet. Thus TCPIIP is considered a 
"reliable" protocol. TCPIIP is well suited for the transfer of data files, where all data must be 
received exactly as sent. Portions of the file(s) lost in transit are merely retransmitted. 
Unfortunately, awaiting acknowledgment and re-transmitting messages does not support more 
time-critical traffic, such as "streamed" video and audio. 
Audio and video as all data destined for transmission via networks must be wrapped into network 
messages or packets with a maximum length based on the type of physical media employed. 
These types of transmissions involve continuous, real-time broadcast of the intended information 
and are thus not suited to the interruptions imposed through the use of acknowledgments and 
retransmission of data. Such data must be processed in the same timeframe and order it was sent 
or it is rendered unintelligible. Therefore, audio and video information is typically forwarded 
using an unacknowledged, ''unreliable" method, known as User-Datagram Protocol (UDPIIP). 
(Unreliable within this context indicates that since the packets are not acknowledged, their 
delivery cannot be guaranteed.) Moreover, within DCP sessions, one site typically intends to 
disseminate information to several sites simultaneously, thus necessitating some method of 
transmission to multiple addresses in real-time. COMPASS DCP also possesses the capability to 
provide real-time simulation and modeling in support of planning (e.g., casualty prediction 
assuming the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction [WMD]). Several nodes must also typically 
receive this information simultaneously for effective collaboration to take place. UDPIIP 
messages are typically addressed to a broadcast address, which allows them to be sent to several 
nodes simultaneously. This has the desirable effect of supporting DCP, however, would also 
impact other nodes on the network as the broadcast were propagated throughout the entire 
network. As nodes receive broadcast messages they attempt to "unpack" the message and 
process its content. This effort wastes processing for nodes receiving such data unintentionally 
(such nodes can be numerous, depending on the size of the network relative to the intended 
audience). Were such data to be addressed, the packets would need to be repeated for each 
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addressed node (thus increasing the related traffic by 1 *h, where his the number ofDCP hosts on 
the network). The theoretical impact of such addressing is illustrated in figure 1. This problem is 
addressed through an additional protocol known as Multicast. 
IP Tunneling of Multicast Packets on SIPRNET 
IP tunnels, while reliable, ostensibly create additional network traffic across SIPRNET. This 
occurs in a couple of ways. The process of applying IP-in-IP wrappers itself ostensibly creates 
additional traffic (additional headers are applied to packets actually sent across WAN media). 
While not generating an inordinately large amount of traffic, the use of additional encapsulation 
does impact bandwidth usage. More significant, however, is the use of multiple point-to-point 
connections to handle the "broadcast" of information to multiple hosts. Figure 3 provides a 
simplified illustration ofiP tunnels applied to SIPRNET. 
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SIPRNet Multicast .... ~r--_IP_M_u_l_ti_ca_s_t P_a_c_ke_t 
Router 
Tunnels are established to provide a 
path between Multicast routers. These 
connections effectively establish point 
to point connections enabling Multicast 
packets to traverse a non-Multicast 
network (e.g., SIPRNET). Each tunnel 
requires a copy of the multicast data. 
Figure 9. IP Tunnels Across SIPRNET 
On the surface, the use of tunnels might seem relatively innocuous, since SIPRNET is designed to 
handle high-bandwidth users. The problem, however, is not in employing multiple tunnels across 
SIPRNET, per se, but rather with the use of multiple hosts configured as "multicast routers" at 
individual sites. When this occurs, the results are very much akin to the replication of packets 
indicated in figure 1, where a separate stream of data must be forwarded to each host. 
Essentially, each packet is replicated at the multicast router host for each connected host. This 
traffic replication might cause one to wonder why tunnels were ever employed with multicast 
traffic, since they tend to obviate some of the advantages inherent in multicast protocols. The IP 
tunneling protocol was actually intended as a means by which multicast routers could forward 
between multicast backbone or "mbone" routers, for the purpose of transporting multicast 
efficiently between established multicast routers. SIPRNET, however, does not actually employ 
the established (and evidently expanding) mbone and as such needs to establish IP tunnels 
between all multicast hosts. 
The establishment of IP tunnels requires the entry of multicast routing information or "rnroutes" 
within each multicast host (mroutes can only be established on UNIX workstations). Assuming 
either the use of multiple multicast workstations on the same network or a multicast-configured 
router at the individual site, the multicast host can strip off the IP-in-IP headers and forward the 
multicast packets to other DCP stations within the confines of that site. If, however, a non-
multicast router exists between the two (or more) DCP stations, each one must be setup as a 
multicast router, which has the effect of increasing traffic on and off the ship by an ordinate 
amount, given multiple workstations. 
Since SIPRNET does not route multicast packets, individual connections must be established 
between all participating sites. On a "multicast subnet" with multiple sites, this would prove 
impractical. Therefore, a single site is typically selected to be the multicast router for the WAN. 
During recent FBE events (including TMDI-98), the SSC-SD MOSC router "greyhound" was 
148 
employed as the WAN multicast router. In this capacity, theW AN multicast router functions as a 
"relay site", or "hub" with IP-in-IP connections established to all other participating multicast 
sites. To SIPRNET, each transmission appears as a generic IP wrapper, with the content of the 
encapsulated traffic unknown. Upon its receipt by "greyhound", the wrapper is stripped off and 
repackaged for each ofthe other IP-in-IP connections. The impact of this method is that it 
increases traffic from the hub site by a substantial amount. This works relatively well in cases 
where each site has only one mroute host. As previously noted, however, the number of mroute 
stations at each site increases traffic by an ordinate amount. 
Another impact of using mroutes and IP-in-IP encapsulation within a DCP environment is that of 
the system setup. Mroutes must be properly configured for the environment in which the host 
will be participating. This information is typically set up within the appropriate UNIX 
directories. While it is relatively straightforward for most competent UNIX users, such users are 
not typically available within the shipboard environment. Given the potentially dynamic nature 
of such setup, ongoing support involving personnel other than ship's company may be required to 
ensure platforms are properly configured, regardless of their operating environment (e.g., ships in 
company, operating Area of Responsibility, etc.). 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Multicast via IP tunneling has generally proven adequate to support an exercise environment. To 
the extent that information systems prove reliable under more critical operating conditions, the 
use of this technique should support DCP. Observations to date, however, have indicated that its 
use of bandwidth is far from optimum. This should be addressed as follows: 
Ensure that all sites, comprised of multiple DCP workstations, are configured with only multicast 
routers between the mroute host and other workstations. Should workstations be located on 
separate LAN segments or subnets, then any router or switch between the nodes must be 
configured to support multicast. 
SIPRNET' s architecture does not allow for the use of multicast routers. DCP requirements 
should be presented to SIPRNET's governing body and a plan to modify and/or upgrade 
SIPRNET routers developed and implemented at the earliest possible date. Multicast protocols 
will be required for many future network applications, involving streamed video and audio and 
should be accommodated via either SIPRNET or other similar means as soon as practical. 
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Appendix E - Acronyms and Abbreviations 
Acronym Definition 
ADNS Automated Dioital Network System 
ADP Automated Data Processing 
AFMSS Air Force Mission Support System 
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare 
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Organization 
BW Bandwidth 
CAPS Commander's Analytic and Planning Simulation 
CBW Chemical and Biological Warfare 
COMPASS Common Operational Modeling, Planning and Simulation Strategy 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
COTS Commercial Off-the-Shelf 
CSEL Combat Systems Engineering Laboratory 
CTAPS Contingency Tactical Air Control System (TACS) Automated 
Planning System 
DCP Dynamic Collaborative Planning 
DIS Distributed Interactive Simulation 
EDP Electronic Data Processing 
ELB Extended Littoral Battlespace 
FBE-E Fleet Battle Experiment-Echo 
FDDI Fiber Distributed Data Interface 
FTP File Transfer Protocol 
GCCS Global Command and Control System 
HTML Hypertext Markup Language 
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
INMARSAT International Maritime Satellite 
IP Internet Protocol 
IP-in-IP IP Encapsulation for use with IP Tunnels 
ISO International Standards Organization 
IT Information Technology 
IT-21 Information Technology for the 21st Century 
JAOC Joint Air Operations Center 
JHU/APL Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Lab 
JMCIS Joint Maritime Command Information System 
JTW Joint Targeting Workstation 
Kbps Kilobits per second 
LAN Local Area Network 
LAWS Land Attack Warfare System 
MAC Machine Access Code 
MBC Maritime Battle Center 
Mb_QS Megabits per second 
METOC Meteorologic and Oceanographic 
MOSC Modeling & Simulation (M&S) Operations Support Cell 
MR Multicast Router 
MROUTE Multicast Route(r) 
MTF Message Text Format 
NAT Network Administration Tool 
NES Network Encryption System 
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Acronym Definition 
NFS Network File System 
NIC Network Interface Card 
NIPRNET Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network 
NIU Network Interface Unit 
OTCIXS Officer-in-Tactical Command Information Exchange System 
PDU Protocol Data Unit 
POP Post Office Protocol 
PST Portable Surface Terminal 
RTP Real Time Protocol 
SATCOM Satellite Communications 
SBBL Sea-Based Battle Lab 
SCI Sensitive Compartmentalized Information 
SHF Super High FreQuency 
SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Routed/Router Network 
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol 
SPA WAR Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
SSC-SD SPAWAR Systems Center, San Diego 
TADIXS Tactical Data Information Exchange Service/System 
TAMPS Tactical Aircraft/Automated Mission Planning System 
TCP Transmission Control Protocol 
TCP/IP Transmission Control ProtocoVIntemet Protocol 
TEMP MOD Temporary Modification 
TMD Theater Missile Defense 
TMDI Theater Missile Defense Initiative 
TRE Terminal Receive Equipment 
UDP User Datagram Protocol 
ULPDB Unit Locator and Purpose Database 
WAN Wide Area Network 
WeCAN Web Centric ASW Network 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
\1\foNN World Wide Web 
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